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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to study the position of the individual in 
international lawo The traditional viewpoint is that only states have rights and 
duties at the international levelo However 0 the modern exception is found in 
the doctrine of the law of human rightso After a theoretical 0 jurisprudential 
analysis of the position of the individual in the international arena 0 the work 
concentrates on the interaction of a traditional area of the law with a direct 
impact on individuals 0 namely extradition and the role human rights plays in 
this domaino Extradition is a key area where an examination of the individual 0 s 
position in the international arena can be testedo 
Within the law of extradition 0 the political offence to extradition forms 
an important (at least in theory) limitation to extraditiono However 0 with the 
increase in international violence which the perpetrators claim is justified by 
political motives 0 democratic states have enacted measures designed to limit 
the exceptiono Limitations which have been sought at both the national and 
international level 0 are analysed in detailo 
It has been put forward that these limitations augur ill for the protection 
of individual rights and libertyo Asylum for the political offender is a 
sensitive issue; the study of the concept of asylum and its relation to the law 
of human rights will form the concluding section of the worka 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this work is to study the relationship between the individual 
and international law" The traditional view of international law is that it 
regulates conduct between states only. Thus states were and, some authors still 
forcefully maintain, are the only subjects of international law. This essay 
will attempt to prove that the individual has been granted significant status in 
the domain of international law for the status of any particular legal person 
depends upon the rules of the legal system, which 0grants 0 or 0 confers 0 
personality. 
Attempts to limit the cruelty of war brought the individual into contact 
with international law. In the Hague Conventions of 1907 regarding warfare, 
many rules were in operation whose aim was to protect soldiers and civilians 
against unnecessary cruelty during war" The League of Nations and later the 
United Nations had as their primary purpose the prevention of war. But it was 
clear that to do so, other aspects of human society had to be taken care of" 
These include the respect for human life and dignity, economic and social 
conditions. With the creation of special organs and organisations to deal with 
these issues, individuals were brought into a limited amount of contact with 
international law. 
Chapter Two of the essay will analyse the various theories of the position 
of the individual in international law. Jurists of the Positivist School in 
international law insist that individuals are the objects of international law, 
whilst states alone are the subjects. But Naturalists think otherwise. The 
views of leading Natural lawyers such as Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht provide 
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powerful counter-arguments to positivist thoughto 
Chapter Three of the essay will consist of a study of some of the practice 
of LLctdi·tional international law with a direct imp~ct upon the interests of the 
individual, to see how these interests are protectedo The area of study will be 
extraditiono Extradition is one of the two areas which masts concerns the 
individual and his claim to recognition as a subject in international lawo The 
important safeguard which is invoked as proof of state recognition of the rights 
of individuals is the political offence exception to extradition incorporated in 
all extradition legislationo This trend commenced in the middle to late nine-
teenth century with Franceo France initiated the most important substantive 
treaty provision commonly contained in modern extradition treaties, namely, the 
exception of political offenders, the concept of specialityo These substantive 
provisions will be discussed in detailo One other important aspect to look at 
concerns the international minimum standard of state treatment of individuals 
and the development of human rights lawo In traditional international law, 
protection of individual interests was extended only to the treatment of alienso 
If a state committed a wrong against an individual who was an alien, the wrong 
was considered a wrong against the alien's state of nationalityo In other 
words, the duty not to deviate from the international minimum standard was owed 
to the state of nationalityo As such there was no protection for stateless 
persons or for nationals against mistreatment by their own stateo The events of 
World War Two showed the need for such protectiono Protection which is not 
dependent on the nationality or official status of the individual is afforded by 
the human rights principleso This •new law' of human rights will be studied and 
analysed in detailo It is worth noting that in order to emphasise the import-
tance of the issue it was decided that the measures to protect respect for human 
life and dignity were not left to the discretion of the individual stateso The 
work for the promotion of human rights has been allotted to various organs of 
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the international institutions such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the 
International Labour Organisation (LL.O.) These efforts to protect human life 
and welfare have the effect of bringing the individual into direct contact with 
international law. This is inevitable since the creation of international 
organs which deal with individuals must logically conceive of individuals as 
entities with a status, however limited, on the international plane. Mrs. 
Erica-Irene A. Daes, appointed as Special Rapporteur by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was given a mandate to 
undertake a study on the subject entitled "The status of the i ndi vi dual and 
contemporary international law".(l) She is of the opinion that international 
societies are collectivities composed of individuals; that international law is 
a legal order of the community of peoples of the "World Association of Men".(2) 
She correctly asserts that international law has changed qualitatively, 
especially after the Second World War; the most important change having taken 
place after the birth of international human rights law. She asserts that 
international law at the present time should be considered as a transitory 
period towards a new legal order in which the individual will be "called to play 
a more important role as a subject of international rights, responsibilities and 
duties".(3) "In particular, it is around the respect for the human person that 
new developments and tendencies join in order that the individual, regardless of 
his own nationality may be recognised as a person with rights, responsibilities 
and duties in international human rights law".(4) 
1. E/CN 4. Sub. 2/1984/29 26 June 1984 - The Commission on Human Rights Sub-
Commission on Prevention_ of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
XXVII Session. Item 15(a) of the provisional agenda. 
2. Ibid., p. 4, para. 13. 
3. Ibid., p. 4, para. 18. 
4. Ibid., p. 4, para. 19 
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The fact that such a study is taking place at the international level and 
with widespread co-operation from the various specialised agencies (such as the 
IoLoOoo UoNoEoSoCo0o 9 the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UoNo -the 
FoAo0o 9 the World Health Organisation - WoHoOo) only emphasises the importance 
of the topico The essay will conclude with a discussion of what actual state 
practice perceives the position of the individual to beo Some suggestions will 
be put forward with regard to areas where improvements can be madeo 
CHAPTER TWO 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Jurisprudential writing on the position of the individual in international 
law concerns itself with the question 0 "is the individual a subject of inter-
national law?" Two schools of thought dominate the discussion: the first school 0 
the positivist school (1) can be divided into two classesa The traditional 
positivist view insists that only states and never individuals are subjects of 
international lawa More modern positivists adopt the view that individuals could 
in principle be subjects of international law, but no existing rule of inter-
national law renders him the subject of rights and dutiesa The second school of 
thought can also be divided into two categoriesa Traditional natural lawyers (2) 
believe that only physical persons are the subjects of law and therefore only 
individuals and never states are and can be the subjects of international lawa 
But the more middle of the road naturalist adopts the view that although states 
have been regarded as the traditional subject of international law 0 individuals 
have, in an increasing number of cases achieved recognition as subjects of 
international lawa 
As a starting point to the discussion reference must be made to the works of 
la Go Schwarzenberger, International Law Vola I (3rd eda) (1957) London; A 
Manual of International Law (5th eda) (1967) London; Do Anzilotti 0 Cours de 
Droit International (1929) Paris; To Gihl, Folkratt under Fred (1956) 
Stockholm; Mo Siotto-Pintor, Recueil des Cours 41 (1932 III); Go Sperduti, 
L 0 individu et le Droit International 90 (1956 II) 
2a Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd eda) (1966) New York; 
Alfred Verdross, Volkerrecht (1959) Vienna; Lauterpacht, International Law 
and Human Rights (1950) London; "The Subjects of the Law of Nations" (1947) 
63 LaQaRo, PPo 443-460; Po Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International Public 
T I-II (1953-54) Geneva; C.Aa Norgaard, The Position of the Individual in 
International Law (1962) Copenhagena 
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Grotius and in particular his work entitled De Jure Belli ac Pacis.(3) Grotius 
believed that relations between states were governed by law; and the law of 
nature was a source for supplementing the voluntary law of nations and in judging 
its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason. He conceived that the will of 
states could not be the exclusive or decisive source of the law of nations. A 
persistent theme of Grotius 0 s treatise is that of morality and rationality as the 
foundation of law and this is extended to the conduct of nations and rulers 
acting on behalf of individuals. Grotius maintained that there was a close 
analogy between the legal and moral rules governing the conduct of states and 
individuals alike. He saw states as composed of individual human beings; "Behind 
the mystical 0 impersonal metaphysical state there are actual subjects of rights 
and duties. namely individual human being".(4) Therefore the individual is 
conceived as the limit of all law 0 international and municipal. in the sense that 
the obligations of international law are ultimately addressed to him. The 
development. the well-being and the dignity of the individual are a matter of 
direct concern to international law. 
From this starting point 0 members of the monist school of jurisprudence have 
continued the tradition. Natural lawyers insist that individuals and states are 
subjects of international law. Among the supporters of this philosophy are to be 
found Professor Hans Kelsen (5), Professor Alfred Verdross (6), Professor Paul 
3. Books I-III (1625). An excellent analysis of the works of Hugo Grotius is 
found in a study by Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in (1946) XXIII B.Y.I.L., 
Po lo 
4. De Jure Belli ac Pacis Book II, Ch.XV and XII 1. See also (1946) XXIII 
B.Y.I.L. 0 p. 27. 
6. Op.cit •• supra. N.2. 
7 
Guggenheim (7) and Judge Sir HeT':;Sch Ls'll.terpachto(8) In describing 
the position of the individual IJau terpacht employs the concepts 
11 subjects of rightsn ( 9) 9 "subjects of duti es 11 ( 10) and 11 procedural 
capacity." (11) The individual is a subject of duties under inter-
nat:tonal law vr-hen international law directly (vdthout recourse to 
state legislation) imposes duties upon the individual not acting as 
an organ or on behalf of his state 9 and the duties can be enforced 
on him before a court 9 either international or~ in cases where 
national courts according to the monist conception of the author 
directly apply international law ~ a national court. Where he 
refers to "subject of rights" under international law Lauterpacht 
means the beneficiary of an international rulA, the person whose 
interests are directly fixed and protected by international law. 
He believes that international law may confer rights directly upon 
individuals and illustrates this assertion by reference to the 
Advisory Opinion concerning the Jurisdiction of the Court of 
Danzig.(12) Here he held that although in principle a treaty 
cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private 
7. Op.cit. 9 supra. N.2. 
8. Op.cit. 9 supra. N.2. 
9. Lauterpacht 9 International Law and Human Rights (1958), p. 38. 
10. Ibid. 9 P• 38. 
11. Ibid. 9 p. 38. Also Lauterpacht 9 International Law Collected 
Papers Vol. I 9 pp. 141~143. 
12. P.C.I.J. (1928) Series B No. 15 9 pp. 17~18. 
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individuals, "the very object of an international agreement, according to the 
intentions of the contracting parties, may be adoption by the parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by 
national courts".(13) The Court rejected the view that as the provisions of a 
treaty adopted in favour of Danzig railway officials had not been incorporated in 
Polish law, those officials had no enforceable rights of action. 
Norgaard (14), although an ardent supporter of the view that the individual 
is a subject in international law, does not accept that the quotation from the 
case proves anything. He does not accept that the Opinion can be construed so as 
to mean that the individual is a subject of international law. He accepts that 
the view expressed by the court marks an important step in the evolution of the 
position of the individual in international law, because the court for the first 
time explicitly states that the individual can have rights and duties under 
international law. But, he maintains. the Opinion does not prove that a person 
possessing rights under international law, but not endowed with procedural 
capacity in any form on the international plane, is nevertheless to be considered 
a subject of international law. But there are instances where individuals have 
been provided with procedural capacity to invoke an international tribunal. This 
power has been furnished by certain treaties. In 1907 five Central American 
states signed a convention for the establishment of the Central American Court of 
Justice. Article 2 of the Convention provided that the Court should take notice 
of the questions which any individual of one of the Central American countries 
raised against any of the other contracting governments, due to the violation of 
treaties or conventions, and any other cases of an international character, even 
13. Ibid., p. 17. 
14. C. Norgaard 0 The Position of the Individual in International Law (1962) 
Copenhagen. p. 49. 
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if their own government supported the claim or not. Another example of rights of 
individuals under international law is provided by the Germane-Polish Convention 
regarding Upper Silesia 0 signed at Geneva on May 15 1922. Article 5 permitted 
private persons to bring a suit before an international court against the state 
which had violated certain interests of these individuals protected by the 
Convention. Because the interested parties were 0 in this case 0 private persons 0 
the Convention attributed rights to individuals as private persons by conferring 
on them the power to appeal to an international tribunal even against their own 
state. In Steiner v. Gross (15) a Polish and a Czechoslovak citizen brought 
action against the Polish state before the Upper Silesian Arbit~lTribunal on the 
basis of the German-Polish Convention of May 15 1922. The Polish government 
argued that the Convention did not give the Polish national a right of action 
against the Polish state~ that it was a general principle of international law 
that an individual could not invoke an international authority against his own 
state. The tribunal rejected this contention stating that the Convention con-
ferred in unequivocal terms jurisdiction upon the tribunal irrespective of the 
nationality of the claimants. The guiding principle of Article 5 was the respect 
of private rights and the preservation of the economic unity of Upper Silesia 0 
and thus no one of these considerations was compatible with the exclusion of any 
category of claims for the sole reason of the nationality of the claimant. 
Steiner v. Gross goes further than the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig 
Advisory Opinion for the individual in the former case 0 could point to a specific 
authority entitling him with the power to invoke an international tribunal. 
Lauterpacht maintains that there is nothing in the structure of international law 
that prevents the individual from becoming a subject of proceedings. In this 
connection he suggests as a natural consequence of the development of 
15. ( 1927-28) Ann. Dig. 4 (No. 988). 
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interna·tiondl law a change of Article 34 ( 16) Statute of the International Court 
of Justice to read as follows: "The Court shall have jurisdictiona 1. In disputes 
between states, 2. In disputes between states and private and public bodies or 
private individuals in cases in which states have consented in advance or by 
special agreement. to appear as defendants before the Court". Lauterpacht 0 s 
train of thought is powerfully influenced by his monist point of view. Monist 
thinking asserts that national and international law are both part of the same 
legal order and international law can, without any specific transformation, be 
directly applied by a national court. The individual may therefore be considered 
a subject of international law if he is a party to a case decided by a national 
court by applying international law. 
"Now the principle that international law is 0 without an express act of 
transformation part of municipal law means in effect that rights and duties 
created by international law are directly applicable through the instrumentality 
of municipal courts and that 0 to that extent, individuals are subjects of the 
law of nations".(l7) 
In Trendex v. Nigerian Central Bank (18) Lord Denning and his colleagues 
in the Court of Appeal found that 0 the Central Bank having acted commercially and 
not for a state purpose 0 it could not as an arm of the government claim immunity 
in personam in respect of a failure to meet commercial letters of credit. This 
shows that if the courts are now prepared to look at the nature of the trans-
action engaged in and not at the status of the foreign state trading company, 
16. Article 34 Statute of I.C.J. reads: "(1) Only States may be parties in cases 
before the Court". 
17. H. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations (1947) Vol. 63 L.Q.R., 
p. 443. 
18. (1977) 2 W.L.R., p. 356. 
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the individual will be greatly protected in that his international corr~ercial 
transactions will be subject to the process of lawo 
Du.J.licm or the dualist school of thought maintains that nati_nn.3.l ann i ntpr-
national law are two separate legal orderso International law is never applied 
directly by national courts, but must be transformed in one way or another to 
national law before it can be applied by national organso If a national court 
relies on the transformation of the international rule by a domestic rule, it is 
this latter which gives the individual his rights and it is not necessary to 
regard him as having any rights in international law in order to give him his 
remedyo The monist position has in recent times been associated with Kelseno(19) 
Kelsen 1 s view is that the rules of international law laying down duties, 
responsibilities and rights, can have only human conduct in viewa The 
individuals are the final subjects of international law, but in most cases they 
are subjects in a specific way because international law frequently leaves to 
national law to decide who are the subjects of international lawo(20) In rare 
cases, however, international law directly states who are the individual 
subjects, and the individuals in these cases are direct subjects of international 
lawa(21) Kelsen breaks down the concept "subjects of law" into the three groups, 
"subjects of duties" 0 "subject of responsibility" and "subject of rights"a 
According to him, a person is a subject of law when he possesses one or more of 
these qualitieso According to Kelsen, a subject of duties is a person whose 
conduct is regulated by a legal norm in such a way that the person is obliged 
to refrain from acting contrary to ita A subject of responsibility is the 
person against whom the court directs a sanction in case of a behaviour contrary 
19o Ha Kelsen 0 Principles of International Law (2nd edo) (1966) New Yorko 
20a Ha Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd edo) (1966), Po 195a 
21o Ibidao PPo 212 and 221a 
- 12 -
to the norm stipulating the duty. The subjecl uf uuties and the subject of 
responsibility is often the same person 0 but not necessarily so 0 and the two 
concepts must be distinguished. A subject of rights is a person who has the 
legal possibility of instituting a lawsuit in order to enforce the legal duty of 
another person. So for Kelsen 0 a person is a subject of duties under inter-
national law if his conduct is regulated by international law 0 a subject of 
responsibility under international law if the rules of international law 
establish individual responsibility "by directing sanctions exclusively against 
the immediate delinquent or against another physical person individually and 
directly determined by international law"(22); and a subject of rights under 
international law if he can appear before an international court as plaintiff. 
As far as Alfred Verdross is concerned. in order to consider the individual 
a subject of rights within the international law arena, he or she must have 
capacity to assert his right before an international court; the capacity to make 
petitions to an international organ is not sufficient.(23) But as regards being 
a subject of duties Verdross states that the individual has this position only if 
he directly. on the basis of international law. can be held responsible for his 
conduct.(24) Professor Guggenheim states that in order to recognise the 
individual as a direct subject in international law, the individual either can be 
held responsible before an international court or can enforce his rights inter-
nationally - either as plaintiff before an international court or by petition 
directly to an international organ.(25) All four leading natural rights 
22. H. Kelsen, op.cit., supra. N. 20, p. 195. 
23. A. Verdross, op.cit., supra. N. 2, pp. 159-160. For reference to the 
works of A. Verdross, see c. Norgaard. op.cit., supra. N. 2, pp. 44-46. 
24. Ibid., pp. 157-158. 
25. P. Guggenheim. Traite de droit internationale public (1953-54) (Geneva), 
pp. 171-210. For reference to the works of P. Guggenheim 0 see C. Norgaard, 
op.cit •• supra. N. 2 0 pp • 53-57. 
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proponents claim thdt the individual must either be a subject of rights or a 
subject of duties under international law in order to be characterised as subject 
of international lawo But there is a divergence of opinion when the question of 
responsibility and the capacity to enforce the rights is debatedo Lauterpacht 
does not claim any procedural capacity vested in the individual in order to 
recognise him as a subject of international lawo It is sufficient that a rule of 
international law confers a right on the individual even if the individual is not 
furnished with any capacity to enforce his right before a court by his own 
actiono Kelsen and Verdross set higher 0 more rigorous standardso They both 
require that the individual must be a subject of proceedings before an inter-
national court in order to be considered a subject of international law where 
"rights" are concernedo Thus the question must inevitably be asked 0 if the 
prospect of judicial enforcement before an international tribunal is the matrix 
of international personality and since all international judicial proceedings are 
established by treaty 0 perhaps Kelsen and Verdross lean towards the positivismo 
The most one can say is that Lauterpacht belongs to the "traditional" natural law 
school whereas Kelsen and Verdross can be viewed as merely natural lawyers who 
wish to see the jurisprudential debate of law as it is and law as it ought to be 
kept close to the legal ought rather than the moral oughto 
Before considering the alternative view as stated by the positivist school of 
thought 0 reference must be made to the work of Norgaardo(26) He believes that 
the disagreement in the doctrine of international law as to the position of the 
individual results from the fact that many authors do not make clear what they 
understand by a subject of lawo "It is a decisive prerequisite for development 
and lucidity in the theory of international law that several concepts of inter-
national law are distinguished into their constituent elements and thereupon in 
26o Co Norgaard 0 opocitoo suprao No 14o 
- 14 -
an empirical investigation,are confronted with the legal reality".(27) 
I 
Norgaard considers that in describing the position of the individual in 
international lawu the most appropriate point of departure is to be found in the 
basic conceptual analysis undertaken by Alf Ross.(28) Ross was of the opinion 
that the concept of subject of law ought to be disintegrated into constituent 
elements, subject of rights and subject of duties because a subject of law is not 
necessarily both a subject of rights and of duties. The concept of subject of 
rightsu in its turn, is reduced into subject of interests and subject of 
proceedings. Correspondingly. the concept of subject of duties is disintegrated 
into subject of conduct and subject of responsibility. A subject of interests 
under a legal rule is a person for whose benefit the rule exists, i.e., a person 
who has a substantive right under the legal rule notwithstanding the problem 
whether the person himself has any legal capacity to take action by which to 
enforce his substantive right or whether such action can only be taken by 
another, in international law. normally his state. A subject of proceeding is a 
person who can bring a claim as a case before a tribunal. A subject of rights is 
a person who is both a subject of interests and of proceedings. A subject of 
conduct is a person of whom a legal rule requires a certain conductu i.e., a 
person who has a material duty under the legal rule irrespective of the problem 
whether he personally can be held responsible for violating it or whether only 
another. in international law normally his state, can be held responsible. A 
subject of responsibility is a person who can be sued and held responsible 
before a tribunal. Norgaard stresses that in order to describe the position of 
the individual in international law, a division of the concept of subject of law 
as outlined above is necessary. Norgaard is convinced of the natural law 
27. C. Norgaard, op.cit. 0 supra. N. 14 0 p. 27. 
28. Alf Ross, A Textbook on International Law (1947) (London). 
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proposition that the individuals along with states 0 are subjects in international 
law. And he believes that the main weakness of the positivist view regarding the 
position of the individual is that it does not distinguish between the possession 
of rights and duties and the procedural capacity to be sued or be sued on them. 
Norgaard invokes the dictum of the permanent Court of International Justice in 
1933. "It is scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil 
rights does not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights one-
self" (29) and asserts that access to the International Court 0 as to the 
Permanent Court before it, is barred to the individual. But he may assert his 
claim through his national government. Professor R. Higgins (30) disagrees with 
Norgaard 0 s assumption that there is something "fixed and immutable" in the non-
access of individuals to the International Court. "Power 0 to be sure 8 still 
rests to a substantial degree with sovereign states; and it is within their power 
to block the access of the individual to certain international tribunals and to 
continue to assert the old rule of nationality of claims 0 but the very notion of 
international law is not predicated on this assumption and the international 
legal system survives conceptually even were this to change".(31) 
The positivist school of thought is led by such eminent jurists as Dionisio 
Anzilotti 0 G. Schwarzenberger and Torsten Gihl1 Schwarzenberger does not object 
in principle to the individual being a direct bearer of rights and procedural 
capacity and of duties and responsibility under international law; but he main-
tains that no existing rule of international law provides as such. The 
individual is thus merely an object of the law.(32) Anzilotti for his part 
29. Series A/B No. 61 0 p. 231. 
30. R. Higgins, (1978) 4 B.J.I.S. p •. L 
31. R. Higgins, op.cit., supra. N. 30 0 p. 4. 
32. G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (5th ed.) (1967) Londono 
Po 52o 
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maintains that the rules of international law which seem to impose duties and 
responsibilities on individuals. in reality only means that the state will 
suppress and/or punish certain acts of individuals. Where no national rule 
forbids the act of the individual 0 he is under no duty and responsibility and 
cannot be punished for committing the act in question.(33) Gihl is a rigid 
exponent of the positivist view point. He asserts that though states may permit 
an individual to bring a claim based upon international law before an inter-
national tribunal. it is not the individual 0 s own claim but rather the claim of 
the state to which the individual belongs. Individuals do not have this capacity 
on the basis of international law (i.e. 6 not in the capacity of being subjects of 
international law) but only based upon the agreement between the states.(34) 
Sperduti maintains that the rules of international law which deal with the 
interests of the individuals do not address themselves to the individuals but to 
states having jurisdiction over the individuals in question.(35) But he proceeds 
to disagree with the view that the individual is the object of international law. 
The individual 0 s status is intermediary, he contends and. using the concept 
"material subject"o (the concept "material subject" covers the individual as one 
designated subject of rights and/or subject of duties) he alleges that the 
individuals in most cases are material subjects of international law. 
Importantly however, Sperduti disagrees with the fundamental dualist proposition 
that the individual cannot be a subject of international law and, therefore, 
cannot have access to international courts. He correctly points to the Central 
33. D. Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International (1929) (Paris), p. 134. For 
references to the works of D. Anzilotti, see c. Norgaard, op.cit., supra. 
N. 2, pp. 35-36. 
For references to the works of T. Gihl and 
op.cit •• supra. N. 2, pp. 37-38 and 38-39. 
Fred (1956) (Stockholm), p. 31 et seq. 
Sperduti 0 see C. Norgaard, 
T. Gihl 0 Folkratt Under 
35. G. Sperduti 0 L 0 individuo nel diritto internazionale and L 0 individu et le 
Droit International Ret. t. 90 (1956 II) 0 p. 788. 
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Amercian Court which existed from 1907-1917 where the individual had a direct 
access to an international court. But. he continues. since this is the only time 
when the individual has had the said capacity. "the individual cannot today be 
recognised as a subject of international law in the strict sense".(36) 
Having canvassed both sides of the argument, the arguments of one important 
author who is strictly speaking a natural lawyer. needs to be mentioned. 
R. Higgins (37) suggests that it is not useful to "rely on the subject-object 
dichotomy". She maintains that it is "closer to perceived reality" to return to 
the view of international law as a particular decision-making process". Within 
that process there are a variety of participants making claims across state 
lines. with the object of maximising various values. These values will relate, 
among other things. to power. wealthu prestige and nations of vindication and 
justice. The participants will promote their claims by a variety of techniques. 
ranging from force to diplomacy and public persuasion and a variety of decision-
makers, international arbitration tribunals, or courts. will pronounce author-
itatively upon these claims. In this model there are no "subjects" and "objects" 
but only participants. "Individuals are participants along with governments. 
international institutions and private groups". She asserts that the interests 
of individuals lie in the direction of protection from the physical excesses of 
others, in their personal treatment abroad, in the protection abroad of their 
property interests; and such topics as the minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens, the growth of the human rights movement "are not simply exceptions 
conceded by historical chance within a system of rules that operates as between 
states. Rather they are simply part and parcel of the fabric of international 
law, representing the claims that are naturally made by individual participants 
36. G. Sperduti, op.cit. 0 supra. N. 1 0 p. 789. See c. Norgaard, p. 39. 
37. R. Higgins, op.cit •• supra. N. 30, p. 5. 
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in contradistinction to state-participants"o(38) She goc~ on to argue that 
individuals are now able to pursue claims if they have grievances about an 
identified set of human rights, in the Council of Europe countries, initially in 
the European Commission of Human Rights (39) and perhaps ultimately in the 
Strasbourg Court of Human Rightso Thus access of individuals to international 
forums is becoming a reality. although access to the International Court by 
individuals is still blockedo Professor Higgins refers to the notion of 
nationality of claims and the fact that particular tribunals are not available to 
the individualo She argues that although Articles 35 and 65 of the Statute of 
the International Court allow only states and international organs to obtain 
judgments and advisory opinions respectively. this does not mean that the court 
has no interest in "for example 0 the expropriation of property or human rights"o 
She maintains that the assumption is that the state will bring the action on 
behalf of its nationala However she realistically points out that governments 
will not disturb good relations with other states and in such a situation the 
individual has no means of compelling his government to take up his claima "The 
nationality of claims rule can thus militate unjustly so far as the individual is 
concerned and there are powerful arguments for giving him access - through a 
revision of its Statute - to the International Court or perhaps to a special 
chamber of that Court"o(40) An important study on the question of nationality of 
claims and human rights has been carried out by certain authorso(41) The aim of 
the study was to observe the concept of "nationality" and all the ancillary rules 
about the conferrment and withdrawal of nationality and "to see how these are 
39a The individual has no right of access to the European Court of Human Rights, 
Article 31o 
40a Ro Higgins, opocito, supraa No 30 0 Pa 7o 
41a Myres So McDougal, Ho Lasswell, La Chen, "Nationality and Human Rights: The 
Protection of the Individual in External Arenas" (1973-74) 83 YoLaJa 900o 
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managed in the allocation of competence among territorial communities to protect 
human beings against deprivations by other territorial communities and in 
determinations of what states are authorised to impose what burdens upon individ-
uals in different value processes"o The study was focused upon the allocation of 
competence to protect individuals and the decisions which most directly affected 
the allocation. "Given a decentralised world arena in which nation-states are 
still the principal official participants. if the individual human being does not 
have some state as a protector, the larger community aspiration for human rights 
is meaningless. The possible value deprivations to which such a person may be 
subjected are severe and all-encompassing; he has little or no access to 
authoritative decision. on either national or international levels".(42) 
McDougal et al assert that despite movement toward human rights standards in the 
laws concerning conferrment and withdrawal of nationality. the individual ought 
to be vested with the authority of self-protection. They argue that the 
substantive human rights prescriptions can never be made effective if the 
individual has no competence to invoke them in appropriate conditionso As such 
therefore, the individual should be made a full subject of international law. 
with access to all arenas. both international and nationalo They also recommend 
that much greater effect be given. in the laws permitted by international law for 
the conferrment or withdrawal of nationality, to the free choice of the individual 
in associating himself himself with a state. And to accord the individual 
freedom of choice among potential state protectors would be an important move in 
this direction. They conclude with the words. "the time has come to make the law 
of nationality defend and fulfil the human rights of the individual"o(43) 
Essentially McDougal is a natural lawyero His views reflect the domain of law as 
it ~ to beoD.P. O'Connell (44) asserts that the individual being the end of a 
42o Ibido 
43. McDougal et al 0 op.cit •• suprao No 41 0 Po 998o 
44. D.P. 0°Connellu International Law (2nd edo) (1960) 0 p. 108. 
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community 0 is a member of the community 0 and a member is furnished with stat_us. 
Therefore he cannot be an objecta He argues that theory and practice establish 
that the individual has legally protected interests 0 can enjoy rights and be the 
subject of duties under municipal law deriving from international law3 and if 
personality is no more than a sum of capacities 0 then he is a person in 
international law. though his capacities may be different from and less in number 
and substance than the capacities of states"a(45) 0°Connell argues that much of 
the difficulty that international lawyers have experienced on this topic has 
arisen from the assumption that if the rights are vested directly in the 
individual there must be duplication of them in the national statea "There seems 
to be nothing juristically contradictory in the idea that the national state is 
empowered to act for protection of its nationals 0 rights; failure or refusal to 
act merely means that the available machinery for protection has not operated, 
and lack of machinery has never been taken to be lack of substantive law"o(46) 
Professor Brownlie (47) suggests, like Roo Higgins, that to say the 
individual is, or is not. a "subject" of international law is "in either case, to 
say too much and to beg a great many questions"a(48) He suggests that it would 
be more helpful if writers were to "advert to the precise difficulties involved 
in giving procedural capacity to individuals before international tribunals"a 
He asserts that political factors are the major inhibiting factoro But he does 
share the views of writers on the subject on the need to reinforce the protection 
of human rightso 
45o Do Po 0°Connell, OPoCitot suprao No 43, Po lOBo 
46o Do Po 0°Connell, OPoCitoo supra a No 43 0 Po 109o 
47o Io Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law ( 3rd edo) (1979). 
Po 577o 
48o Ibidog Po 577o 
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In conr.luR.ion, one has to admit that there are powerful arguments on both 
sides to justify the conclusions the various scholars promote. But one major 
flaw in the argument of the positivist is their refusal to acceptu with the 
advent of international recognition of human rightsu that the individual has been 
vested with rights which he can point to as being embodied within the inter-
national legal framework and from which he can seek protection by approaching 
certain international tribunals.(49) Although the framework of human rights is 
still being strengthened and various qualifications and reservations present 
obstacles to the individual 6 they are nevertheless a set of rights which the 
individual possesses in international law. As such therefore the strict 
delimitation of states alone being subjects of international law is challenged 6 
since these human/individual rights demand of the states specific consideration 
and care in their treatment of nationals. Any breach may result in international 
determination of the breach. However, there are areas where the individual still 
has a long way to go in order to achieve the status of being an unchallenged 
subject of international law. The nationality of claims rule means that the 
individual is dependent on his state to pursue an action on his behalf. And it 
is in this area that Professor Higgins and McDougal insist that the most 
fundamental changes be made on behalf of the individual. 
49. The European Commission on Human Rights and at the world level 6 The Human 
Rights Commission. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 
Brief Introduction 
The previous chapter concerned the theoretical analysis of the individual in 
international lawo In this chapter we will look at the inter-relation of a long-
established area of the law which has a direct impact on the individualo The 
actual practice is the yardstick to measure the theoretical explanationso Extra-
dition is a state right and the exercise of this act by a state provides an 
opportunity to analyse state perceptions of the power of the individual. when 
exercising his right. to challenge any breach which is detrimental to the 
individualo Extradition has been defined as "the surrender by a state of a 
fugitive alleged or convicted criminal from another state 0 following a request by 
the latter for his surrender"o(l) In addition to this definition. one must add 
that the surrender is for the purpose of trying the fugitive or returning him to 
custodyo 
Extradition has also been described as "the formal surrender based upon 
reciprocating arrangements by one nation to another of an individual accused or 
convicted of an offence outside its own territory and within the jurisdiction of 
the other which 0 being competent to try and punish him 0 demands the 
surrender"o(2) 
Extradition will not be looked at in its entiretyo The study will concen-
trate on the Anglo-Irish side of the issue 0 but where necessary references will 
lo VoEo Hartley-Booth 6 British Extradition Law and Procedure (1981) 6 Po Lla 
2o Terlinden Vo Ames 184 UoSo 270 0 289 (1902) 0 
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be made to tho United States of America and European practiceo Any arguments put 
forward or conclusions reached 0 are tentative 0 but due to the material studied 
one can reach certain conclusions with some confidenceo 
Both definitions assume that the requested state has the power under its own 
law to deal with a person found within its jurisdiction by "surrendering" him to 
another state for a crime he committed or is alleged to have committed outside 
its jurisdiction; and that there exists reciprocal arrangements which have been 
formally securedo(3) There are different views as to the basis for the surrender 
by a requested state of a fugitive criminal to a requesting stateo Some authors 
take the view that it is an international duty, others perceive it as an act of 
international comity or goodwillo The United Kingdom view appears to be that 
extradition is a matter of international comityo In support of this contentionu 
authors cite the case of The Creole in 1842 (4) where the slave cargo of a United 
States vessel rose against the masteru murdered a passenger and sought refuge in 
the Bahamaso The law officers statedu "It is the practice of some states to 
deliver up persons charged with crimes who have taken refuge 8 or been found 
within their domains 0 on demand of the government of which the alleged criminals 
are subjects but such practice does not prevail universally 0 nor is ther any rule 
of the law of nations rendering it imperative on an independent state to give up 
persons residing or taking refuge within its territory"o(S) The founders of 
international law, among them Grotius 0 took the view that a legal duty to 
surrender criminals existedo Grotius believed that the state of refuge should 
punish the criminal or hand him back to the state seeking his returno(6) Vattel 
3o See article by Rezek in BoYoioLo (1982) LII 0 Po 171o 
4o 6 BoDoioLo VOlo 6u Cho 17u Po 456o 
So Ibido q Po 456o 
6o Grotiusu De Jure Belli ac Pacis 0 Bko IIu Co 21, paraso 3-4o 
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also considered extradition to be a clAar legal duty" at least in the case of 
serious crimes and between states on terms of amity"o(7) The opponents consider 
extradition 0 as already stated 0 simply as a matter of imperfect obligation only 0 
which was required to be confirmed and regulated by special compact in order to 
secure the force of international lawo Common law countries do not extradite in 
the absence of a treaty" The United States law requires the existence of a 
"treaty or convention for extradition"(8) 0 while in Great Britain 0 the extra-
dition legislation only applies "where an arrangement has been made with any 
foreign state"o(9) However the intra-Commonwealth scheme does not depend on 
treaties nor does rendition between the United Kingdom and Irelanda Most of the 
states of the Commonwealth are similarly inhibited by their laws from extraditing 
in the absence of a treaty" Canadian extradition legislation contains a 
provision permitting extradition without treaty but the provision has never been 
brought into forcea(10) It is suggested that the effective beginnings of modern 
international co-operation in the suppression of crime lie in the eighteenth 
centuryo In traditional international law0 there is no duty to extradite" A 
state can enter into treaty relationship with another state which creates an 
obligation to extraditeo The treaty invariably contains provisions which protect 
the individual 0 s interests 0 for example 8 the non-extradition of political 
offenders 8 or those that protect the state rights 6 such as the refusal to return 
nationals of the requested stateo But the individual cannot rely on these 
protections at the international levelo The protections are only relevant in so 
far as they can be invoked at domestic level" "A state may limit its freedom 
7a Vattel 0 Le Droit des Gens 0 Bko II 0 Co 6 8 paras" 76-77o 
8o 18 UoSoCo 3184 (1964 edo) and Valentine Vo United States exo relo 
Neidecker 299 UoSa 5 8 9 (1936)" 
9a 33 and 34 Victo Co 52 Sa 2 (1870)" 
10o RaSoCo 1952 Co 322 0 Part IIo 
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under its own national law to extradite certain porsons 0 [but] rules of 
national law should not be confused with rules of international law".(ll) Thus 0 
even if the individual is permitted to enjoy a right under the municipal law of a 
state not to be extradited for a political offence 0 this provision in an extra-
dition treaty is not generally construed as conferring rights on the individual 
under international law. Certain measures have become prevalent in attempts to 
by-pass lawful extradition. 
Part I will consist of an analysis of irregular extradition with its 
specific impact on the individual. Part II will consist of a review of domestic 0 
i.e., United Kingdom extradition law with reference to the political offence 
exception 0 the most important principle which an individual may invoke in 
proceedings concerning his extradition. 
In Part III we will look at the Political Offence exception 
in the international le~al arena. 
11. A.M. Connelly 0 "Non-extradition for Political Offenders; A Matter of Legal 
Obligation or Simply a Policy Choice?" (1982) IoJo 0 Po 59 at Po 66o 
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Part I Irregular Extradition 
In addition to extradition according to treaties and the municipal laws of 
the two states 0 an individual may be returned to the state where he is alleged to 
or has committed a crime in other ways. There may be violations of the municipal 
law of either state in which case his remedy 0 if any 0 would be in the domestic 
law. But the return may be achieved in violation of the extradition treaty 
(where there is one) or in violation of some other rule of international law. 
The question then arises whether the individual may rely on such a violation as a 
bar to the jurisdiction of the courts of the requested state. While this prop-
osition can often be tested only to the extent that the courts can rely on 
international law0 an examination of the practice shows that domestic courts are 
extremely reluctant to concede that an individual has any rights as a result of 
the violation of international law. 
As far as English law is concerned it has been established since the nine-
teenth century that the court has no power to inquire into the circumstances in 
which a person is found in the jurisdiction for the purpose of refusing to try 
him.(12) The earliest case to lay down this precedent was ex p. Susannah Scott 
(1829).(13) Scott was arrested in Brussels by an English officer 0 to whom the 
warrant for arrest on a charge of perjury was specially directed. Scott applied 
to the British ambassador who refused to interfere and she was brought into 
custody against her will to England where she was tried. On her behalf it was 
argued that the courts of England had no jurisdiction to try her because of the 
improper manner in which she had been brought into the jurisdiction. Lord 
12. Dr. 0°Higgins 0 "Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition" (1960) 36 
B.Y.IoLa 279. 
13o 9 B and C 446; 109 EoRo 166o 
- 27 -
Tenterden CoJo stated: "I thought and still continue to think that we cannot 
inquire into the manner in which she was brought within the jurisdictiono If the 
acts complained of were done against the law of a foreign country 0 that country 
might have vindicated its own lawo If it gave her a right of action 0 she may sue 
upon it"o It was not clear if the Belgian authorities agreed to the arresta The 
judge only concerned himself with the question of illegality under municipal lawo 
There was no consideration of breach of international law on the jurisdiction of 
the courto The case was not concerned with breach of international law because 
there was noneo Even if there had been it is doubtful whether this would have 
barred the jurisdiction of the courto 
In R Vo Officer Corrunanding Depot Battalion, RoAoSaCo Colchester ex parte 
Elliot(14) a deserter from the British army was arrested in Belgium by British 
military police accompanied by two Belgian policemeno At his trial he argued 
that his arrest was illegal because the British authorities had no authority to 
arrest him in Belgium and because he was arrested contrary to Belgian lawo His 
contention was rejected by the court; Lord Goddard CoJo: "The point with regard 
to the arrest in Belgium is entirely falseo It is no answer to state I was 
arrested contrary to the laws of state A or state Bo He is in custody before the 
court which has jurisdiction to try himo We have no power to go into the 
question 6 once a prisoner is in lawful custody in this country, of the circum-
stances in which he may have been brought here"o Professor 0°Higgins doubts the 
absoluteness of this rule, but in commenting on ex parte Susannah Scott and ex 
parte Elliot. he concludes that the cases are authority for the principle that an 
arrest made in breach of English municipal law or in breach of the law of the 
state where the arrest took place is no bar to the jurisdiction of an English 
courto One question which should be addressed is the effect of the mistaken 
14o {1949) 1 All EoRo 373o 
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surrender of a fugiti.vR criminal by one state to another. Mistaken surrender is 
an example of collusive avoidance of the extradition process. 
In g v. Savarkar (1911) (15) Savarkar was an Indian revolutionary being 
sent back for trial in India under the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Actu 
1881. He travelled in the custody of Indian police officers on a ship which 
called at Marseilles. Savarkar jumped overboard in an attempt to escape and swam 
ashore. He then handed himself over to a French constable (or equivalent in 
France). The policeman did not know who he was and led Savarkar back to the 
ship. The international tribunal had to decide whether "Savarkar 0 in conformity 
with the rules of international law0 should be restored to the French government 
from the United Kingdom". The United Kingdom argued that the case was one of 
erroneous surrender because the mistake 0 if any, was made by the French police-
manu as to French law or his powers thereunder and was not a matter for inter-
national concern. The tribunal held that a mistake committed by an official in 
circumstances such as those in which Savarkar was surrendered could not in 
international law give rise to an obligation to restore the prisoner to France. 
Shearer suggests that because great significance was attached by the tribunal to 
the fact that French police had assisted in Savarkar 0s arrest and return to the 
vessel 0 "it cannot safely be concluded that the tribunal would have come to the 
same conclusion had the arrest been effected without the co-operation of the 
local authorities".(16) Dr. 0°Higgins for his part suggests that the English 
court is not precluded from considering the international illegality as a bar to 
jurisdiction.(!?) Since Elliot 0 two recent cases have been judged upon 
concerning the same area of the law of extradition. Before discussing these 
15. Hague Court Reports 276 (1911). 
16. I.A. Shearer 0 Extradition in International Law (1972) 0 p. 73. 
17. Dr. 0°Higgins 0 op.cit. 0 supra. N. 12 at p. 
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cases reference must be made toR v. Brixton Prison Governor ex parte Soblen(l8)o 
The case concerned the deportation of an alien from the United Kingdomo Extra-
dition and deportation are different powers vested in a stateo Extradition has 
the object of restoring a fugitive criminal to the jurisdiction of a state which 
has a lawful claim to try or punish him for an offenceu whereas deportation is 
the power by which a state removes undesirable aliens from its territoryo 
Deportation is a domestic power. Municipal law powers do not provide inter-
national law remedies for the individual. International law imposes virtually no 
restrictions on whether a state can expel an alien nor in the destination to 
which it can send him. However the destination to which the alien is deported 
raises certain questions. By the municipal law of most statesu the deporting 
authorities are empowered to specify a particular destination in a deportation 
order (19); and a common practice of national immigration authorities is to look 
first to the place where the alien embarked for the territory of the deporting 
state. Where the country of embarkation indicates in advance that it is 
unwilling to receive the alien 8 other destinations must be sought. Usually the 
choice will revolve next to the state of which the deportee is a national. But 
the bone of contention 8 as far as the individual fugitive criminal is concerned 
is that where the destination selected is one at which the authorities are 
anxious to prosecute or punish the deportee for a criminal offenceu the deport-
ation may result in a de facto extradition. This is usually referred to as 
disguised extradition 6 and is considered to be the process by which deportation 
is used with the prime motive of extradition. 
Soblen was a naturalised citizen of the United States and was convicted in 
the United States of espionage and sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment. 
18. (1963) 2 Q.B. 242; (1962) 3 All EoRo 641. 
19. Immigration Act 6 1971 8 Sch. 3 6 para. 1. 
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While on bail pending the hear.ing of his appeal he fled to Israelc Israel 
rejected Drc Soblen°s invocation of the Israeli law of return and put him on a 
plane bound for New York via Londono He inflicted knife wounds upon himself just 
before arriving in London and this necessitated his hospitalisationo When he 
recovered a deportation order was made against him specifying removal by a direct 
flight to New York. The question raised on habeas corpus was whether the 
deportation order which was prima facie lawfully made on the grounds of Dro 
Soblen°s illegal entry into the United Kingdomu could be set aside on the ground 
that the ulterior motive of the order was to secure his return to the United 
States to serve his sentence of imprisonment. Czechoslovakia announced its 
willingness to accept the deportee and this possibility of an alternative 
destination added weight to Dr. Soblen°s challenge. All the members of the court 
considered that it was open to the court to look behind a deportation order and 
consider any evidence that the order had been made mala fide 0 on grounds other 
than those appropriate solely for deportation. But on the facts of the case the 
court held that the fact that Czechoslovakia had announced its willingness to 
accept Dr. Soblen did not of itself provide conclusive evidence of mala fides on 
the part of the Home Secretary.(20) Discovery of Home Office papers was refused 
on the basis of Crown privilege. Soblen could not have been extradited because 
under the provisions of the Treaty of Extradition of 1931 between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, espionage was not an extraditable crime. And on 
the question of any breach of international law, there was no such breach because 
Soblen had no right to go to Czechoslovakia. Lord Denning M.R. (21) stated on 
the question of the order having been made mala fides: "The court cannot compel 
the Home Secretary to disclose the materials on which he acted but if there is 
20. (1962) 3 All E.R. 641u p. 660u 662. 
21o Ibidoo Po 661o 
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evidence on which it could reasonably be supposed that the Home Secretary was 
using the power of deportation for an ulterior purpose 0 then the court can call 
on the Home Secretary for an answer~ and if he fails to give itu it can upset his 
ordero But on the facts of this case I can find no such evidence"o Soblen was 
relied on in the case of~ Vo Bow Street Magistrates ex parte Mackesono(22) 
The applicant 0 a United Kingdom citizen 0 was in Zimbabweu formerly Rhodesia 0 in 
1979 when allegations of fraud were made against him in the United Kingdomo The 
Metropolitan Police could not then ask the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian (23) authorities to 
extradite him because at the time the de facto government of Rhodesia was in 
rebellion against the Crown and considered illegalo Subsequently 0 the 
Metropolitan Police informed the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian authorities that the 
applicant was wanted in England in connection with fraud charges. He was 
arrested in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and a deportation order made against himo His 
passport was returned to the Metropolitan Police and sent back to the United 
Kingdomo He brought proceedings in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia for the deportation order 
to be set asideo The court of first instance accepted the claim that his 
deportation was unlawful because it served the purpose of extraditing him to 
England.(24) The judge at first instance referred to ex parte Soblen 0 citing a 
passage from the judgment of Lord Denning MoRo where the learned judge stated 
that the courts can always go behind the face of the deportation order in order 
to see whether the powers entrusted by Parliament have been exercised lawfully or 
not. There was evidence that extradition was the purpose of Mackesonus deport-
ation. The judge at first instance in Mackeson proceeded to adopt this 
proposition. The finding was overturned on appeal on the basis that the courts 
22o (1982) 75 Cr. App. Ro 24. 
23. The name Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will be used for convenience. 
24o Mackeson v. Minister of Information 0 Immigration and Tourism (1980) 1 
S.A. 7 0 747o 
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had no power to look behind the deportation ordero(25) No attempt was made to 
extradite the applicant after Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had returned to direct rule under 
the Crown in December 1979 when extradition proceedings could have been relied 
ono The applicant was escorted back to the United Kingdom under the deportation 
order and handed over to the Metropolitan Policeo In the proceedings in Englandu 
Mackeson sought judicial review by way of an order of prohibition to prevent the 
hearing of committal proceedings against him in the magistrates court because of 
the manner in which he had been brought to England. The divisional court 
reviewed the evidence presented in Rhodesia. The evidence showed that the 
British police had taken some initiative in the process which had eventually led 
to Mackeson°s return. that there had been co-operation between authorities in 
Salisbury and London to facilitate the return of Mackeson and the important fact 
that the British police had not taken the opportunity to commence proper extra-
dition proceedings with the resumption of British authority in Rhodesia. 
Mackeson had been properly arrested at Gatwick Airport and was therefore properly 
before the courts. However Lord Lane C.J. agreed with the decision at first 
instance in Rhodesia stating "It seems clear to me that the object of this 
exercise was simply to achieve extradition by the back door. It seems equally 
plain to me that the English police authorities were. to say the least 0 
concurring in that exercise". The court approved the New Zealand case of R 
v. Hartley (26) 0 and held that although it could hear the charges against the 
applicant since by whatever means he had arrived in the United Kingdom he was 
subject to arrest by the police force in the United Kingdom and the mere fact 
that his arrival might have been procured by illegality did not in any way oust 
the jurisdiction of the courtu nevertheless. since the applicant had been removed 
from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by unlawful means 0 i.e. 0 by a deportation order in the 
25. (1980) 2 S.A. 0 747o 
26. (1978) 2 N.Z.L.R. 199. 
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guise of extradition he had in fact been returned to the United Kingdom by 
irregular means. The court would therefore in its discretion 0 grant the 
application for prohibition and discharge the applicant. The court was relying 
on its inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of its process.(27) There had 
been no breach of international law in Mackeson. But despite this fact 0 the 
court felt it necessary to signal its disapproval of any excess on the part of 
the executive or public officials acting on behalf of the executive. 
Hartley 0 s case concerned a murder committed by a motorcycle gang. The gang 
dispersed and one member called Bennett went to Australia. Hartley was charged 
with the murder and Bennett was charged with being a party to the offence. 
Bennett appealed on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try him 
because he was illegally brought back to New Zealand. The police had not 
obtained a warrant for Bennett 0 s extradition and had merely asked the Melbourne 
police by telephone to put Bennett on the next plane to New Zealand. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal stated that on the issue of jurisdiction ex_parte 
Elliot governed the law and was applicable to New Zealand. Although Bennett 
had been brought back unsuccessfully 0 he was eventually lawfully arrested within 
New Zealand and then by due process of law0 brought before the court. Thus the 
court was able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of him. But as far as the 
issue of discretion was concerned0 "There are explicit statutory directions which 
surround the extradition procedure for the protection of the public. The statute 
rightly demands the sanction of recognised court processes before any person who 
is thought to be a fugitive offender can be properly surrendered from one 
country to another. And in our opinion there can be no possible question here of 
of the court turning a blind eye to the actknof the New Zealand police which has 
deliberately ignored those imperative requirements of the statute11 .(28) This 
27. Connelly v. D.P.P. (1964) A.C. 1254. 
28. (1978) 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 0 216-217. 
- 34 -
simply illustrates judicial control of public officials and it does not raise any 
issues of internation~law. The New Zealand court then referred to the 
Australian case Brown v. Lizars (29) which reinforced their argument. The 
court in Mackeson therefore relied on Hartley in stating that it had an 
inherent power to prevent the abuse of its jurisdiction. The fact that it has 
such a power is not in dispute. but the uncertainty is why the court chose to 
invoke it in the present case. It is at odds with ex parte Elliot and previous 
case law. on facts which do not seem to sanction any derogation from the prin-
ciples of ex parte Elliot. However 0 as far as the individual is concerned, it 
would seem to be a welcome decision because it seems to suggest that priority 
should be placed on compliance by the English authorities with available extra-
dition proceedings to obtain the return of fugitive criminals because of the 
importance of the safeguards in such procedures for the protection of individual 
liberty. But hardly had the dust settled from Mackeson than another case came 
before the courts 0 R v. Guildford Magistrates Court ex parte Healy.(30) The 
applicant. who was wanted for various offences in the United Kingdom fled to the 
United States on a false passport. Policemen from the United Kingdom went to the 
United States where Healy was eventually arrested in Los Angeles. At the hearing 
at the Los Angeles Immigration Tribunal the officers gave evidence of the gravity 
of the charges against Healy. The officers then returned to England and took no 
further part in the deportation proceedings. The judge at the immigration 
tribunal, having decided that Healy was an illegal immigrant and subject to 
deportation. gave the defendant a choice of deportation destinations: United 
Kingdom or Spain. Spain refused to take him so he was deported to the United 
Kingdom. He was arrested on his return to the United Kingdom and argued that 
instead of using extradition procedures. the police had improperly co-operated 
29. (1905) 2 C.L.R. 837, 852. 
30. (1983) 1 W.L.R. 108. 
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with the American nuthorities to obtain his deportation to England. The appli-
cant referred to ex parte Mackeson. However his argument was rejected~ the 
judgment of the court was that it was only proper for the English police to 
pursue the applicant after he had allegedly fled from England and inform the 
United States authorities that he may have (and indeed did) enter their country 
on a false passport. It was also right that the United Kingdom police should 
furnish the Los Angeles tribunal with evidence so as to enable the tribunal to 
establish the status of the applicant. The police were not in America when most 
of the hearing took place. The decision to deport the man was therefore not 
prompted by the British police. 
"It is in the interest of the law abiding community that there should be 
international co-operation to bring wanted criminals to justice; this does not 
suggest a collusive agreement between two countries to use the deportation 
process as a short cut to extradition".(31) Thus the law prior to Mackeson was 
in great measure restored. c. Warbrick (32) discusses the effect of the two 
cases Mackeson and Healy and their significance as regards irregular extra-
dition. He argues that the two cases can be distinguished on the basis that 
deportation in the one case was to avoid extradition and in the other was 
properly for immigration purposes. But he goes on to state that it is harder to 
distinguish Mackeson and Elliot "at least in a way which justifies a depart-
ure from the rule in Elliot's case". Mr. Warbrick points out that the return 
of the fugitive was achieved with the co-operation of the "foreign" authorities 
in both cases. In Elliot there were no arrangements by which Elliot's return 
could have been otherwise achieved; in Mackeson such a possibility arose only at 
a late stage in events with the restoration of British authority in Rhodesia. 
31. (1983) 1 W.L.R. 112. 
32. c. Warbrick, "Irregular Extradition", (1983) P T. ·~09 P• 26~o 
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Mr. War brick continues by pointing out that. any "wrongdoing" by the British 
officials was both limited. in that they co-operated in what was admittedly a 
procedure initiated by the Rhodesian authorities and omitted to act when extra-
dition became a feasible process after the establishment of the government in 
Rhodesia 0 and not unlawful either by Rhodesian law since no British official had 
done anything in Rhodesia. or by British law, since it is not unlawful for a 
British official to ask for or to acquiesce in the return of a fugitive from 
another state by a means other than extradition. "To suggest otherwise is to 
give a domestic status to extradition that they do not possess and an inter-
pretation they cannot bear, viz. that where an extradition treaty exists, the 
states have argued that it is by extradition alone that they shall obtain from 
each other fugitive criminals".(33) Mr. Warbrick suggests that the error of 
Mackeson is caused by the reliance upon Soblen. An individual in this 
country possesses legal rights under the extradition legislation not to be 
removed to face criminal charges abroad other than within the terms of the 
statutes. However a person brought back to this country has no such legal rule 
to rely upon. Mr. Warbrick concludes his analysis by stating that "Mackeson 
does little more than confirm that there are some limits to the rule in Elliot 
without providing much guidance as to what they are".(34) Mackeson would have 
left the law in an uncertain condition, with the courts in the difficult position 
of not knowing which line of precedent to follow; but a decision in the 
Divisional Court this year has clarified the position of the fugitive criminal 
returned to the United Kingdom by way of irregular extradition. In R v. 
Plymouth Justices ex parte Driver (35) the applicant had been on holiday in 
Plymouth when a murder had been committed. The following day the applicant had 
33. Ibid. I p. 273. 
34. Ibid. I p. 274. 
35. The Times Law Report, April 19 1985, p. 21 and (1985) 2 All E.R., pp. 
681-699. 
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left the country and the police suspecting him of murder had inquired through 
Interpol as to his whereabouts. About four weeks later he was arrested in 
Turkey 0 and the co-operation of the Turkish authorities was sought in order to 
confirm his identity and assist in establishing his connection with the crime. 
The English police had told the Turkish authorities that they had no authority to 
seek his extradition or deportation but if it was within their power to deport 
him to the United Kingdom it would assist the police to interview him. The 
Turkish authorities told the police that they would expel the applicant "to the 
United Kingdom" and asked the United Kingdom authorities to pay his air fare 
which they had done. The applicant had then been deported from Turkey in a way 
which was illegal in Turkey and flown to Heathrow airport where he had been 
lawfully arrested. After being charged with murder the applicant argued that his 
deportation had amounted to a disguised extradition and that since the deport-
ation had been unlawful in Turkey and against his willu and since he could not 
have been extradited from Turkey 8 the case was on all fours with the decision in 
Mackesonu the applicant 0 s presence in England having been procured by irregular 
co-operation between the English and Turkish police. But the court rejected this 
allegation, stating that it had not been established that the English police had 
been guilty of any improper dealing, i.e., the United Kingdom authorities had not 
exceeded their powers as public officials. Stephen Brown L.J. pointed out that 
the English police had never sought the applicant 0 s detention or continued 
detention in Turkey and had never encouraged the Turkish authorities to act 
illegally in any way. His Lordship referred to ex parte Susannah Scott and to 
Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate (1890).(36) Here, the Lord Justice Clerk said that 
even if proceedings in Scotland were irregular where a court of competent juris-
diction had a prisoner before it upon a competent complaint they were bound to 
try him, no matter what had happened before 0 even though he might have been 
36. (1890) 17 R. (Crt. Sess.) 38. 
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harshly treated by a foreign government and irregularly dealt with by a sub-
ordinate officero Concerning Hartley 0 s case their Lordships stated that the 
court in Hartley were wrong to have thought that Elliot was only concerned 
with questions of jurisdictiono Elliot was authority for the proposition that 
the courts had no discretion such as the court in Hartley held that they hado 
Their Lordships also stated that Soblen was not relevant to the issue in 
Mackeson since it was concerned with the exercise of a discretionary power by a 
minister of the Crowno Thus there was no power to inquire into the circumstances 
in which a person was found within the jurisdiction for the purpose of refusing 
to try himo Thus their Lordships felt they must differ from the decision in 
Mackeson "which had been decided per incuriam. since the court had not there 
been referred to Scott or Sinclair, and might have considered Elliot in the 
light of the reference to it in Hartley"o Elliot 1 s case ought to be followed 
on the basis that the court had no title or interest to inquire as to the 
regularity of proceedings under which a fugitive was apprehended and given over 
into custodyo This case has the effect of isolating Mackeson and reinforcing 
the line of authority prior to Mackesono There is no doubt that the certainty 
on this area of the law which ex parte Driver reintroduces, is more desirable 
than the attempt in Mackeson to introduce a principle which, although laudable 
from the point of view of the individual and his protection, cannot strictly be 
accommodated in the evolution of irregular extraditiono The restoration of the 
orthodoxy shows that the individual has apparently no rights of his own to be 
extradited properly - or at least no right which goes so far as precluding juris-
dictiono 
In the United States the case law parallels the English line of evolution, 
that the court has no authority to inquire into the manner in which a defendant 
has come into its jurisdictiono The leading authority is Ker Vo Illinoiso(37) 
37o Ker Vo Illinois 119 UoSo 436 (1886)o 
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Whilst resident in Peru, Ker was indicted by an Illinois grand jury for embezzle-
ment and larcenyo The President invoking the current treaty of extradition 
between the United States and Peru. issued a warrant for Kero The warrant was 
never served, Ker was forcibly abducted by an American agent. put on a vessel and 
taken to the United States where he was tried and convictedo Counsel for Ker 
attempted to rely primarily on a treaty between Peru and the United States to 
argue that he could not be tried in the United States" The court found that the 
case was not covered by a treaty right of asylum and that since no treaty between 
the United States and Peru had been invoked. the United States had no such 
obligation to Peru with regard to Kero Therefore he was entitled to no 
protection under the treatyo The abduction of Ker did not violate the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" The method by which Ker had been 
acquired was irrelevanto The holding thus established that Ker could not rely on 
the treaty because the treaty had not been relied ono Nor could Ker rely on any 
violation of Peru 0 s sovreignty because this was a right that belonged to Peruo 
Ker in fact had no constitutional rights because the Fourteenth Amendment 
extended only to the trial process in the United States and not to pre-trial 
proceedingso(38) 
What the so-called "Ker-Frisbie" rule established was that the due process 
rule was limited to the guarantee of a constitutionally fair trial 8 regardless of 
the method by which jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant" However "Ker-
Frisbie" was the subject of qualification in United States Vo Toscaninoo(39) 
The applicant was wanted for various narcotics offences in the United Stateso In 
proceedings before the courts in the United States. the applicant alleged that he 
had been lured by a telephone call to his home in Montevideo, Uruguay, the call 
38o Note also Frisbie Vo Collins 342 UoSo 519 (1952) which reiterates the 
same pointo 
39o United States Vo Toscanino 500 Fo 2d 267 (1974)o 
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having been made by or under the direction of the police forcec In answer to the 
call Toscanino went to the arranged spot and was tied up and abducted and 
driven to the Brazilian borderc At no time had there been any formal or informal 
request on the part of the United States government or of the government of 
Uruguayc The Uruguayan government claimed it had no prior knowledge of the 
kidnapping nor did it consent to ito In Brasilia Toscanino was subjected to 
torture and interrogation for seventeen daysc More importantly he alleged that 
throughout the entire period the United States government was aware of the 
interrogation and did receive reports of its progress; that members of the United 
States Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were 
present during the torture and interrogationc He was electrocuted, then drugged 
and flown to the United States where he was brought to trialc The District Court 
refused to entertain Toscanino 0 s challenge, citing the "Ker-Frisbie" line of 
precedentc On appeal Circuit Judge Mansfield said of the "Ker°Frisbie" rule that 
in the two cases due process was limited to guarantee of a constitutionally fair 
trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was obtained over the 
defendantc However various attempts had been made since then to deter police 
misconduct and ~ Vc Ohio (40) was referred to, a case which interpreted 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that the exclusion-
ary rule be applied to unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Judge Mansfield 
continued by stating that having seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons 
against unreasonable seizures" the government ought as a matter of fundamental 
fairness be obliged to return him to his status quae "We view due process as now 
requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant 
where it had been acquired as the result of the government 0 s deliberate 
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused 0 s constitutional rights. 
40. ~ v. Ohio 367 U.Sc 643 (1961). 
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This conclusion represents the well-recor.Jnised power of federal courts in the 
civil context to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence 
has been secured by force or fraud".(41) The important part of the judgment to 
note is the reference to "unreasonable invasion of the accused 0 s constitutional 
rights". The actions of the American agents, Toscanino 0 s torture and drugging, 
went beyond the acceptable standards of police authority and were such as to 
severely infringe Toscanino 0 s constitutional rights and this required compen-
sation not only for violations of his rights (note Elliot), but also the denial 
of jurisdiction to try him. This case was followed in quick succession by 
United States ex parte Rel. Lujan v. Gengler.(42) Lujan was a pilot hired by 
one Duran to fly him to Bolivia. Duran was hired by American agents to lure 
Lujan to Bolivia although he said he had business there to transact. Lujan was 
promptly arrested in Bolivia and taken into custody by police acting as paid 
agents of the United States, not at the direction of their own superiors or 
government. He was flown to New York and was arrested there. No charge had been 
made against him by the Bolivian police nor had a request for extradition been 
made by the United States. However the court stated that in comparison with 
Toscanino the government conduct of which Lujan complained paled in comparison. 
"There is no allegation of that complex of shocking governmental conduct 
sufficient to convert an abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks 
to a violation of due process".(43) There were no allegations of having been 
subjected to drug intoxication by the United States officials; nor were there any 
acts of torture, terror or custodial interrogation. Thus Lujan suffered no 
deprivation greater than that which he would have endured through lawful extra-
dition. Thus the "Ker-Frisbie" rule was re-affirmed in much the same way that 
41. United States v. Toscanino 500 F. 2d. 267 (1974), p. 275. 
42. Lujan v. Gengler 510 F. 2d. 62 (1975). 
43. Lujan v. Gengler, p. 66. 
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ex parte Driver han re-affirmed Ellioto In the United Kingdom there are no 
similar constitutional arguments which can be invokedo As Mro Warbrick points 
out 0 "there is little enough indication that the courts are prepared to protect 
individual rights by the sanction of exclusion"o(44) Mo Feinrider (45) in his 
review of Toscanino and Lujan suggests that the authority for the remedy of 
divestiture of jurisdiction was found either in an unprecedented extension of the 
constitutionally based "exclusionary rule" or in the court 0 s discretionary super-
visory power over the administration of criminal justice in the district courtso 
But he concludes by saying that Toscanino 0 s vitality for support of divestiture 
of jurisdiction does not go beyond cases involving extra territorial abduction 
and torture. 
Before considering in detail the rights of the individual in cases of 
irregular extradition and the cases of abduction which breach internationa law 0 
one area must be canvassedo It has clearly been established by American courts 
that seizure by United States officials of fugitive criminals on the territory of 
a state with whom the United States has an extradition treaty is not ipso facto 
a breach of that extradition treatyo As stated above in Ker Vo Illinois 8 
counsel for the plaintiff attempted to argue that by virtue of the Treaty of 
Extradition with Peru, the defendant acquired by his residence in Peru a right of 
asylum; a positive right that he should only be forcibly removed from Peru to the 
State of Illinois in accordance with the provisions of the treatyo And that this 
right is one that he could assert in the courts of the United States in all 
cases 0 whether the removal took place under proceedings sanctioned by the treaty 8 
or under proceedings which were in total disregard of that treaty amounting to an 
44a C. Warbrick 0 "Irregular Extradition" 8 (1983)PoL,·,·~o 275. 
45o M. Feinrider 8 "Extraterritorial Abductions; A Newly Developing International 
Standard"o (1980) 14 Akron 1. Rev. p. 27 at pp. 34-35o 
- 43 -
unlawful and unauthorised kidnappingo(46) But the court refuted this contention 
stating that such a proposition could not be sustained in that there was nothing 
in the treaty with Peru that expressly gave the fugitive such a righto This 
doctrine was confirmed in United States Vo Sobello(47) Sobell alleged he was 
illegally kidnapped from Mexicor by the Mexican security police acting as agents 
of the United Stateso He argued that his kidnapping violated the extradition 
treaty with Mexico and that since that treaty was the law of the land its 
violation deprived the United States courts of jurisdiction over the offence he 
was charged witho The court rejected this argument. On appeal Sobell sought to 
rely on Cook v. United States (48) which holds that the United States courts 
may not acquire jurisdiction by means of treaty violationo But the Appellate 
Court refused to accept Sobell 0 s contention and ruled that Ker Vo Illinois 
applied and that there had been no treaty violationo "[The] appellant seeks to 
avoid the impact of the Ker case by insisting that 8 although there was no 
treaty violation in that case 0 there was such a violation in the case at bar". 
"Unlike the facts in Ker" 0 appellant saysr "the petition here charges action by 
the UoSo government"o The appellant relies on "the actions of the UoSo agents in 
initiating 0 planning and participating in the seizureo But it can hardly be 
maintained still assuming the truth of appellant's charges that the unlawful and 
unauthorised acts of the Mexican police acting on behalf of subordinate agents of 
the executive of the U.S. government were any more acts of the UoSo than the 
unlawful and unauthorised acts of the emissary of the chief executiveo We think 
the question presented is indistinguishable from that before the Supreme Court in 
Ker 0 and our decision is controlled by that case".(49) 
46. ~ Vo Illinois 119 U.S. 436 (1886)o 
47. United States Vo Sobell (1956) 142 Fo Suppo 515o 
48. Cook Vo United States 288 UoSo 102. 
49. United States Vo Sobell (1957) 244 F. 2do 520 at Po 525. 
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Questions of international responsibility for the irregular sei~ure were 
raised by Toscanino and Lujan v. Gengler. The Uruguayan government had no 
prior knowledge of the kidnapping no~ did it consent to it. In fact it condemned 
the abduction as alien to her laws. Thus there was a violation of her 
sovereignty. But the rights following a breach of state sovereignty belong 
exclusively to the state and not the individual. The solution reached following 
such a breach is a matter for the government and executive of the states in-
volved. And if Toscanino had sought to rely on this breach of sovreignty alone 
he would have been met by the "Ker-Frisbie" line of precedent. In Lujan v. 
Gengler the court pointed to the fact that neither Argentina nor Bolivia had 
protested or even objected to his abduction and therefore he could not rely on 
the United Nations Charter or the Charter of the Organisation of American States. 
In Toscanino the court referred to the United Nations Charter Article 2u para. 
4 which obliges "all members to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity of political independence of any state" and to the 
Charter of the Organisation of American States Article 17 "The territory of a 
state is inviolable. It may not be the object even temporarily of measures of 
force taken by another stateu directly or indirectlyu on any grounds whatever". 
In Lujan the court stated that the lack of protest by Bolivia or Argentina was 
fatal to his reliance upon treaty provisions. In Patrick Lawler (1860) the law 
officers advised the surrender of the fugitiveu a convict, who having escaped 
from Gibraltaru was seized on Spanish territory by a British prison officer7 the 
law officers stated that "we regard removalu if effected 8 as alleged by means of 
drugging or intoxication as being removal clearly without consent and involving 
the same international consequences as if it had been accomplished by force. A 
plain breach of international law having occurred we deem it to be the duty of 
the state into whose territory the individualu thus wrongfully deported was 
conveyed to restore the aggrieved stateu upon its request to that effect as far 
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as is possible to its original position".(SO) It may be significant that iu none 
of the cases concerning forcible abduction has the Patrick Lawler case been 
mentioned. As far as the individual is concerned it would provide solid weight 
to the argument that where state sovreignty has been breached it is not just the 
state which has been wronged. The leading case concerning international 
responsibility for abduction is Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. 
Eichmann.(51) The accused 0 a German national 0 was head of the Jewish office of 
the German Gestapo and responsible for the extermination of countless number of 
Jews in Europe during the Second World War. He was found in Argentina in 1960 by 
persons who may or may not have been agents of the Israeli government and 
abducted to Israel without the knowledge of the Argentinian government. When put 
on trial the Israeli court concluded that the defendant could not claim immunity 
from prosecution on the basis of his abduction from Argentina. Argentina lodged 
a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations requesting 
reparation 0 Eichmann°s return and punishment of his abductors, for the violation 
of its sovreignty.(52) The Security Council resolved on June 23 1960 (53) that 
Israel 9 s action in abducting Eichmann in the way they did from Argentina was a 
breach of sovreignty and caused the kind of international friction which 0 if 
repeated 0 could endanger international peace and security. It advised Israel to 
make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the rules of international law. The two governments reached an agreement and 
issued a joint communique 0 resolving "to regard as closed the incident which 
arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel, which infringed the 
50. Lord McNairu International Law Opinions Vol. 1 0 pp. 78-79. 
SL (1961) 36 I.J,.R. 5. 
52. 15 U.N. SCOR. Supp. April-June 1960 at 26 0 U.N. Doc. S/4334. 
53. U.N. Doc. S/4349. 
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tundamental rights of the State of Argentina"o(54) The Israeli court relied on 
the settlement of the dispute between Argentina and Israel in dismissing Eich" 
mann°s contention that he was immune from prosecutiono The case against Eich-
mann began after Argentina had exonerated Israel for violating her sovereignty 
and the breach of international law was thereby curedo The court decided that 
"the accused cannot presume to speak 0 as it were 8 on behalf of Argentina and 
claim rights \11hich that sovreign state had waived" a (55) La Co Green (56) 
discusses Eichmann and states that the assertion that a state is not competent 
by international law to try an alien for an offence committed abroad is 
irrelevant as far as Eichmann is concerned 0 because international law in the 
absence of a treaty expressly creating individual rights only recognises the 
rights of stateso "The theory of international law in such cases is that the 
wrong suffered by the alien is in fact an injury to his home state"o Eichmann 
was German and thus only Germany ought to have protested against the exercise by 
Israel of jurisdiction over himo But the West German authorities 0 whom Israel 
recognises as a state, made known their willingness to tolerate the trial and co-
operate in any way possibleo The court in Eichmann referred to ex parte Scotto 
and Elliot stating that the illegality of his arrest or of the means whereby he 
was brought within the jurisdiction were not sufficient to bar his trialo One 
important point that Green makes is that if the kidnappers were private individ-
uals indulging in private enterprise 0 no international responsibility ariseso 
Prime Minister Ben Gurian claimed personal credit for the abduction at first; 
later on he disclaimed all personal knowledge and described the affair as one of 
purely private initiativeo Eichmann is a sad reflection of the assertion that 
54. Joint Communique quoted in Eichmann 36(5) IoL.R. 0 p. 59. 
55o Ibido i Po 63o 
56. LoCo Greeno "The Eichmann Case" (1960) MoLoRo Vola 23 0 p. 507o 
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the individual has no rights to rely on at the international level. The eventual 
agreement Argentina accepted was an agreement which had nothing to do with the 
securing of just reparation to Eichmann himself (despite the odious character of 
Eichmann). Israel has again been the subject of discussion concerning forcible 
abduction. In Faik Bulut (57)u a Turkish citizen was convicted by an Israeli 
military court of belonging to Al-Fatah in Lebanon and Syria and sentenced to 
seven years in prison. He had been captured in February 1972 during an Israeli 
raid one hundred miles into Lebanon. He was tried under a 1972 amendment to the 
Israeli penal law (Offences Committed Abroad) which states "The courtsof Israel 
are competent to try under Israeli law a person who has committed abroad an act 
which would be an offence if it had been committed in Israel and which harmed or 
was intended to harm the State of Israel, its security, property or economy or 
its transport or communication links with other countries". The article suggests 
that the trial raises two important issues in internation~ law; firstly, is there 
a substantive basis under international law for the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the State of Israel despite the fact that the offences were committed by non-
nationals outside Israel?; and secondly, is the exercise of jurisdiction 
consistent with internationallaw despite the fact that the defendants were 
brought to Israel in a manner not condoned by international law? Both questions 
are important because they involve the relative freedom of an individual from the 
control of a foreign legal system. The protective principle was considered to be 
the source applicable to the issue of substantive jurisdiction. Bulut had not 
been charged with acts of aiding a wartime enemy or crimes against humanity as 
Eichmann had been; he was simply a member of an organisation which is considered 
by some to have terrorist links. In analysing the protective principle, the 
article points out that Lebanon guarantees the right to be a member of a 
57. "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction following Forcible 
Abduction; A New Israeli Precedent in International Law" (1973-74), Vol. 72 
Mich. L .. Rev o _9 . p. 1087. 
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Palesti11ldo organisation and such membership is not a crime under the inter-
national law of states. The offence with which Bulut was charged and convicted 
is likely to endanger the security of Israel only in an indirect and insub-
stantial way. the article claims. Concerning the second point raised by the 
case. the court relied on the principle male captus bene detentu. Ker v. 
Illinois. ex parte Scott and ex parte Elliot were relied on. The article 
accepts this line of judicial development but argues that kidnapping encourages 
the undermining of the international and domestic law of extradition. which 
provides safeguards for the individual. The article suggests that a total 
repudiation of the Ker doctrine is not necessary to support the conclusion that 
jurisdiction should be precluded in the current Israeli case(s). The reason put 
forward is that Ker, Frisbie, Scott and Eichmann all involved offences 
such as larceny, murder 0 perjury or war crimes which were presumably crimes in 
the state of refuge and which were not political crimes. Thus they were extra-
ditable. But the offence of belonging to Al-Fatah is not a crime in Lebanon and 
it is also arguably a political offence. Thus, the article suggests as a 
distinction to Eichmann, Bulut had not committed a crime of an international 
character, nor had he committed crimes within the territory of Israel prior to 
his abduction. On this basis, preclusion of jurisdiction on account of forcible 
abduction would not require an overruling of Eichmann. A further distinction 
is that whilst the issue of the impairment of Argentina's sovreignty had been 
settled by both countries, there has been no such diplomatic closing of Israeli 
incursions into Lebanon. The article emphasises in conclusion that it is the 
individual human rights that are ultimately affected, "forcible abduction [is a 
precedent] harmful to ••• the international system and to individual human 
rights".(58) Professor A. Evans (59) in her article in which she discusses the 
58. Ibid., p. 1113. 
59. Professor A. Evans, "Acquisition of Custody over the International Fugitive 
Offender - Alternatives to Extradition. A Survey of United States Practice" 
(1964) 40 B.Y.I.L. 77-104. 
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shortcomings of the extradition process argues that despite the expense and the 
lack of speed by which extradition is characterised, use of other methods of 
rendition other than extradition severely inhibit the protection afforded to the 
accused such as the mandatory hearing in the courts of the state of refuge and 
the general unavailability of extradition for political offences. She argues for 
a balance to be struck between the public interest in acquiring the fugitive and 
the need to safeguard his interests. 
As regards irregular extradition reference should be made to the Argoud 
Case.(60) In France, Article 23 of the 1927 Extradition Act provides that 
extradition is null when it is obtained in cases not provided by the law. Argoud 
was a member of the Secret Army Organisation. His capture and kidnap in Munich 
was made by unknown persons and the French police had no knowledge of Argoud 
until an anonymous telephone call led them to find him gagged in an abandoned 
car, inside French territory. It was argued on Argoud 0 s behalf that Article 23 
negated the jurisdiction of the court because of the irregular manner by which he 
was returned. Also, that since he had been granted asylum by the Federal 
Republic of Germany his abduction without extradition proceedings violated inter-
national law and rendered his subsequent prosecution a nullity. But the court 
rejected this assertion. The court distinguished between a "disguised extra-
dition" carried out by officials in disregard of the extradition treaties or laws 
to which the provisions related, and an abduction carried out by private persons 
which was unprotected by the provision. Or put another way, the Supreme Court 
stated that Article 23 only contemplates violations of the extradition treaty 
and does not relate to non-observance of treaty provisions. The court also 
found that, if a violation of the sovreignty of the Federal Republic had 
occurred, only the injured state could complain and demand reparation. Thus, 
60. Cours de Cassation decision of 4 June 1964. Re Argoud 45 I.L.R. 90. 
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Argoud was not entitled to plead a violation of the rules of international law as 
a personal basis for immunity from judicial proceedings. In Croissant (61), 
the German Federal Republic requested the extradition of Klaus Croissantu an 
attorneyu whom the German authorities suspected of forming a network of 
communications for the benefit of a criminal organisation and carrying on an 
intense propaganda campaign for a group called the Baader-Meinhoff gangu an 
alleged terrorist group. The relevance of this case as far as irregular extra-
dition is concerned lies in its illustration of extradition as an institution of 
international public law which renders possible an international administration 
of justice; and the judicial control on decisions with respect to extradition 
has, in this context 8 a purely domestic character and as such is not regulated by 
international law. In the majority of countries, judicial control takes the form 
of an advisory opinion which has to be requested of the court by the government 
before extradition can be granted. Advisory opinions are usually a.iJy derogated 
fran if they are positive (i.e., if they favour extradition). The legal remedies 
against an extradition decree differ from country to country. Some offer no 
remedy at all, whilst some limit it to either the judicial or the administrative 
stage of the decision-making. The effectiveness of this legal recourse is often 
strongly undermined by the fact that it does not have the effect of suspending 
proceedings and extradition can be granted before the competent court has been 
able to rule upon the appeal. In Croissant the extradition decree against him, 
issued after the mixed positive advisory opinion of the Chambre d 1Accusation of 
the Court of Appeal of Paris, was immediately executed although the government 
had been expressly notified of the fact that Croissant had challenged the decree 
before the Conseil d 0Etat. Thus there is no real guarantee for the requested 
person as long as there exists no legal provision to the effect that execution of 
of the extradition decree should be suspended until the decision on appeal 
61. Court of Appeal of Paris, November 16 1977. See c. Wijngaert, The 
Political Offence Exception to Extradition, 1980, p. 124. 
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against the extradition decree has been rendered. Extradition lato ~er1su ought 
to be the only legitimate process to surrender a person to the authorities of the 
state seeking him for the purposes of prosecution or punishment. Before 
considering what protection the individual can be provided with through the 
invocation of human rights lawu two cases must be mentioned which give priority 
to individual interests above state rights. Unconcerned as they are with 
irregular extraditionu they are nevertheless important. 
In Plaster v. United States (62) an army serviceman named Plaster and 
another called Burt fled from West Germany to the United States to avoid 
prosecution for the murder of a West German national. Intending to prosecute 
both men for the West German murderu the United States military authorities 
obtained a waiver of prosecutional jurisdiction from the West German authorities. 
But Miranda v. Arizona (1966) barred the use of incriminating confessions 
such as those obtained from the appellee and Burt. The United States and West 
Germany entered into an extradition treaty providing for extradition by either 
government for offences committed either before or after the treaty entered into 
force. Under Article 7 of the treaty, a government asked to extradite one of its 
own nationals "shall have the power to do so provided the law of the requested 
state does not so preclude". The United States attorney sought a certificate of 
extraditability for the appellee, supported by a West German request under the 
1978 Treaty. But the United States District Court issued a writ of habeas corpus 
prohibiting extradition, finding that Article 7 of the 1978 Treaty precluded the 
appellee since it would violate his constitutional rights. Also, allowing the 
United States government to renege on its promise of transactional immunity would 
be fundamentally unfair and violate the appellee's due process rights. Apart 
from the treaty the court also found that the United States government could not, 
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as a matter of constitutional lawu extradite a United States citi~en if to uo ou 
would violate his constitutional rightso The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the District Court 0 s interpretation of Article 
7 but upheld the judgmentu observing that United States treaty obligations 
cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional governmental conducto The Appeal Court 
rejected the government 0 s contention that the extradition power of the United 
States commits the consideration of alleged constitutional violations solely to 
the Secretary of State and the President, stating that the Secretary of State and 
the President may not extradite an individual where extradition would in the 
opinion of the judiciary violate the individualvs constitutional rightso The 
case clearly illustrates that (as far as United States citizens are concerned) 
foreign policy considerations and treaty obligations, although important, do not 
necessarily override the notion implicit in the constitution that the government 
must deal fairly with its citizens in conducting criminal prosecutionso Such a 
decision is a favourable precedent for the individual to draw upon in the wider 
context of individual interest being just as important as state interests, and it 
will be interesting to see how often the judgment is invoked as persuasive 
argument on behalf of the individual during an appropriate case in a different 
jurisdictiono 
In Jaffe (63) a Canadian businessman, Sidney Jaffe, was abducted from 
Canadian territory by two United States bounty hunterso The bounty hunters 
brought Jaffe to Florida where he was tried and convicted for unlawful land sales 
practices and failure to appear at trialo The Canadian government is protesting 
the abduction and requesting Jaffe 0 s returno It has filed an application in the 
Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpusu challenging Jaffe 0 s detention 
in the United Stateso If Canada succeeds in proving that the abduction 
63o (1984) VOlo 78 Amo JoioLo 207 0 
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constituted ct violation of international lawu the court may order Jaffe 0 s 
release to redress the violationo In her article (64) Ko Selleck suggests that 
the traditional Ker rule would mandate the court 0 s exercise of jurisdiction 
over Jaffe given his presence before the Florida courto She suggests that like 
Keru Jaffe cannot claim any right of asylum in the country from which he was 
forcibly takeno She also asserts that Jaffe cannot invoke the Cook exceptionq 
since the express terms of the extradition treaty between Canada and the United 
States were not abrogated by Jaffe 1 s kidnappingo There was no evidence of the 
sort of "shocking" brutality apparent in Toscanino. Therefore on the basis of 
precedent Jaffe will have difficulty in his attempts to bar the court 0 s exercise 
of jurisdiction over him. However Selleck asserts that based on strong policy of 
"respect for the law of nations, and the integrity and independence of other 
nations" (65), the court may consider Jaffe 0 s release appropriate redress for 
the violation of international law.(66) 
As regards possible human rights protection certain safeguards may lie 
within the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 as far as European states are 
concerned. There are two lines of argument which may be put forward. Under 
Article 5 it can be argued that irregular return of a fugitive is not "lawful". 
Secondly, that the manner of return has been achieved in a way not compatible 
with Article 3. Article 5(2) states "everyone has the right to liberty and 
securi·ty of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) The 
lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the 
lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
64o Ko Selleck, "Jurisdiction After International Kidnapping; A Comparative 
Study" (1985) VoL VIII No 1 B. Colo I .& C.L.Ro 
Po 237 at Po 248o 
65. Lira 515 Fo 2d. at pp. 72-73. 
66o K. Selleckq op.cit., suprao No 64 at p. 249. 
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before the competent legal authority". Professor 0°Higgins was of the opinion 
that the unlawful seizure of a person abroad might not be in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law and that a competent court could not be determined 
solely by reference to the municipal law of a state but must mean competent in 
the light of international law.(67) However Mr. Warbrick (68) states that it is 
not certain that a violation of international law in obtaining a fugitive 
necessarily involves the consequences 8 as a matter of international law, that a 
domestic court has no authority to try him. He points to Eich~ and the effect 
of the agreement between Argentina and Israel. Also Mr. Warbrick alludes to 
Mackeson illustrating that difficult cases can arise where there is no breach of 
international law. 
Article 3 prohibits "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". In Toscanino the court found the actions of the police such as to 
amount to a violation of his constitutional rights. (Note; Patrick Lawler 
(1860) where the court stated as much). Mr. Warbrick suggests that if the 
abduction is the work of the agents of the state seeking the fugitive criminal 0 
Article 3 can be said to carry an obligation not to go on with the trial of the 
abducted individual.(69) "The state has a positive obligation to guard against 
violations of Article 3 and the collateral consequences of the denial of juris-
diction as a contribution to this end could be argued to be inherent in Article 
3".(70) For those countries outside the ambit of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights may be useful. Regarding Article 13 8 the suggestion is that it imports 
67. Professor 0°Higginsu loc.cit.u p. 319. 
68. c. Warbrick, loc.cit., pp. 275-276. 
69. Note Eichmann where it was uncertain whether the kidnappers were agents 
of the Israeli government. 
70. Co Warbricku loc.citou p. 277. 
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an obligation not to try a person brought to one state 1 s jurisdiction without 
complying with another state 1 s law. Article 13 states 0 "An alien lawfully in the 
territory of a state party to the present covenant may be expelled therefrom only 
in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall 0 except where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require 0 be allowed to submit 
the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by 0 and be 
represented for the purpose before the competent authority or a person or 
persons especially designated by the competent authority". This Article is 
particularly apposite when Hartley is considered. Bennet was returned to the 
jurisdiction by a mere telephone call from the New Zealand police who had not 
obtained a warrant for Bennet 1 s extradition to Australia without a chance to 
submit reasons against his removal to a proper tribunal. Thus any expression of 
his rights were completely violated by public official excess. Thus human rights 
protection are effective for an individual only where the national court can take 
them into account 0 for example 0 where the treaty has been made part of municipal 
law or where there is the possibility of an appeal by the individual to some 
international human rights body such as the European Commission on Human Rights 
or where as in the United States, the national constitutional protections reflect 
the international human rights standards; note Toscanino. At present 0 extra-
dition is still viewed as an inter-state mechanism for the suppression of crime 
and this has paramountcy over any interests the fugitive criminal may haveo 
Cases like Plaster seem to be the odd beacon in the dark world of state 
supremacy; until a consistent line of precedent is built up 0 individual 
protection against irregular extradition will remain a question of hit and misso 
Ex parte Driver has isolated the deviation of Mackeson 0 but it has not 
provided positive evidence that anything but state interest is the central matrix 
around which irregular extradition revolves. A fuller study of human rights and 
individual protection will be carried out in Chapter Four. 
Part II Extradition 
- -~------
and the Political Offence 
A. Brief HisLuri<.:ctl OuLliue 
The majority of writers on the history of international law express the view 
that international co-operation in the matter of ordinary crime was not extensive 
before the eighteenth century. Not many treaties existed and if extradition did 
take place, it occurred in the absence of treaty obligations and concerned 
largely the delivery of political enemies, not ordinary criminals.(!) 
In confirmation of this statement, the earliest major work on British extra-
dition law listed only five treaties concluded by England between 1174 and 1794 
and stated that cases of extradition in almost every instance concerned the 
delivery of political offenders.(2) One eminent international law expert 
suggests that the above conclusion, as far as is applicable to the United 
Kingdom, may have to be qualified. Professor 0°Higgins (3) adduces evidence that 
there were a considerable number of treaties in existence, that extradition 
seldom took place in the absence of a treaty obligation and that extradition was 
not limited to political offenders. The oldest document in diplomatic history, 
the peace treaty between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusili III 
(c. 1280 B.C.) made provision for the return of the criminals of one party who 
fled and were found in the territory of the other. I.A. Shearer (4) points out that 
this treaty was not just a mere crude machinery for surrender of fugitive 
1. De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (1957), 243; 
Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Laws of Nations, 214 (254); Oppenheim, 
International Law Vol I (8th ed.) (1955), 696, 704. 
2. Clark, Extradition (4th ed.) (1903), 18-22. 
3 0 0 D Higgins Q "The History of Extradition in British Practice II ( 1964) 13 I nd 0 
Y.I .A. •. 9 -73. (,' --=~ .w • 
4. I.A. Shearero Extradition in International Law (1972), p. 6. 
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criminals 0 that it contained some institutional conceptso The treaty stipulated 
that any one surrendered pursuant to the treaty was not to be subjected to such 
severe punishments as mutilation and the destruction of his house and familyo 
Can these provisions be adduced as forerunners to the present rights to be found 
in human rights law? Professor 0°Higgins (5) in his study showed that the 
treaties he looked at appeared to be concerned with objects other than the 
surrender of criminals, such as the protection of trade and industry in addition 
to the reciprocal surrender of criminals. 
British extradition history goes back a number of centuries. Early examples 
of treaties entered into by the sovereign to expel fugitive criminals include the 
treaty of 1174 when Henry II and William of Scotland agreed to deliver up 
fugitive felons. In 1303 Edward I and Philip of France each agreed to expel 
enemies of the other 0 whilst in 1496 Henry VII and the Duke of Burgundy each 
agreed to order rebels and other fugitives from the dominions of the other to 
leave the realm.(6) However, the first extradition agreement of the modern era 
entered into by Great Britain was concluded with the United States in 1794. This 
was the Jay Treaty of 1794.(7) Article 27 of the treaty provided: "It is further 
agreed that His Majesty and the United States on mutual requisitions. by them 
respectively, or by their respective ministers or officers authorised to make the 
same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with murder or 
forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within 
any of the countries of the other, provided that this shall only be done on such 
evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive 
or person so charged shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment 
6. V.E. Hartley-Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure (1981), LVII. 
7. Malloy, Treaties. Conventions, International Act, Protocols. and Agreement 
between the U.S.A. and Other Powers. 
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for trial, if the offence had there been committedo The expense of such appre-
hension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the re-
quisition and receive the fugitive"o IoAo Shearer (8) suggests that the treaty 
can be recognised as setting the framework of later American and British treaties 
of extraditiono But he notes. and an important note it is as far as the 
individual is concerned, that certain common present-day features were lacking in 
the treaty~ the exception of political offenders. the principle of speciality and 
the rule against double jeopardyo The start of modern extradition history. 
however. commenced in 1842 with the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 
1842 (9) between the United States and the United Kingdom which dealt 
specifically with the surrender of fugitive offenderso The Jay Treaty expired in 
1806o Before its expiration only a few criminals had been surrendered pursuant 
to its provisionso(lO) 
BoBritish Extradition Law 
United Kingdom law regarding extradition is dependent entirely on 
statuteo(11) Any fugitive criminal found in the Kingdom may be extradited to a 
foreign country only in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Acts 
1870 to 1935o(12) It seems that the prerogative power to accede to a request for 
the surrender of a fugitive offender to a foreign state has not survived the 
passing of these Acts; Barton Vo Commonwealth of Australiao(13) However, 
9o Malloy, 650 0 655 (Arto lO)o 
lOa Clark, Extradition (4th edo) (1903) 0 PPo 39-41; Moore, Extradition (1891) 
VOlo lu Po 90; (1965) 6 BoDoioLoo Po 445o 
llo g Vo Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Soblen (1963) 2 QoBo 243 at 
299, 300 0 
12o Brown Vo Lizars (1905) 2 CoLoRo 837; Diamond Vo Minter (1941) 1 KoBo 
656 0 
13o (1974) 131 CoLoRo 477 at 485; 3 AoLoRo 70 at 74o 
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while in tho absence of an extradition treaty it is the normal p:r.actj_ce of the 
United Kingdom not to request extradition. the prerogative power to make such a 
request has probably not been extinguished by the passing of the Acts (14) 0 
Barton Vo Commonwealth of Australiao(15) In proceedings concerning Ronald 
Biggs who committed what is popularly known as "The Great Train Robbery" 0 Biggs 
entered Brazil in 1970o No extradition was in force between Great Britain and 
Brazil. When he was arrested by order of the Minister of Justice in 1974 0 Biggs 
applied for a writ of habeas corpus before the Federal Court of Appeal, arguing 
that, in spite of his unlawful immigration he could not be expelled from the 
country since the Brazilian law precludes both expulsion and deportation whenever 
these measures can in practice imply an extradition which would not be legally 
permitted. The court held that Biggs 0 extradition to Great Britain was 
effectively impossible u although it recognised that the minister was in 
principle allowed to deport himo The final decision denied the writ of habeas 
corpus stating that the arrest was lawful 0 but that the fugitive could not be 
deported to Great Britain or to any other country from which Great Britain could 
obtain his rendition. Thus the government was divested of power to expel Biggs 
from BraziL ( 16) 
In the particular area of extradition treaties 0 where the identity of the 
contracting state is important. the continued validity of such treaties depends 
upon the existence of the original contracting states; thus if one of them ceases 
to exist (i.e. 0 through annexation) then its obligations under the treaty cannot, 
14. The Extradition Act 0 1870; The Extradition Act 0 1873; The Extradition Act. 
1895; The Extradition Act 0 1932; The Counterfeit and Currency (Convention) 
Act 0 1935, s. 4 and s. 6(4). 
15. Op.cit. 0 supra •• 13 at 485 and 74o 
16o Rezek. "Reciprocity as a basis of Extradition" (1982) L.II B.Y.IoL. 171 at 
202. Also R.A. Biggs v. Minister of Justice habeas corpus No. 3.345o 
Tribunal Federal de Recursos, 20 July 1974o 
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without further arrangement be fulfilled by the new state and the treaty becomes 
extinguishedo(17) 
'l'hP .llc::t st-i pnlf!.t.As t-hP r.nnni t-.i nm~ 11hi l""h. shOlJlrl l)P mt=>t before a person is 
extraditedo Before any formal request is made to the United Kingdom 0 there are 
usually informal communications of an informative nature between various 
authoritieso Interpol may inform the British foreign office of the presence of 
wanted foreign criminals in the United Kingdom before any requisition is made to 
the United Kingdomo The government of the foreign state would then instruct its 
embassy to forward the requisition for the arrest of the fugitive to the foreign 
officeo(18) As far as the actual formal request is concerned 0 section 7 of the 
1870 Act governs the procedure; section 7 of the 1870 Act states "A requisition 
for the surrender of a fugitive criminal of any foreign state 0 who is in or sus-
pected of being in the United Kingdom 0 shall be made to a secretary of state by 
some person recognised by the secretary of state as a diplomatic representative 
of that foreign stateo A secretary of state may, by order under his hand and 
seal signify to a police magistrate that such a requisition has been made, and 
require him to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive criminalo 
If the secretary of state is of the opinion that the offence is one of a 
political character 0 he may 8 if he thinks fito refuse to send any such order, and 
may also at any time order a fugitive criminal accused or convicted of such 
offence to be discharged from custody"o 
By section 8(1) a police magistrate once in receipt of the order from the 
secretary of state and if there exists such evidence as would in his opinion 
justify the issue of the warrant if the crime had been committed or the criminal 
17o Also new treaty with Spain signed 22 July 1985 prior to which no extradition 
between the United Kingdom and Spain was possible, after the lapse of the 
previous treaty in 1979o 
18o VoEo Hartley-Booth 0 opocitoo suprao No 6 at Po 20o 
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convicted in England 0 must issnP. a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive 
criminalu who is in or suspected of being in the United Kingdom. 
SP.ction 8(2) governs the issue of a provisional warrant. Where a warrant 
has been issued without an order from the secretary of state 0 the police 
magistrate or justice of the peace must send a report of the fact of such issue 0 
together with the evidence and information or complaint, to the secretary of 
state who then has the power to cancel the warrant and discharge the person who 
has been apprehended. 
Where the fugitive criminal is apprehended on a warrant issued without the 
order of a secretary of state 0 the individual has to be discharged by the police 
magistrate 0 unless the police magistrate within such a reasonable time as he 
fixes 0 receives an order from the secretary of state signifying that a 
requisition has been made for the surrender of the individual. 
Committal Proceedings 
A fugitive criminal arrested under the provisions of the Extradition Acts 
has the right to have the evidence presented in court as if he or she were 
subject to committal proceedings for trial on indictment. The burden which is 
normally on the prosecution in such cases is transferred to the requesting state; 
it has to satisfy the magistrate that a prima facie case exists on the evidence 
produced, as well as having to comply with the formalities of extradition 
procedure and show that the request is in respect of an extradition offence or 
offences. Sections 9, 10 and 14 of the 1870 Act govern the procedure and 
evidence at committal. Section 9 requires that the manner of hearing and juris-
diction of the court closely follows committal on indictment; section 9 states: 
"When a fugitive criminal is brought before the police magistrate 0 the police 
magistrate shall hear the case in the same manner and have the same jurisdiction 
and powerso as near as may be as if the prisoner were brought before him charged 
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with an indictable offence committed in England"o In a recent government 
report (19) on extraditionu the requirement of a prima facie case was widely 
debatedo In European countries the absence of committal procedures means that 
when faced with the English requirement that they establish a prima facie case 
against the accused 0 the state finds itself with an unduly burdensome and serious 
obstacle to the efficient extradition of a fugitiveo The existence of this 
requirement is regarded as one of the reasons why Spain after twenty-five years 
lack of success denounced its extradition treaty with the United Kingdom in 1978o 
As a result suggestions were made that the prima facie rule be retained only 
where the person whose rendition is sought is a British national~ and to discard 
the rule where the requesting state is a party to the European Convention on 
Extraditiono(20) This would enable the United Kingdom to benefit from easier 
extradition arrangements with those European countries with which the United 
Kingdom has particularly close commercial and legal ties. 
The rights of a fugitive criminal during committal proceedings in the 
magistrates court are important. These rights take the form of submissions as to 
the validity of the proceedings. The fugitive criminal can be represented (21) 
and may receive legal aid as well as be permitted to give evidence on oath 
himself. Although he may call witnesses and produce exhibits, the committal 
proceedings must not amount to a trial of fact. The three main submissions which 
shall be referred to are the political offence exception~ the principle of 
speciality and, the principle of double criminality. 
I. The Principle of Speciality 
This principle is embodied in the 1870 Act section 3(2) which states that 
19. Government Report of February 1985 6 R/85 Cmnd. 9421. 
20. December 13 1957, EoToSo No. 24. 
21. The Legal Aid Act s. 28(2), Archbold, p. 321C. 
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fugit~vP.R may not be tried or convicted for offences which occurred prior to 
their surrender other than those for which they are returned. The importance of 
this principle is somewhat negated by the fact that speciality is not a right of 
the individual. This factor is clearly borne out when one realises that although 
the principle requires a requesting state to give the fugitive an opportunity to 
return to the asylum state before prosecution for other offences 0 the rule is 
almost certainly to be ineffective in cases where the requesting state is anxious 
to retain the individual for political reasons. Speciality is a principle which 
can be waived by the state in whose interest it is to do so. The tendency has 
been to assume that the requesting state will act in accordance with its treaty 
commitment and that the request is made with the bona fide intention to put the 
accused on trial solely for the offence recited in the extradition warrant; Re 
Arton (22) where the court refused to allow counsel to question the good faith 
of the requesting state. Some authors suggest that though the principle is 
widely known, it is of little importance without clear evidence, and since such 
clear evidence depends upon information which is difficult to obtain, namely the 
intentions of the public prosecution departments of foreign states 0 it is not 
likely to be argued frequently. Thus 0 although the principle imposes 
restrictions on the requesting state 0 the "good faith" rule means that it 
provides little protection in proceedings in the requested state. And 
importantly 0 the possibility of speciality providing protection in the law of the 
requested state depends on whether the extradition takes domestic effect; and if 
it does so 0 whether it is interpreted as providing rights for the individual and 
not just the state. 
The European Convention on Extradition (23) 
Article 14(1) makes reference to the rules of speciality. It states that 
22o (1896) 1 QoBo 
23. December 13 1957 0 E.T.S. No. 24. 
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a person extradited should not be proceeded agajnst, sentenced or detatned with a 
view to carrying out of a sentence or detention order for any offence committed 
prior to his surrender other than that for which he was extraditedu nor shall he 
be for any other reason restricted in his personal freedom 0 except where (a) the 
requested state surrendering him consents, (b) or when the person 0 having had an 
opportunity to leave the territory of the state to which he has been surrendered 0 
has not done so within forty-five days of his final discharge 0 or has returned to 
that territory after leaving ito 
II.The Principle of Double Criminality 
In Government of Denmark Vo Nielsen (24) the House held that on a proper 
construction of section 10 of the 1870 Act 0 a magistra~ considering an 
application for extradition of a fugitive under a treaty which incorporated the 
whole of the list of extradition crimes set out in Schedule 1 to the 1870 Act was 
only required to determine whether the conduct or acts of the accused constituted 
under English law a crime so that he would be committed for trial if he had 
committed such acts or conduct in England 0 provided that the crime was one of the 
crimes listed in Schedule 1 to the 1870 Act and in the relevant extradition 
treatyo In considering whether the fugitive 0 s acts or conduct would amount to a 
crime in England the magistrate was not required to consider any question of 
foreign law0 because any comparison was only necessary if the extradition treaty 
contained limitations on surrender or if extradition was being sought on the 
basis of a conviction already obtained in the foreign statea(25) The question of 
double criminality is linked to the concept "extradition crime"a This term is 
defined in section 26 of the 1870 Act as "a crime which, if committed in England 
or within English jurisdiction0 would be one of the crimes described in the first 
24o (1984) 2 All EoRo 81 HaLo 
25a Note also, United States Government Va McCaffery (1984) 2 All EaRo 
5700 
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schedule to this Act". In addition to the requirement that the offence should be 
listed in the 1870 Act 9 the extradition crime must also be one of those offences 
listed in the contractual document entered into by the United Kingdom and the 
foreign state.(26) Usually the requesting state checks that the ottence 1s on 
the list of extradition offences at the time of the requisition. When the 
evidence is presented 0 difficulty sometimes arises over whether the facts 
establish a prima facie case for the actual offence charged. There must be 
evidence showing that all the elements of the offence were committed (27) and 
that this was within the jurisdiction of the requesting country.(28) However 9 
within the context of Nielsen if the British court were asked to delve into 
"minutiae" of foreign law8 "the court would be engaging itself in an impossible 
task".(29) It has been stated that the court cannot become a tribunal of foreign 
law.(30) From this point of view0 the double criminality rule is severely 
restricted. The rule or principle as expressed in Nielsen does not look like 
a rule for the protection of individual interests as opposed to state interests. 
Nielsen attempted to rely on section 9(2), "The police magistrate shall receive 
any evidence which may be tendered to show that the crime of which the prisoner 
is accused or alleged to have been convicted is an offence of a political 
character or is not an extradition crime". But the court cited the safeguard of 
speciality in section 3(2) in reply.(31) The court was more concerned with 
ensuring that the magistrate understood his function and powers under section 10 
26. g v. Wilson (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42; Re Arton (No.2) (1896) 1 Q.B. 509 per 
Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. at 513. 
27. R v. Portugal 16 Q.B.D. 487. 
28. R v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Rush (1969) 1 All E.R. 316. 
29. V.E. Hartley-Booth 8 op.cit. 0 supra •• N. 6 p. 50. 
30. g v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Elliot (1975) 119 s.J. 709. 
31. (1984) 2 All E.R. 91. 
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of the 1870 Act in relation to the list of extradition crimes set out in Schedule 
1 of the 1870 Act. than whether Nielsen was likely to ultimately suffer any 
injusticeo 
C. The Political Offence Exception to Extradition in England 
Extradition is an international legal act between two states, the requesting 
and the requested state. In this process 0 the requested person plays a merely 
passive role; he is the object of a legal process in which only the states 
concerned are considered interested parties.(32) The recognition of the 
individual as an interested party wouldu as a matter of facto be incompatible 
with one of the fundamental principles of international law, which only considers 
states as perfect juridical subjects.(33) However there has been a move towards 
greater recognition of the individual as a juridical subject 0 with the develop-
ment and strength of the human rights principle since the Second World War. The 
political offence exception was one of the first legal principles which clearly 
and unequivocally contemplated the protection of the individual.(34) The French 
Revolution is seen as the point at which the exception began to gather momentum 
against the idea of extradition. The emergence of the philosophical concept of 
freedom and its penetration into French society ultimately culminated in the 
right to revolt as proclaimed by the French Revolution 0 which established the 
moral and legal basis for the exercise of the right to revolutionary political 
32. M. Ch. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (1974) 0 
p. 49. 
33. Th. E. Lawrence, The Principles of International 
p. 72; Oppenheim0 Vol 1 0 p. 19 (8th ed.) (1955). 
present study. 
Law (6th ed.) (1915), 
Also see Chapter 2 of 
34o Dr. c. Van den Wijngaert 0 "The Political Offence Exception to Extradition; 
The delicate problem of balancing the rights of the individual and the 
international public order" Kluwer (1980) 0 p. 37. 
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action.(35) The abhorrence of absolutism and d<3spot.i.sm wh:i.r.h was gaining ground 
in Europe at the time 0 resulted in the Jacobin Constitution of 1793 which for the 
first time proclaimed the individual right to asylum. It declared in Article 120 
that the French people "grants asylum to foreigners banished from their countries 
for the cause of freedom. It will be denied to tyrants". This connection 
between the political offence exception and the concept of asylum is of 
fundamental importance to the individual. Briefly stated 9 asylum is defined by 
the Institut de Droit International at its 1951 Bath session as: "The protection 
accorded by a state on its territory or in another place under its jurisdiction 
to an individual who has come to seek it". Article 2(1). This definition is in 
keeping with the classic law of nations because it indicates the state 9 and not 
the individual as the holder of the right of asylum. This right follows the 
normal exercise of territorial sovereignty and each state isu in principle 6 
completely free to act at its own discretion.(36) In recent times 9 new trends 
have developed which tentatively suggest that the individual may be the holder of 
a right of asylum (37) as well as various attempts to restrict the content and 
scope of the right of asylum. Asylum will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
In 1833 political asylum was 0 for the first time 9 officially codified in 
statute law. The Belgian Extradition Act of October 1 1833 was the first 
recorded extradition Act in history and at the same time the first official 
35. L. Bolesta-Kodziebrodsk 0 Le Droit d 0Asile (1962) 9 p. 29; Th. E. Carbonneauu 
"The Political Offence Exception to Extradition and Transnational 
Terrorists; old doctrine reformulated and new norms created" (1977) 1 
A.S.I.L.S. Int. L.J.v p. 45. 
36. L. Oppenheimu International Vol 1 0 pp. 676-678 (8th ed.) (Lauterpacht 
1955)a F. Morgensternu "The Right of Asylum" (1949) 26 B.Y.I.Lo 
p. 327a M. Garcia-Mora 6 International Law and Asylum as a Human Right 
(1956) 0 p. 120. 
37. However 9 note the U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum December 14 1967 
A/Res. 2312 (XXII). Article 1 refers to "Asylum granted by a state in the 
exercise of its sovereignty" which clearly negates the individual right to 
asylum. 
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codification of the political offence exception. Article 6 contained the rele-
vant provision. "It shall be expressly stipulated in these treaties that the 
foreigner shall not be prosecuted nor punished for any political offence 
committed before extradition 0 nor for any fact connected to such crime'1 • However 
even at this time 0 the drafters were conscious of the practical difficulties 
arising from the vagueness of the concept "political crime". The first formal 
limitation to the political offence exception in statute law was introduced by 
Belgium as a result of Jacquin 0 a famous case. In September 1854 the French 
Emperor Napoleon III made a trip by train to Tournai Belgium. Celestin and Jules 
Jacquin. two Frenchmen residing in Belgium had placed a bomb on the railway where 
the French emperor 0 s train was about to pass. The bomb exploded 0 but the attempt 
was unsuccessful. Napoleon survived and Celestin and Jules Jacquin fled to 
Belgium. France then requested Celestin°s extradition from the Belgian govern-
ment. Since France was a mighty military power 0 Belgium was in a difficult 
position. The Brussels Court of Appeal had rendered a negative advisory opinion 
regarding Jacquin's extradition, holding that the crimes charged were political 
offences. The Belgian government though not bound by the court realised the 
political delicacy of granting extradition in derogation of the court ruling. 
France withdrew her extradition request eventually 0 but the government of Belgium 
introduced a bill 0 now known as the "Belgian Clause" or the "Attentat Clause" 
which provided that "It shall not be considered as a political offence nor as a 
fact 0 connected 0 to such offence, the attempt against the person of a foreign 
head of state or against the person of his family members, whether the attempt be 
by means of murder 0 assasination or poisoning". Many countries have now enacted 
a similar clause in their extradition laws and treaties.(38) Great Britain is 
38. Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 
Article 3(2)(a) 1962; European Convention on Extradition 0 Article 3(3) 
(1957); Arab League Extradition Agreement. Article IV(1) and (2) (1952)1 
Central American Extradition Convention 0 Article 3 (1934). 
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seen as the forerunner in the modern establishment of the political offence 
exceptiono In 1815 the Governor of Gibraltar surrendered political fugitives to 
Spaino This led to a public outcry in England which led Sir James Mackintosh to 
say that no nation ought to refuse asylum to political fugitiveso In 1816 Lord 
Castlereagh stated that there could be no greater abuse of law than to allow it 
to be the instrument of inflicting punishment on foreigners who had committed 
political crimes.(39) In 1868 various debates took place in the Select Committee 
of Parliament. These debates were due to the fact that it was Parliament 0 s 
doubts about the compatibility of extradition with the right of asylum which 
delayed the enactment of an extradition law in the United Kingdom. The Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs stated (40) : "Under our present treaties we should 
not give up a person charged with a political crime"; and the chief Metropolitan 
Police magistrate when appearing before the same Committee stated (41) : "The law 
of extradition expressly excludes political offences. In our treaty there is no 
clause to that effect~ but it is a well understood law and it is laid down by all 
French authors; all their treaties contain a clause that political crimes are not 
to come within the treaty". 
The desire to prevent the legal processes from being used by another state 
as instruments against its domestic opponents 0 and the feeling that the political 
offender had suffered enough by exile meant that despite the example of the 
Belgian "attentat" clause in 1856 0 Parliarnent 0 s strong protection of the right to 
grant political asylum would not admit any limitation or derogation. 
After the 1868 Parliamentary debates legislation was introduced which 
eventually resulted in the enactment of the 1870 Extradition Act. Section 3(1) 
39. Oppenheim, pp. 704-705; Wheaton 0 International Law (6th ed.) (1929) 0 Vol. 1 0 
Po 217 o 
41o HoCo Papers 1867-1868 No. 393; 6 BoDoioLoq PPo 659-804o 
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of the 1870 Extradition Act (12) contains the relevant exception clause "A 
fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in respect of which his 
surrender is demanded is one of a political characteru or if he proves to the 
satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on 
habeas corpus or to the secretary of state that the requisition of his surrender 
has 8 in fact 8 been made with a view to try and punish him for an offence of a 
political character"o No definition of the term "offence of a political 
character" exists and case law subsequent to the 1870 Act has interpreted the 
termo At the outset 8 as the debates before Parliament illustrated in 1868, the 
primary concern was the respect for the right of asylum given to political 
offenderso The clear line of priority resolved itself in favour of the individ-
ual interests rather than state interestso With the passage of time, however 8 
this advantage to the individual has been gradually eroded as a direct result of 
the changing methods by which individuals have challenged the political structure 
of the stateo The conflict between state interests in the repression of crime 
and the individualvs right not to be oppressed is being resolved more and more in 
favour of the stateo The justification for this move is the fear that the 
predominant form the political challenge now assumes is one which endangers the 
whole social fabric of democratic societies and not just the particular govern-
ment in powero The "terrorists" whose early form was the anarchist has found 
that his right to rebel or to rebel in the way that they choose is not deemed 
superior to the common interest in the suppression of their activitieso In fact 
the invocation of the political offence exception has succeeded only twice before 
the English courtso The first case that will be considered illustrates 
"acceptable" violence permitted in the commission of a political offence 8 whilst 
the third case shows violence which is permitted where the purpose is deemed 
42o 33 and 34 Victo Co 52 (1870)o Note 8 "true" or "pure" political offences 
such as high treason 8 sedition and lese-majeste are not extraditable 
offences 8 as they are not included in the first schedule to the 1870 Acto 
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acceptablea In these two cases the section 3(1) exception was successfully 
invokeda The analysis of the case law shows this move towards the consolidating 
of state interests above individual interestsa 
Re Castioni (43) 
This concerned an application by Switzerland for the extradition of Castioni 
for the murder of one Luigi Rossi 0 who was a member of the state council of the 
Canton of Ticinoo The murder occurred during an uprising which grew out of the 
dissatisfaction with the administration of the government of the Cantone The 
citizens rose up against the government by use of force 0 with weapons 0 and 
attacked the municipal palace 9 where they then set up a provisional governmento 
The prisoner took an active part and shot Rossi during the struggle for the 
municipal palaceo Counsel for the applicant sought to invoke the protection of 
section 3(1) by using the definition of political offence suggested by John 
Stuart Mill in the debate in the House of Commons upon the Extradition Bill 0 
namely 9 "any offence committed in the course of a furthering of civil war 9 
insurrection or other political commotion"o A more obvious case of a political 
offence could hardly be imaginedo(44) Counsel for the applicant also referred 
to the definition given by Stephen Jo in his History of the Criminal Law of 
England (45) that political offences were those crimes which were "incidental to 
and formed part of political disturbances"o(46) Hawkins Jo came nearest to a 
definition when he stated he "adopted absolutely" Mro Justice Stephen°s inter-
pretation advanced in his booko Denman Jo rejected Mill 0 s definition on the 
ground that it appeared to give immunity to any act merely because it occurs 
concurrently with the existence of political commotiono Thus it was considered 
43a {1891) 1 QoBoq Po 149o 
44o IoAo Shearer 9 Extradition in International Law 0 Po 170o 
45o Vola II 70 0 71 {1883)o 
46o {1891) 1 QoBo 165-166o 
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too broado Hawkins Jo felt that the first requirement was that there had to be 
some political disturbanceo Some commentators on the case suggest that this does 
not necessarily import a contention for control of the governmento(47) Denman Jo 
though it necessary that there be "a political matter 0 a political rising.0 or a 
dispute between two parties in the state as to which is to have the government in 
its hands"o(48) On this view something less than a disturbance would apparently 
be sufficiento A mere disagreement or a dispute between two political parties 
would be coveredo(49) This view is broader than that of Hawkins Jo Much effort 
is made by both Denman Jo and Hawkins Jo to emphasise that Castioni 0 s act was 
not motivated by private revengeo(SO) "He did not shoot to take the man°s life 
or pay off an old grudge or revenge himself for anything which Rossi had ever 
personally done to him"o Thus the court felt there were at least three 
constituent elements in a political offence; first 0 the actor must be politically 
motivated0 any conduct for such private purposes as revenge being excluded; 
secondly0 the act must be at least some overt act aimed directly 0 not indirectly 
at the existing government 0 if not in active support of the attempted overthrow 
of the state; thirdly0 the act in question must take place in a political 
context (51) ioeoo within the specific physical context of the political 
struggleo Following closely on Castioni was Re Meuniero(52) 
47o Jo Woodcock 0 "Political Offences and Extradition1 A Conceptual Deviation 
in the English Courts" April 1980 To 1. 9 p o 2_9 o 
48a ( 1891) 1 QaBo 156o 
49a Dra Amerasinghe 0 "The Schtraks Case 0 Defining Political Offences in Extra-
dition" (1965) 28 MaLaRaq Po 32o 
50o (1891) 1 QoBo 159u 165o 167o 
SL JoGo Castel and Mo Edward 0 "Political Offences; Extradition and Deportation 
- Recent Canadian Developments" ( 1975) Os ~ ::1. L. J.• 9 89. 
52o (1894) 2 QaBa 415o 
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~~e_Jiieu~ier 
The prisoner had caused two explosionsa one at a cafe killing two persons 
and the other at military barrackso He argued that the offences charged were of 
a political character because they were outrages against government property 
committed by an anarchisto In rejecting this propositionu Cave Jo stated: "It 
appears to me that, in order to constitute an offence of a political character 0 
there must be two or more parties in the state 0 each seeking to impose the 
government of their choice on the other 0 and that 0 if the offence is committed by 
one side or other in pursuance of that object 0 it is a political offence 0 
otherwise not"o(53) Thus the elements necessary to constitute an offence of a 
political character 0 as regards Cave Jo 0 s interpretation are 0 firstly 0 the 
existence of two or more parties 0 and secondly 0 that these parties are seeking to 
impose the government of their choice and thirdly0 the act must be done in 
pursuance of the second point aboveo Cave Jo emphasised that anarchists are 
enemies of all governments and that their acts are directed against the general 
body of citizens; "they may secondarily and incidentally commit offences against 
some particular government; but anarchist offences are mainly directed against 
private citizens"o(54) The court emphatically stated that there were not two 
political parties in the case 0 thus denying that anarchists were a political 
partyo This stresses the important part that political parties play in the 
definitiono It is not a question of political motives as sucho But it is 
essential that political parties be at variance before the notion of a political 
offence can come into operationo(SS) Anarchist activities throughout Western 
Europe 0 most particularly in France 0 had reached their zenith at this timeo The 
philosophical precepts held by this group were anethema to the bourgeois liberal 
53o Ibidoq Po 419o 
54o Ibidog Po 419o 
55o Dro Amerasinghe 0 opocito 6 suprao No 49 at Po 34o 
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democratsu who held sacrosanct the existing forms of pa:clictrnentary democracy. 
Meunier 0 s activities in France were only a part of a much larger offensive 
organised by the anarchists beginning some time in March 1892o This offensive 
was prompted by the Conservative republicans 0 continued resistance to social 
reform and then the Massacre of Fourmies in 1891 0 where government troops fired 
on a group of demonstrating workers and killed women and children. From this 
historical context 0 either no evidence of the political situation in France was 
placed before the court or the notion of giving asylum to a person of Meunier 0 s 
political persuasion was completely offensive to the judges.(56) The first 
provisions cqncerning the political offence exception were drafted in an 
atmosphere of romanticism and glorification of political offenders 8 starting from 
an almost naive identification of the political offender with the liberal 
revolutionary 0 without 0 however taking into account the possibility that other 
political offenders would in turn oppose the new liberal legal order itself.(57) 
Shearer notes that the judgment of Cave J. at page 419 served to narrow the 
concept by introducing the qualification that there should be some kind of 
organised party contending for power with the established government.(58) The 
court preferred the definition of Denman J. in Castioni to that of Hawkins J. in 
that it did not require the existence of a physical political disturbance. The 
next important case concerning section 3(1) of the 1870 Act was R v. Governor of 
Brixton Prison ex parte Kolczynski.(59) 
R v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Kolczynski 
The case concerned seven Polish nationals serving as crew members on a 
trawler in the North Sea 0 as part of a Polish fishing fleet. On board each of 
56. J.G. Castel and M. Edwardu op.cit. 0 supra. N. 51 at p. 98. 
57. Dr. c. Van den Wijngaert 8 op.cit., supra. N. 34 at p. 14. 
58. Shearer0 cip.cit. 8 supra. N. 44 at p. 171. 
59. (1955) 1 Q.B. 540. 
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the trawlers wac a person known ac a party socrctaryo The political cowmissar 
and party secretaries exercised supervision over the crew 0 s political leanings 
and they noted the conversations of the meno The applicants decided to escape so 
they overwhelmed the captain and the party secretary and brought the vessel into 
an English porto Poland demanded their extradition for assault and revolt or 
conspiracy to revolt on board a vessel on the high seaso The applicants raised 
the defence that their offences were political 0 arguing that a broad meaning 
should be assigned to the words "offence of a political character"o 
Alternatively 0 if Castioni and Meunier were still good law0 as they were 0 
and that as the offence had to be done "in furtherance of a conflict between 
different parties contending for power in a state" 0 then the crew could be 
considered to be a "political unit" which had rebelled against the "political 
head" of that political unito The political head was the party secretary on 
board the vessel 0 who 0 it was alleged0 listened to the conversations of the crew 
and generally supervised the crews political leaning. The court accepted the 
suggestion that the views expressed in Castioni and Meunier were to be read 
in the political context of the nineteenth centuryo Lord Goddard CoJ. considered 
that "the evidence about the law prevalent in the Republic of Poland today shows 
that it is necessary 0 if only for reasons of humanity 6 to give a wider and more 
generous meaning to the words we are now construing".(60) It was admitted that 
there was no organised internal opposition to the government of Poland in 1955. 
Section 3(1) contains two limbs. The first limb forbids the surrender of a 
fugitive if the evidence shows the crime to have been committed in circumstances 
clothing it with a political character; the second prevents his surrender 0 
although the offence is not of a political character if the fugitive can 
establish to the court that the requisitioning state really requires his 
surrender so that it may try him for another offence which is of a political 
60. · Ibid. 8 p. 549 0 551. 
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characteJ~ 0 or at least punish him on his conviction of tho non-political offence 
as though he had been tried for the political offence 0 Cassels Jo adopted this 
construction holding that the offences here were of a political character within 
the first limb of the subsectiona further that even if the seven men were tried 
in Poland for the extradition offences alone 0 they would be punished for an 
offence of a political character 0 ioeo 0 treason in going over to the enemy 0 thus 
bringing the case within the second limb of section 3(1)o As such the sailors 
would be punished for an offence of a purely political charactero(61) 
Lord Goddard CoJo construed the subsection in an entirely different manner 
in extending the definition of an offence of a political charactero He stated: 
"The revolt of the crew was to prevent themselves being prosecuted for a 
political offence and in my opinion therefore the offence had a political 
character"o(62) The party secretary was keeping observation on the accused 0 
monitoring their political opinionso If they were returned to Poland and 
prosecuted 0 any such prosecution would have been a political one 9 or a 
prosecution for a political offence in the pure sense of the termo Since the 
common crimes for which extradition was sought were committed with the purpose of 
avoiding such a prosecution they acquired the character of political crimeso As 
such therefore Lord Goddard felt the case fell squarely within the second limb of 
section 3(1)o Wo Denny (63) points out that in reaching his decision upon the 
relationship between the facts of the case and the construction of section 3(1) 0 
Lord Goddard relied upon the provisions of section 3(2) the principle of 
specialityo A treaty containing the provision for the principle of speciality 
was made with Poland in 1932o Relying upon a case called Re Arton Nool (64) 
61. Wo Denny 0 "An Offence of a Political Character 11 (1955) 18 MaLaRa 380o 
62o (1955} 1 QoBo 550o 
63o Wo Denny 0 opocitoo suprao No 61 at PPo 381-382o 
64o (1896} 1 QoBo 108o 
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Lord Goddard declared that "the court must not assume that the foreign state will 
not observe the terms of the treaty" and that therefore "the second limb of the 
section cannot mean that the court can say that if extradition is sought for 
crime A we believe that if surrendered he will be tried or punished for crime 
B"o In Re Arton it was alleged by the applicant fugitive from France that his 
extradition on charges of monetary crimes was a mere device in order to subject 
him to police interrogation with regard to certain political matterso The court 
considered that an offence of a political character had to be an offence already 
committedu and not a purely speculative one which might be the outcome of 
interrogationo Lord Russell CoJo stopped counsel for the applicant from arguing 
that the French government ("a friendly state") was not acting in good faith in 
making its applicationo Certain authors,notably Denny (65)u do not agree with 
Lord Goddard 0 s interpretation of Arton in Kolczynskio They view this manner 
of interpretation as depriving a fugitive criminal of an important additional 
protection against political persecutiono They argue that in section 3(2) the 
legislature obviously intended that some safeguard should operate against abuse 
of surrender; "although the courts will not assume that the foreign state will 
not observe the treaty (as the Lord Chief Justice said)o Re Arton does notu it 
is submitted, preclude the reception of evidence and a finding by the court to 
that effect (as the argument of the Lord Chief Justice inferred and re-
quired)"o(66) In deciding the meaning of the phrase 11 an offence of a political 
character"u Lord Goddard CoJo and Cassels Jo considered the previous case lawo 
Of Castioni they found the definition suggested by Stephen Jo to be too narrow 
for the facts before themu flexibility was needed due to twentieth century 
circumstanceso Wo Denny considers that the definition of Stephen Jo was adequate 
65o WoEo Dennyu "An Offence of a Political Character" (1955) 18 MoLoRo Po 380 
at Po 382o 
66o WoEo Dennyu Ibido, Po 382; IoAo Sheareru opocitou suprao No 44 
at PPo 173-175o 
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for Kolczynskiu provided "the phrase political disturbance was given a common-
sense interpretation in the light of existing political circumstances and not 
limited to forcible attempts to overthrow a government by an opposing party'0 .(67) 
Neither judge referred to Meunier in their judgments. The case is regarded as 
'
0the high water mark of liberality in the determination of the limits of a 
political offence by British courts 10 .(68) Denny concludes by stating that it is 
regrettable that the law on the interpretation of section 3(1) should have been 
left in a state not only uncertain but also capable of dangerous restrictions in 
the protection afforded by the Act to political fugitives.(69) The prophetic 
nature of these words have in the course of time become apparent. One can only 
conclude that the case was or should have been decided on the second limb of 
section 3(1) whilst Castioni and Meunier were confined to the first limb. 
In 1962 the House of Lords for the first time considered the words "offence 
of a political character". 
Schtraks v. Government of Israel (70) 
The parents of a boy named Joseph Schuchmacher left the boy in custody of 
his mother 0 s parents 0 the Schtraks. When the parents asked for the return of the 
boy the grandparents refused to return the boy on the grounds that if the boy 
were returned he would not be given the education proper to an orthodox Jew. 
In habeas corpus proceedings the Supreme Court ordered the grandparents to hand 
over the boy by a set date; when the date came and the boy had still not been 
returned 0 the grandfather was sent to prison. The appellant was an uncle of the 
67. W.E. Denny 0 Ibid. at p. 384. 
68. I.A. Shearer 0 op.cit. 0 supra. N. 44 at p. 173. 
69. W.Eo Denny 0 op.cit. 0 supra. No 61 at p. 385; J. Woodcock 0 op.cit. 0 
suprao No 47 at Po 32o 
70o (1962) 3 All EoRo HoLo; (1962) AoCo 573; (1962) 3 WoLoRo 1Q13o 
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boyv being a son of tho grandparents. It was alleged against him that he took 
the boy to a settlement at Kommemiyut and arranged with a family that they should 
keep the boy for some time 0 giving false names for himself and the boy. The 
application was against both the grandparents and the appellant who was alleged 
to be making common cause with the grandparents and in assisting them in their 
determination not to return the boy. The appellantvs action was supported by 
the Rabbi of Jerusalem. The case provoked debates in the Knesset and public 
meetings were held. The appellant fled to England to seek refuge and proceed-
ings were commenced to return him to Israel on charges of child stealing and 
perjury. The accused sought to argue that because no precise definition of 
"political" could be given 0 if a crime is committed within the context of an 
acute political struggle within the state then it is a crime of a political 
character (the Castioni criteria). In Israel the argument proceeded 0 religious 
leaders also have political duties and this particular religious issue had become 
a political issue in the Knesset. But the House of Lords unanimously held that 
it was not enough to make out a case under the section that the offences were 
capable of political significance if in fact they had not been committed for a 
political purpose. The fugitive had to be at odds with the state which applied 
for his extradition0 on some issue connected with the political control or 
government of the country. The present offence was not of a political character 
because they were ascribable either to "filial piety" or to a wish to take his 
(the appellant) fathervs side rather than to demonstrating against the policy of 
the state. The House thus made it plain that an offence could not be regarded as 
political where it was committed without a political motive notwithstanding that 
a political significance might be attached to the act in the minds of other 
people. The evidence strongly showed that the actions of the accused in this 
case,were privately motivated rather than in any real sense directed towards 
demonstrating against the policy of the state. On this view of the facts it 
became unnecessary to decide what in fact was meant by a "political offence". 
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The views on this question which followed were obiter dicta. The decision of 
the court was based on a principle to be found in all the definitions that had 
emerged from the previous cases of Castioni and Meunier 0 namely 0 that it was 
necessary that the offence be committed in furtherance of the political struggle. 
The illustrations given in this case do not insist on the presence of a political 
disturbance of the kind envisaged by Hawkins J. in Castioni. The existence of 
a political movement or struggle is deemed sufficient. In this respect it comes 
closer to the definition adopted by Denman J. in Castioni and that of Cave J. 
in Meunier. The other factor to emerge is that it is necessary for the struggle 
to be between the governing party and another political party in the state. It 
is insufficient that the struggle be between any two political parties in the 
state. In this aspect it is different from the definition offered in the Meunier 
case; it approximates to the narrower interpretation of Denman J. 0 s definition in 
Castioni. 
Lord Reid 0 s judgment is considered by one author to be "one of the most 
sensitive and penetrating that has yet been given".(71) He looks to the 
intention of the legislature which he stated was to give effect to the principle 
that there should be_in this country_asylum for politica~ refugees. He widens 
the circumstances which may be said to be indicative of an offence of a political 
character. He emphasised the preparatory stages of an open insurrection 0 some-
thing which Castioni did not take account of. He stated that there need not be 
an open insurrection; "an underground resistance may be attempting to overthrow 
a government and it can hardly be that an offence committed the day before open 
disturbances broke out would be treated as non-political while a precisely 
similar offence committed two days later would be of a political character".(72) 
71. J.G. Cassel and M. Edwards 0 op.cit., supra N. 51 at p. 102. 
72. (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1025-1026. 
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Nor was it necessary that there should be nn nttempt to overthrow the government3 
attempts to compel a government to change its advisers or its policy could give 
rise to political offenceso Dro Amerasinghe also points out that Lord Reid 
established that the motive and purpose of the offender is relevanto "Thus the 
commission of a crime in order to satisfy a grudge would prevent the offence from 
being politicalo The purpose must be to promote a political cause"o(73) 
Lord Radcliffe (74) felt an attempt at a definition would be inappropriate 
but that it was necessary to give the words a "descriptionno He sees the whole 
question of "political offence" as one concerning itself with "political 
refugees" 0 "political asylum•• and 10political prisoner" o "The fugitive is at odds 
with the state that applies for his extradition on some issue connected with the 
political control or government of the countryo It does indicate that the 
requesting state is after him for reasons other than the enforcement of the 
criminal law in its ordinary 0 what I may call its common or international aspect; 
if the central government stands apart and is concerned only to enforce the 
criminal law that has been violated by these contestants 0 I see no reason why 
fugitives should be protected by this country on the grounds that they are 
political offenders"o This statement has been the source of considerable 
controversy and confusion as various interpretations of its meaning have been put 
forwardo(75) Lord Radcliffe 0 s discussion impels one to the conclusion that the 
formulation of a workable rule is impossibleo(76) On what evidence could a court 
come to the conclusion that a requesting government was intent only to enforce 
the ordinary criminal law? From Lord Radcliffe 0 s judgment two points of 
73o Dro Amerasinghe 0 op.citoo suprao No 49 at p. 37o 
74o (1962) 3 WoLoRo 1Q32-1Q33o 
75o JaGa Castel and Mo Edwards 0 op.cito 8 suprao No 51 at Po 104o 
76o IoAo Shearero Extradition in International Law8 Po 178o 
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importance emerged on the question of a political offencea(77) Firstly0 the idea 
that the connection between the offence and an uprising0 disturbance 0 
insurrection and war or struggle for power envisaged in Castioni and Meunier 
had to be maintained0 even though a liberal meaning was given to these wordsa 
Secondly 0 the mere fact that the offence was committed for a political purpose or 
with a political motive or for the furtherance of some political cause or 
campaign did not make it politicala Arguably the judgments have had the result 
of widening the Castioni decisiono However Amerasinghe cautioned against a 
wide interpretation of its conclusions on political offencesa Co Warbrick (78) 
suggests that this was "percipient counsel 0 because since that time 0 the English 
cases have narrowed down the concept of political offence in response to the 
nature and extent of political violence perceived by the courts"o JoGo Castel 
and Mo Edwards (79) consider that the judgment in laying less emphasis on the 
requirement of a turbulent political context as an element in a political offence 
is eminently praiseworthy "as it reflects a more realistic understanding of 
modern conditions and the changing modes of political resistance"o For his 
part 0 Jo Woodcock (80) argues that by approaching the concept from the 
"worthiness of asylum" angle the court widens the Castioni model which is a 
good thingo But by "deliberately keeping their options open by enabling them-
selves to alter the definition according to present circumstances (which can 
only be taken to mean political considerations) they are in effect establishing 
and retaining for themselves a political veto"o(81) 
- 83 -
For her part Dro c. Van den Wijngaert (82) says of Kolczynski and 
Schtraks that they illustrate how within the boundaries of the political 
incidence theory (as the English case law development of the political offence is 
known) British courts managed to reduce the political offence exception to its 
most essential raison d 0etre 0 ice •• the protection of the individual against 
retaliatory trial by his political adversaries. "Whereas in the Kolczynski 
case. the risk of a retaliatory trial led the court to characterise the crimes 
alleged as political. the absence of the same risk in the Schtraks case 
resulted in the crimes being considered as extraditable. non-political offences". 
Re Gross. ex parte Treasury Solicitor (83) 
In this case the trial of an s.s. officer for murder of concentration camp 
inmates was held not to be an offence of a political character. The offender was 
not "at odds" with the government when the offence was committed, but was rather 
serving its end. Chapman J. noted that Lord Radcliffe had stressed the 
relationship between political offenders and political asylum in Schtraks and 
there was little prospect that the offender here would have been granted 
political asylum when the crime was committed. He, however, did consider that 
there might be cases where persons working for the government might claim that 
their actions were of a political character, for example, if a usurper government 
set about liquidating its opponents and later that government was overturned, 
those who had assisted the usurping government in this endeavour might well be 
looked upon as political offenders.(84) 
In 1973 a new case came before the House of Lords which added another 
82. Op.cit., supra. N. 34 at pp. 113-114. 
83. (1968) 3 All E.R. 804. 
84. G.V. La Forest Q.C., Extradition to and from Canada (2nd ed.) (1977) 0 p. 72. 
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dimension to the interpretation of the term "political offence"" 
R Vo Governor of P~ntonville Prison ex parte Cheng (85) 
The applicant was a member of a formosan organisation opposed to the Taiwan 
regime and convicted in New York of the attempted murder of its vice-premiero He 
was allowed bail and he fled to London via Swedeno The attack 0 according to the 
World Union of Formosans for Independence, of which Cheng was a member, was 
equally directed against the United States because of their economic and military 
support of Taiwano As such the offence was claimed to be a political oneo In 
essence the question is do the words "in the state" necessarily import the words 
"requesting" so that the concept is limited to an offence directed against the 
requesting state; and is the exception of section 3(1) to be applied to those who 
carry on political opposition in exile? 
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal stating that the "political 
character" in its context connoted opposition to the requesting state on some 
issue connected with the political control or government of that state; and since 
the applicant had not, on the facts been taking political action vis-a-vis the 
United States government and the United States government was not concerned with 
the relations between the United States and Taiwan in asking for extradition but 
was concerned only with the enforcing of its criminal law, the applicant's 
offence was not one of a political character within section 3(1). 
The defence attempted to argue that the place where the offence occurred was 
irrelevant to the question of whether the offence is political or nato And 
because the evidence established that the applicant was the secretary of the 
established political movement seeking to remove the Taiwan regime, the offence 
was within the meaning of the previous case law authorities whether it be the 
85. (1973) 1 W.L.Ro 747; (1973) 2 All E.R. 204. 
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test of Lord Reid or that of Viscount Radcliffe in Schtrakso The House of Lords 
rejected the appellant 0 s arguments by a three to two majorityo One crucial 
argument operating against the appellant in the case was again put by Lord 
Radcliffe in Schtraksu namelyu that one must look to the requesting state to 
determine whether in its eyes the context is political or noto(86) Lord Diplock 
based his judgment upon an analytical interpretation of the words "offence" and 
"political"o His interpretation of the first is used to limit the territorial 
applicability of section 3 and of the second to limit the "interest sought"o 
"The relevant state of mind is not restricted to the intent necessary to con-
stitute the offence with which he is charged. for in the case of none of the 
extradition crimes can this properly be described as being politicalo The 
relevant mental element must involve some less immediate object which the 
accused sought to achieve by doing the physical act"o(87) In attempting to 
accommodate Kolczynski in his judgment. Lord Diplock confuses the issueso In 
Kolczynski the court did not state that the attribution of "political" to the 
Polish seamens 0 action was conditional upon them having the requisite mental 
element of intending to carry on a fight against the Polish governmento Lord 
Salmon°s judgment shows clearly the political atmosphere and the implications for 
the United Kingdom if the appellant should succeed: "It seems to me that the 
benevolence with which it is said that the Act of 1870 should be construed in 
favour of a fugitive offender must have some rational limitso Otherwise persons 
couldv for example. bomb buildings or destroy civilian aircraft or murder 
visiting politicians in the United States of America or any other country with 
which we have an extradition treaty knowing that they could escape trial and 
punishment by escaping to England"o(88) The dissenting opinion of Lord Simon. it 
86o Jo Woodcockv opocitoo suprao N0 47 at Po 37o 
87. (1973) 1 WoLoRo 755o 
88o Ibidoq Po 771o 
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is submitted 0 is the better view. He refers to the canons of construction~ 
strict statutory interpretation. He refers first to the "first" or golden rule 
which requires that words and phrases should be given their natural and ordinary 
meanings. It is wrong to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not 
there. Secondly, from the approach of historical background, he concludes that 
Parliament could not have intended section 3(1) to be construed other than 
benevolently in favour of the fugitive offender. Thirdly 0 he cites the pre-
sumption in favour of compatability with international law. He refers to Re 
Pavelic and Kwaternik (89) which he considers as indistinguishable from the 
present case. Here 0 two Croatians were alleged to have murdered in Marseilles 
the King of Yugoslavia and also the French foreign minister. They then fled to 
Italy. Subsequently, the request for their extradition was refused uncondition-
ally by the Italian court. So just as international law precludes Pavelic 0 s 
extradition for the alleged murder of King Alexander in France (though the 
Italian court did not rely on international law), it precludes the appellant 0 s 
extradition for the attempted murder of the Taiwan vice-president in the United 
States and the Act of 1870 should be construed accordingly in the absence of 
contraryindication.(90) Lord Simon emphasised at the end of his judgment that 
despite the increase in political violence 0 the solution to the kind of political 
violence represented in the case was for "governments in international conclave; 
there is no advantage in marginal and anomalous judicial erosion of traditional 
immunities". The problem as Shearer (91) points out, is that the treaty 
stipulations relating to political offences are commonly silent as to the organs 
of the requested state competent to determine whether a fugitive is protected as 
a political offender. The executive exercises the final act in the extradition 
89. (1933-34) 158 Ann. Dig. 
90. (1973) 1 W.L.R. p. 766. 
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process of ordering the conveyance of the fugitive to the requesting stateo In 
Zacharia and Arestidou Vo Republic of Cyprus (92) a case brought under the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 0 a statute which deals with rendition between the 
Commonwealth 0 the applicant argued on two groundso Firstly0 that the murders 
they were alleged to have committed were offences of a political charactero The 
killings 0 v.rhich they denied they had committedu were done in the course of the 
fight for independence of Cyprus made by a group called the EoOoKoAo to which the 
appellant belongedo Secondlyu the application for their return was not made in 
good faith in the interests of justiceo The appeal was rejected by the House of 
Lordso The executiveu however 8 then refused to allow the surrender of the two 
individual so 
Atkinson Vo United States Government (93) 
This is authority for the proposition that the executive but not the courts 
have the power to refuse the surrender of a fugitive to a foreign country if it 
would be wrongu unjust or oppressive to do soo Various arguments have been put 
forward in support of the exercise of executive discretion in this areao The 
executive undoubtedly has access to confidential avenues of information closed to 
the courts which may significantly alter the appreciation of-the nature-or 
circumstances of an offence to the fugitive 0 s advantageo It can also act upon 
information supplied by the fugitive which could not be received as admissible 
evidence by the courts because of evidentiary rules or procedureso But the main 
objection to the exercise of an executive discretion in favour of the fugitive is 
based on diplomatic expediencyo An executive discretion in favour of the 
fugitive implies an unfavourable comment on the bona fides of the requesting 
government or the standards of justice prevailing in its territoryo To assign 
92o - {1963) AoCo 6341 (1962)- 2 All E~Ro. 433o 
93~ (1969) 3 ~li EoRo 
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the problem to the judiciary spares the requested government much embarrassmento 
This is the nub of Lord Simon°s (94) judgment in Chengo Co Warbrick (95) points 
out that what the court was concerned with in Cheng was the acceptable levels 
of violence used for the purposes of achieving political endso Cheng limits 
the range of violence permitted for the promotion of a political struggleo This 
judicial trend has had a detrimental effect on the principle of asylum. the basis 
on which the political offence exception was introduced into legislation 
concerning extradition.(96) 
The judicial trend of Cheng is well illustrated by reference to cases 
brought before the British courts during the seventies relating to the Irish 
conflicto In these cases the crimes for which extraditions were requested were 
linked (so the argument proceeded) to this conflict situation and thus. according 
to the strict application of political offence theory developed since Castioni, 
they could have been considered as political crimeso "But the courts have 
further de-emphasised the strict application of the political incidence test in 
order to focus on the 0at odds 0 test developed in Schtraks and increased 
attention to the subjective elements, i.e •• the motives for the act".(97) 
Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison (98) 
The procedures governing extradition between the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom are known as the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 
94. Shearer, lococit., p. 192. 
95o Co Warbrick 0 (1980) Summer, pp. 118-119. 
96. M.Ro Garcia-Mora, "The Present Statusof Political Offence in the Law of 
Extradition and Asylum" (1953) 14 Uo. Pitt, Lo Revo Po 371; C. Van den 
Wijngaert 0 op.cit., suprao 0 pp. 114-116; Co WarbriCK, opocit., pp. 118-
120; Thornberry, "Is the Non...,Surrender of Political Offenders Outdated?" 
{1963) 26 MoLoRo 555. 
97. Co Van den Wijngaert, opocit., supra. N. 34 at Po 115o 
98o {1972) AoCo 
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1965 in the United Kingdom and Part III Extradition Act 1965 in the Republic of 
Irelando Keane 0 a former member of the IoRoAo had been involved in political 
activities all his lifeo He helped in the formation of a new political 
organisation called Free Irelando Though not itself illegal. it could be made so 
at any momento The applicant arrived in England and was arrested on two Republic 
of Ireland warrants endorsed in accordance with the Backing of Warrants (Republic 
of Ireland) Act 1965o The first warrant was for the murder of a policeman in 
connection with a bank robberyg the second was a charge of armed robbery of a 
bank on another occasiono Section 2(2) of the above statute states that no order 
(for the applicant 0 s return to the Republic of Ireland) shall be made if it is 
shown (a) that the offence specified in the warrant is an offence of a political 
character; (b) that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person 
named or described in the warrant will, if taken to the Republic. be prosecuted 
or detained for another offence. being an offence of a political charactero The 
magistrate ordered his return to the Republic of Irelando The appellant argued 
that though the newly formed Free Ireland was not illegal, it could be made 
illegal at any moment by the introduction of the Offences Against the State Act 
1939o If it were in the future made illegal 0 then as a leading member of ito if 
he persisted in his political activities he might be detained and prosecuted 
under the Act and the offences would undoubtedly then be of a political 
charactero The appellant secondly argued that he had served prison terms for 
attempted arson and common assault in October 1967 which arose out of an attack 
on the headquarters of the Fianna Fail, the government party office, presumably 
a political offence. showing that he is a political animalo It was argued that 
this was enough to satisfy the court that there were substantial grounds for 
believing that if returned he would be prosecuted or detained for another 
offence. being an offence of a political charactero But the court held that even 
if the widest construction were to be given to section 2(2) (b) (Leo, that if 
there were substantial grounds for believing that after the applicant had been 
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prosecuted for the offences. of murder and armed robbery as charged 0 he would at 
some time in the future undefined be prosecuted for a political offence 0 no order 
could be made for his return) the applicant could only succeed if he could point 
to some offence with which he was going to be detained or charged (note Re 
Arton). Secondly 0 since the applicant had not satisfied the requirements of 
the above statement 0 his application was not successful. Lord Parker C.J. in the 
Court of Appeal (whose judgment was affirmed by the House of Lords) stated that 
an example of something that had already occurred in which it is alleged that he 
is concerned, could be the making illegal of the Free Ireland organisation 0 under 
the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and that before he came to England he had 
taken some active steps as a leading member of the organisation. However 0 as 
this had not been the fact in the case 0 there were no substantial grounds for 
believing that he will be prosecuted or detained, if returned for a political 
offence.(99) 
R v. Governor of Winson Green Prison ex parte Littlejohn (100) 
In October 1972 an armed robbery took place in the Republic of Ireland. The 
robbery was organised by a gang for the purpose of obtaining money for the I.R.A. 
On October 19 the applicant and his brother were arrested in England on an Irish 
warrant charging them with the commission of the robbery. During habeets corpus 
proceedings 0 the applicant and his brother argued that their connection with the 
I.R.A. made the offence one of a political character within section 2(2)(a) of 
the 1965 Act. The court held that there was not a sufficient political assoc-
iation between the offence and the applicant 0 s motive and refused the appli-
cation. On return to Ireland 0 the applicant was tried in a "special court" which 
had been established under the Offences Against the State-Act (Ireland) 1939. 
The special court which sat without a jury had been set up because the Irish 
99. ( 1972) A.C., pp. 209-210. 
100. (1975) 1 All E.R. 208. 
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government was satisfied that the ordinary courts we1::e inadequate to l:lecure the 
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and 
order within sections 35(2) and 36(1) of the 1939 Acto The applicant was 
sentenced to twenty years 0 imprisonmento In March 1974 the applicant escaped to 
Englando A warrant for his arrest was issued in Dublin for the offence of gaol 
breakingo When brought before a magistrate he concluded that the request should 
be refused under section 2(2) of the 1965 Act. to make an order for his delivery 
to the Irish police since there were substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be "detained for another offence. i.e. 8 the armed robbery, being an offence 
of a political character within section 2(2)(b)"o He relied on the fact that he 
had been tried in a special court as evidence that the robbery had been a 
political offence. The court held that an offence might be "of a political 
character" either where the wrongdoer had some direct ulterior motive of a 
political kind or where the state requesting his return was anxious to punish him 
for his politics rather than for the offence referred to in the extradition 
proceedings. Lord Widgery C.J. stated that in refusing to accept the submission 
two years previously when the matter was before the courto the court was saying 
in substance that although Littlejohn had been concerned with the IaRaA. and 
although their interest in robbing the bank was not simply to obtain money on 
their own accountu there was not a direct political association to make the 
offence one of a political charactero Also 0 the fact that the applicant had been 
tried in a special court did not indicate the contrary since neither section 
35(2) nor section 36(1) of the 1939 Act necessarily struck at offences of a 
political character or disclosed that the special courts were political courts. 
Thus the application by Littlejohn was refusedo The Cheng case along with 
Littlejohn and Keane illustrate the way the courts refuse to permit 
allegiance to a political party to be justification for the commission of a 
criminal offence. In Keane and Littlejohn, the offences were considered too 
remote for the~r political objective to be regarded as having a political 
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charactcro The remoteness test was used by Lord Diplock in Chengo nowever 0 
Jo Woodcock (101) argues that Lord Widgery used the test in a different way in 
Littlejohno From Lord Widgery 0 s judgment it is clear he is stating that the two 
most important factors to be taken into account in deciding whether an offence is 
of a political character are (a) the attitude of the requesting state and (b) the 
attitude and motive of the wrongdoer himselfo(102) 
Co Warbrick suggests that perhaps an attack by an IoRoAo member on an Irish 
politician or on a barracks in Ireland would be regarded as sufficiently 
proximate to its political objective to be an offence of a political 
charactero(103) 
R Vo Budlong (104) 
Members of the Church of Scientology entered various government offices in 
the District of Columbia in the United States and stole confidential material 
relating to the churcho The applicants were charged with burglary in respect of 
which the United States government made a requisition for their surrendero The 
applicants argued that the offences were of a political character because the 
applicants were engaged in an attempt to change the policy of the United States 
government towards the Church of Scientology and that the burglaries were 
committed to further this endo They relied upon passages in the opinion Schtraks 
and Cheng where Lord Reid and Lord Diplock refer to an offence of a political 
character being one aimed at changing the policy of the foreign governmento 
However Griffiths Jo stated that these words of their Lordships should be read 
in the full context of their speeches which makes it clear that they were 
lOlo Jo Woodcock 8 opocitoo suprao No 47 at Po 40o 
102o VoEo Hartley-Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure 0 Po 228o 
103o Co Warbrickg opocitoo suprao No 95 at Po 12L 
104o (1980} 1 WoLoRo lllOo 
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considering offences committed in the course of a ctruggle against a foreign 
government from which the accused had sought asylum in this countryo "In respect 
of any government policy there will probably be a substantial number of people 
who disagree with it and wish to change ito but it should not be thought that if 
they commit a crime to achieve their ends it necessarily becomes an offence of a 
political character" o ( 105) 
The applicants stated that the burglaries were planned in order to gain 
access to the information that had been collected by the Internal Revenue 
Services Department and the Department of Justice 0 so that they could identify 
persons in the Department hostile to Scientology and also in order to refute 
false allegationso However the court rejected this argument as coming within the 
ambit of section 3(1) of the 1870 Acto The court held that the applicants did 
not order the burglaries to take place in order to challenge the political 
control or government of the United Stateso They did so to further the interests 
of the Church of Scientology and in particular the interests of their foundero 
Thus the court rejected the plea of the applicants that their offence was of a 
political character and that they were political refugees with a good case for 
asylum being grantedo 
In the case Griffiths Jo stated that as society becomes more sophisticated6 
so the scope of government increases with the inevitable result that certain 
governmental policies will affect individuals over a widening rangeo One 
important area of increasing public concern is that of the various governmental 
stances around the world to the question of the build up of nuclear armamento 
Would offences committed in furtherance of the attempt to alter governmental 
policy on the issue come within the ambit of section 3(1) of the 1870 Act? 
According to Lord Reid in Schtraks 0 non-violent demonstrations against the 
105o Ibidoo Po 1123 0 paraso E-Fo 
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authorities can come within section 3(1) and an assault for example on a 
policeman during such ademonstration oughtu arguably 0 to come within the section. 
In conclm;ion to this survey of thA political offAncA P.XcP.pt_ion and its 
development in English case law0 certain factors emerge. It is clear that one 
must not exaggerate the importance of the political offence exception in 
practice.(106) Only two cases have successfully invoked section 3(1) 0 Castioni 
and Kolczynski. The former was decided on the first limb of section 3(1) 0 
whilst the latter was decided on the second limbo the asylum principle. 
Meunier (anarchist) 0 Cheng (terrorist) and Littlejohn (IoR.A. a terrorist 
also - see later discussion) illustrate the narrowing down of the concept. They 
show the type of violent activity which is outlawed, Lord Simon°s judgment in 
Cheng is an attempt to keep in existence the nineteenth century idea of political 
asylum. However national and international practice suggests that the emphasis 
is shifting from the circumstances of the offence and the motive of the fugitive 
to the likely attitude of the requesting state and the political compulsion of 
the requesting government. (Concerning Cheng 0 the maintenance of good ~elations 
with the United States is obviously a more important factor than the claims of a 
fugitive criminal). To prove that the motive of the requesting state is not made 
in good faith imposes a heavy burden on the fugitive (Littlejohn and his 
argument that his trial at the special courts was evidence of the political 
nature of his offence and the true intentions of the Irish request for his 
extradition). Various authors (107) see this trend of making the dominant factor 
in the decision to grant asylum, conditional upon the goodwill between the 
requesting and requested state, and "reducing the compassion for the individual" 
106~ D.N. Schiff, "Astrid Proll 0~ Case" (1979) pp. 353-371. 
107. C. Warbrick, op.cit. at pp. 121-1221 c. Thornberryo op.cit. at p. 5591 
J~ Woodcock 0 op.cit. at pp~ 42-43; C. Wijngaert, op.cit. at p. 116; 
R~ Young 0 "The Political Offence Exception in the Extradition of the United 
Kingdom - A Redundant- Concept?" ( 1984) Vol. 4 J o Leg. S ~ p o 21L 
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as a great blow to the concept of the political offence exception, A very 
pertinent conclusion to this part of the essay is provided by M, Garcia-Mora when 
he states "To restrict unduly the scope and meaning of the concept of political 
offences would almost certainly amount to striking a mortal blow to the 
protection of human rights in one of its most vital aspects",(108) 
lOBo Mo Garcia-J.I.1orau "The Present Status of Political Offences in the Law of 
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Extradition between Great Britain and the Commonwealth was governed by the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1881.(1) In contrast to the Extradition Act 1870 0 the 
application of the Fugitive Offenders Act is not dependent upon there being a 
treaty in existence. This is due to the fact that despite their different social 
systems and political attitudes 0 the members of the Commonwealth have a common 
political heritage and share in the use of English as the official language of 
the country. Also "the constitutional relationship between the legislative 
executive and judicial branches of government 0 the adversary system of criminal 
procedure 0 the rules of evidence 0 the writ of habeas corpus are all common 
traditions which considerably simplify the finding of common ground".(2) 
However 0 the 1881 Act did not impose the traditional safeguards that are normally 
recognised by international law for the protection of the individual.(3) There 
was no actual listing of extradition offences. Instead the Act asks for the 
surrender of the fugitive if the offence with which he is charged carries a 
penalty under the law of the state where it was committed of at least twelve 
months 0 imprisonment with hard labour.(4) The Act did not mention the principle 
1. 44 and 45 V~ct C. 69 0 now repealed and replaced by the Fugitive Offenders 
Act 1967 c. 68. 
See g~nerally0 V.E. Hartley-Booth 0 British Extradition Law and Procedure; 
Halsbury 0 s Laws of England Vol 18 (4th ed.); I.A. Shearer 0 Extradition in 
International Law (1971) Manchester, A. Bedi 0 "Grounds for Denial of 
Extradition to and from Commonwealth Countries" ( 1978) 10 _ Z •. r.,_.J ~ 9 
· · ··. pp. 1-33; S.D. Bedi 0 "Law and Practice of Extradit~on w~th the 
Commori;ealth Countries" (1977) 14 J. Ind. L;;· Inst. '- .. _ .. 
pp. 437-419; P. 0°Higgins 0 ''Reform of Intia:-Commonwealth Extradition" ( 1966) 
~ __ Q·o~~B'.~-,9' p. 361; "Extradition of Fugitive Offenders" (1968) 42 
• ·_.1\ .• 'L.;J. . p. 87; J.G. Castel and M. Edwards 0 "Political 
Offences; Extradition and Deportation - Recent Canadian Developments" (1975) 
.Os •. ILL ~J ~ . . VoL 13 No. 1u pp. 89-148; G. V. La Forest Q.C. o 
·E~-tr~dl.t{o'~ to and from ·Canada (1977) 0 Toronto. 
2. I.A. Shearer 0 Extradition in International LgW (1971) 0 p. 55. 
3. J.G. Castel and M.Edwards 0 "Political Offences; Extradition and Deportation 
-.Recent Canadian Developments" (1975) Os. E~L~J ~.: Vol. 13 
No. 1o p. 89 at Po 120. 
4. Section 3. 
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of double criminality which requires that the offence in question must be an 
offence under the general law of both the requesting state and the requested 
statea Neither was the important principle 0 that of speciality0 which does not 
permit the trial of a fugitive for an offence that may allegedly have taken place 
prior to his rendition but is different from the one upon which his surrender was 
granted unless he is given the opportunity of first returning to the jurisdiction 
from which he was extradited0 includeda(5) But essentially0 the most important 
omission was the lack of any reference to the exempting of political offenders 
from extraditiono 
These omissions express the basis of the 1881 Act. All parts of the Empire 
owed allegiance to the British Crown and were subject to the supremacy of the 
imperial Parliament at Westminster.(6) Therefore the Act did not require 
reciprocity and extended by the mere force of its enactment to all parts of the 
Empire. In Re Harrison (7) the court commented on the difference between 
surrender to a foreign state and surrender to another member of the Commonwealth. 
"It is quite obvious that some additional care ought to betaken in the case of 
extraditing persons to foreign countries than in facilitating criminal proceed-
ings in the various parts ()f the Empire 0 to which alone the Fugitive Offenders 
Act applies". In the New Zealand Supreme Court Stout J. stated in ex earte 
Lillywhite (8) "At common law there was thought to be an asylum for foreign 
offendersa and it is only by virtue of treaties that foreign offenders are given 
up. The rendition of an offender against the Crown from one portion of the 
5o Ra Clute 0 "Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition" (1959) 8 Am. J. 
' c 0 r. ·, . .· p 0 15 at p. 2 3 0 
•0~ • ----:-
6. P. 0°Higginsg "Extradition within the Commonwealth" (1960) 9 I o·c 0 IJoQo. 4.86· 
7. (1918) 25 B.C.Ro 433 at 437. 
8. (1901) 19 N.Z.L.R. 502. at 505. 
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J!Uasessions of the Crmvn to another portion should0 it seems to mev be 
differently viewed"o 
As time has progressed., Rncl. v.Ti.rh mrrnr=>rm18 rnPrnhPrfl of t.hA Commonwealth 
gaining political independence from the United Kingdomu so the political and 
social objectives shared by the members has declinedo "In particular political 
systems with widely diverging views on the sanctity of civil liberties have led 
to questions about the propriety of surrendering political offenders"o(9) 
Professor ovHiggins states: "The very close relationship between different parts 
of the Commonwealth and the simplified procedure for extradition provided by the 
Fugitive Offenders Act require for their maintenance the utmost good faith and 
mutual confidenceo Whatever was the original raison d 0etre for the non-exclusion 
of political offencesu be it unity of sovereignty or common political deals 0 the 
Fugitive Offenders Act is not likely to survive any attempt to interpret its 
provisions as a licence to secure the surrender of political offenders".(lO) 
Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed (11) 
Ahmed was a Pakistani national who had been on trial in India on charges of 
forgery when he jumped bail and fled to Englando Ahmed's extradition was sought 
~-
-- -by the Indian governmento He attempted to argue that the proceedings were based 
on political considerations and that since 1948 his family had suffered political 
persecution. He asserted that in India he was publicly known as a political spy 
for Pakistan and would thus be unable to get a fair triaL The court affirmed 
the order for his surrender and refused to embark on any consideration of whether 
he would be given a fair trial on his return to Indiao However 0 Lord Goddard did 
state that he was "quite sure that in a proper case the court would apply the 
9~ JoGo Castel and M. Edwards 0 op.citou supra. No 3 at Po 122. 
11. (1952} 1 All EoRo 1060 0 
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same rules with regard to applications under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 as 
it does under section 3(1) of the Extradition Act 1870. If it appears that the 
offence with which the prisoner was charged was in effect a political offence 0 no 
doubt this court would refuse to return him11 .(12) But in point of fact the 
House of Lords came to a different conclusion in Zacharia Vo Republic of 
Cypruso(13) The facts have already been dealt with (14)3 Zacharia 0 in his 
application for a writ of habeas corpus and relif under section 10 of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 0 argued that the Divisional Court had erred in the 
exercise of its discretion under section 10 by not considering the political 
aspects and character of the alleged offenceo Section 10 had been interpreted 
too narrowly by the court and it ought to be read as embracing provisions similar 
to those of the Extradition Act exempting political offenderso Viscount Simond 
stated "[the 1881 Act) unlike the Extradition Act 1870 makes no exception of 
political offences. It would be strange if it dido since in the forefront of the 
offences for which a fugitive offender may be apprehended and returned to his own 
country is placed the offence of treason. [It is) irrelevant to consider whether 
the offences could in another context be called political offences"o(lS) Lord 
Devlin stated: "I think it is assumed [that) countries within the Commonwealth 
will have the same standards of freedom and justice and good o~der and will 
secure them by substantially the same safeguards"o(16) He noted that the 1870 
Act contemplated that there might be fugitives from oppression as well as 
fugitives from justice and the Act excludes the former. The unwillingness of the 
courts to give .effect to the political exception in intra-Commonwealth 
12o Ibid. 8 at Po 1063. 
13o (1962) 2 All E.R. 438. 
14. See Section A. 
15. Ibid. 0 _ at Po 444. 
16. Ibid. 0 at Po 460. 
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extradiLion and the umvillingncGG of the government to intervene had certain 
political repercussions. After Zacharia there were other occasions on which 
-----
member states of the Commonwealth had attempted to secure the return of fugitives 
charged with political crimes or offences allegedly having political over-
tones.(17) It was clear that Commonwealth extradition needed a complete review 
and in 1966 a meeting of Commonwealth law ministers was held in Londono(18) The 
communique issued at the end of the discussions stated0 "The meeting considered 
that Commonwealth extradition arrangements should be based on reciprocity and 
substantially uniform legislation incorporating certain features commonly found 
in extradition treaties 0 e.g. a list of returnable offences 0 the establishment of 
a prima facie case before return and restriction on the return of political 
offenders". The conference then formulated a scheme setting out principles 
controlling extradition within the Commonwealth countries.(19) It was 
recommended that effect should be given to the scheme in each Commonwealth 
country. Thus certain Commonwealth countries have brought new Fugitive Offenders 
Acts replacing the old ones which used to control the law relating to the return 
of fugitive offenders within the Commonwealth countries.(20) 
The scheme makes three important changesg the principles of speciality 
(section 4(3)) and double criminality (section 10) are introduced for the first 
time into Commonwealth extradition.(21) Most vital of all 0 by section 4(1) 0 
17. B_ v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 Q.;B. 455; 
Armah v. Government of Ghana (1968) A.C. 192. 
18. Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders within the Common-
\-.realth0 Cmnd. 3008 ( 1966). 
19. S.D. Bedi 0 "Law and Practice of Extradition within the Commonwealth 
Countries" (1977) 19 J o Indo Lo . !ns t_o 9 pp. 419-437. 
20. (Australia) the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act 1966 (Act No. 75 of 
1966); (Great Britain) Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 c. 68; (Malaysia) the 
Commonwealth Fugitive Criminals Act 1967. 
21. (Australia) the Extradition Act 1966 section 11(3); (Great Britain) the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 section 4(3); (India) the Extradition Act 1962 
sections 21 and 31~ (New Zealand) the Extradition Act 1966 section 5(2). 
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"A pe"l7son RhR l.l n.ot he rP-turnAd undAr. this Act. to a designnted CommonwAalt.h 
country 0 or committed to or kept in custody for the purposes of such return 0 
if it appears to the Secretary of Stateuor'Dthe court of committal (a) that the 
offence of which that person is accused or was convicted is an offence of a 
political charactera (b) that the request for his return (though purporting to be 
made on account of a relevant offence) is in fact made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race 0 religion 0 nationality or 
political opinionsa or 0 (c) that he might0 if returned 0 be prejudiced at his 
trial or punished 0 detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of 
his race 0 religion 0 nationality or political opinion"o 
Many commentators 0 including the present authorv consider that this 
provision goes further than the 1870 Extradition Act in its protection and safe-
guards for the individual fugitive offendero In effect the legislators have 
taken into account "the interests of the human rights principle"o(22) In section 
4(1) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 0 the principle of non-intervention in a 
foreign stateqs affairs and of insulating the judiciary from diplomatic contra-
versy is abandonedo(23) The concept of political asylum has been considered of 
paramount importance and worthy of priorityo "Diplomatic embarrassment" or 
"judicial unease" have been set asideo This section 4 provision is echoed in the 
Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978o The essence of section 4 is that it protects 
individuals whose claim to political refugee status does not rest on the circum-
stances in which 0 nor the purpose for which 0 the alleged offence was committedo 
The fear that the individual fugitive offender has need not emanate from the 
government requesting his extradition and by inserting the clause "for the 
22o Ro Young 0 "The Political Offence Exception in Extradition Law of the United 
Kingdom1 A Redundant Concept?" (1984) Vola 4 Noa 2 , _ ~L~g.~r. .-
PPo 211~223o 
23a Ro Young 0 ibido 0 Po 217o 
.' \ .:: ... 
' ; I:, •• 
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purpose of punishing hJm for. h.is raC"'!R 0 rRligjon 3 nFJ.tionality or. political 
opinions"o a narrow interpretation of "political" is avoidedo Thus the courts 
can investigate the state of affairs in a foreign state and evaluate the 
likelihood of fair treatment in the country and courts of the requesting stateo 
Thus where previously British extradition law made no provision for challenging 
the good faith of a requesting state 0 section 4(1)(b) and (c) now permits ito 
The Extradition Act 1870 however does not do soo(24) 
24o Note~ the government report of February 1985 0 R/85 Cm0 ndc 9421 0 on extra-
dition where it was recommended that the 1870 Act should incorporate a 
provision similar to section 4(1) Fugitive Offenders Act 1967o But no 
change was recommended as regards the provisions of the Commonwealth 
arrangements for extraditiono 
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.' •_o The Political Offence and United States La\'1 
In the United States the judicial development of the concept of a political 
offence in the context of extradition has not proceeded with the same flexible 
development as English case law. This is due to the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court has not had the occasion to consider the problem directly. The 
nineteenth century criteria of Castioni and Meunier is still the basis of 
judicial pronouncements. In Re Ezeta the court quoted Castioni at length and 
defined a political crime as "any offence committed in the course of or 
furthering of civil war 0 insurrection or political commotion".(!) The criterion 
used in the case has been applied without alteration 0 with unusual results in 
certain cases. For example 0 in 1972 a case arose concerning an extradition 
request by Venezuela for ex-president Jimenez.(2) Jimenez was accused of a 
number of crimes allegedly committed while holding office as President of 
Venezuela. The main charges concerned the unauthorised receipt of commissions on 
Venezuelan government contracts for his own personal gain. Jimenez was deposed 
by a coup and fled to the United States 0 to which an extradition request was 
subsequently presented by the new government of Venezuela. Therefore forces 
hostile to Jimenez had overthrown him by violence "on an issue related to the 
political control of the country" 0 and now these forces 0 as the reques.tirig 
government, stood "at odds" with Jimenez on that issue. Jimenez had also been 
accused of murder and attempted murder. The alleged murder and attempted murder 
were deemed to be unextraditable because the facts were not sufficiently proven 
and thus there was a lack of probable cause. But the financial crimes were 
considered extraditable. The court held that they did not qualify as political 
offences because "There is no evidence that the financial crimes charged were 
1. 62 F. 912 0. (N.D. Cal. 184M o See also 8 G.H. Hackworth8 A Dig~st of Inter-
natiqn.al r.;aw" Vol. 4 ( 1942) 0 pp •. 49.::.50; M~Ch. Bassiour)io International 
_Extradition and World Public Order ( 1974ru p._ 390" 
~;, . Jimenez v. Arisb~guieta: et ·al u.·s •. Court of Appeals l)ecelnber .P 1962 
(1967) 33- ToLoRo 'Po 353~ 
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conuuitted in the course of and incidentally to a revolutionary uprising or other 
violent political disturbance'~ o ( 3) I oAo Shearer ( 4) in discusssing the case0 
considers that an English court would have had to consider the implications of 
Lord Radcliffe 0s dictum in Schtraks that the essence of a political offence was 
that the requesting government was intent to enforce its criminal law in some way 
other than in its ordinary aspecto (In factu diplomatic assurances were given by 
the Venezuela to the United States government before extradition was finally 
granted). It would have been difficult to rebut altogether the argument that in 
the case of a former head of state 0 a trial for common offences could not be 
conducted in an atmosphere divorced from political considerationso Oru on the 
other handu and still within the bounds of Schtraks 0 it could have been strongly 
argued that a political motive was vital to the invocation of the defence1 and 
that Jimenez was not motivated by any considerations other than personal profit 
in soliciting the commission. But in strictly applying Castioni and Ezeta 
the court did not even consider these possibilities. The court wasu in effectu 
saying that a premium is placed on violent political disturbance.(5} In contrast 
to Jimenez 0 one notes the case of Mylonas (6) 0 a Greek request was made for 
the extradition of Mylonas on account of similar financial charges. Mylonas was 
an anti -Communist from 1950 until 1953 when he had- been a membe-r and subsequenhly 
the president of the community council of a small Greek town. In 1954 0 he was 
the only member of his party to be re-elected0 the others being defeated by the 
Communists. He thus emigrated to the United States and shortly afterwardsu his 
3. ~·u Po 357. 
4. I.A. Shearer0 op.citou pp. 180-181. 
5. ChoLo Cantrellu "The Poltical Offence Exceptton in International E:x:tra-
dition6 A Comparison of the United Statesu Great Britain" and the Republic of 
Ir~land" ( 1977) 60 Marquette L.Riv •. pp. 777-.8241 ,C. Van- den_ Wijnga·ert 0 
op;;cit.u. Po 117'1 C. Warbricku op.eit., p. 115. 
6. ·united States District Courtu September 1 1960 ( 1966). c31 T 0 r-, T)' Po 369o 
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extradi.t.ion \'las reqnest.ec:'l on cha:r.ges of embezzlemento Acting on a \'lrit of habeas 
corpusu the United States District Court considered the crimes alleged as 
political offenceso The court found that "the offence for which extradition was 
sought was incidental tau formed a part of 0 and was the aftermath of political 
disturances" o ( 7) The unanst'lered question arising here 0 hm'lever 0 is \'lhether the 
same conclusion would have been reached had Mylonas been a Communist instead of 
an anti-Communisto(8) In one case 0 however 0 the hint of Kolczynski is apparent 
in the court 0 s deliberationo 
Gonzales (9) concerned the request by the Dominican Republic of the extra-
dition of one of its nationals charged with murder and torture of political 
prisoners under the former regime of Rafael Trujilloo The crimes alleged had 
been committed by Gonzales in a military or ~i-military capacityo Gonzales 
argued that his crimes were political because they were part of political 
disturbanceso But the district court refused to accept this argument and held 
that the facts alleged did not qualify as political offences 0 because 0 at the 
moment of their commission 0 there was no political uprising to which they were 
incidentalo However 0 the court accepted that this interpretation could possibly 
have been different if the requesting state had been a totalitarian regimeo(10) 
Some authors (11) consider that this case illustrates the weakness of the 
political incidence theoryo They argue that with respect to extremely serious 
crimes such as the alleged torturing and killing of political prisoners 0 as in 
So Co Van den Wijngaert 0 Opocito 0 Po 117o 
9o United States District Court May 23 1963 0 (1967) 34 
Ramo~ Vo Diaz United States District Court December 
. J;o).,.oR~ ·. Po 35lo 
llo In partictilar 0 C. Wijngaert 0 op.cit. 0 ;po·. 117; Co· Warbrick 0 ·op.citou 
Pol18o 
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this case 0 the puJJe poli.tical incidence test :ls too formalistic and incompleteo 
Wijngaert in particular argues that due attention should be paid to the 
seriousness of the acts 0 rather than to the question of whether they were 
incidental to and part of a political conflict situation. 
Artucovic (12) is considered to be an example of the deficiency high-
lighted above. This case concerned a request by the Federal People 0 s Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Artucovic had been the Minister of the Interior of the pro-Hitler 
Pavelic government in Croatia during the waro In this capacity8 he was held 
responsible for the killings of thousands of Jews 8 Serbs and gypsieso Before the 
district court 0 Artucovic invoked the political offence exceptiono He argued 
that his acts were incidental to the political conflict of the Second World Waro 
The district court and the Court of Appeals accepted this argument and considered 
the crimes alleged as non-extraditable political offenceso As a resultu the 
serious international character of the war crimes and the genocide which he was 
party to were not given any prominent considerationo 
In Sindona (13) 8 a request for extradition was made by Italy. The charges 
concerned fraudulent bankruptcyo Sindona argued that his crime was politicalo 
The Court of Appeals did not accept this argument1 without any- reference t-o the 
nature of the act or to Sindona 0 s motivation 8 the non-political character of the 
crimes charged to Sindona was deduced from the fact that there were no severe 
political disturbances such as war~ revolution or rebellion in Italy at the 
moment the crimes were committed. This isu again 0 a strict application of the 
Castioni precedent. 
12o Karadzdeole v. Artucovic Court of Appeal June 24 1957 8 (1957) 24 I • T~cRo 
)J,, 5llo 
13.; Sindona Vo Grant_United States-Court of Appeals-2nd Ciic. March 21 
1980 0 619 F. 2d~ 0 ~. 167-at_173. 
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The United States have not looked to the subsequent developments of the 
"political offence exception" in England since Castioni. Kolczynski 0 
Schtraks 0 Cheng and }:..ittlejohn have all had an effect on judicial develop-
ment of the principle. The trend in the United States is to over-emphasise the 
requirement of a political uprising.(14) Not much attention is paid to the 
seriousness or international character of the crime (Artucovic)~ and on the 
motivation of the perpetrator. Thus a crime may 0 notwithstanding its 
seriousness 0 qualify for the political offence exception as soon as it can be 
considered as related to a political conflict (Artucovic). But in cases where no 
political conflict situation can be proven 0 extradition can be granted even if it 
is requested by the direct political adversaries of the person claimed (Jimenez). 
Reference will be made to the United States practice in reference to Irish 
extradition and the particular difficulties posed by the activities of the I.R.A. 
and the more recent I.N.L.A. in the next section. 
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F 0 The Irish An5t1e 
In continuing the survey of judicial interpretation of the political 
offence exception 0 in this section we will concentrate on extradition from the 
Irish angleo One will look at the way in which the Irish courts have interpreted 
the concept; then reference will be made to limitations placed on the power to 
invoke the exception 0 due to the enactment of the Council of Europe 0 s Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 (1) and the United Kingdom Suppression of 
Terrorism Act 1978 which incorporates the Convention into domestic lawo Then a 
survey will be made of the limitations placed on the power to invoke the section 
at international level 0 as a result of the passing of the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorismo 
Next 0 one will return to consider the attempts made by a law enforcement 
commission in 1973 to resolve the difficulties presented by the "terrorist" 
activity of the IoRoAo and the more recent IoNoLoAo and their claim that their 
activities are within the ambit of the political offence exception to extra-
dition 0 an assertion that has caused untold friction between the authorities on 
the mainland and those across the Irish Seao 
L A Brief Historical Outline ( 2) 
The procedures which govern extradition between the Republic of Ireland and 
the United Kingdom do not depend upon the existence of an extradition treaty 
between the two countrieso The Extradition Act 1870 and the 1967 Fugitive 
Offenders Act do not form the basis of extradition between the two countrieso 
2o See generally 0 VoEo Hartley-Booth 0 British Extradition Law and Procedure 
(1982) Londono Po 209; Dro Po 0°Higgins 0 "Irish Extradition Law and 
Practice" (1958) 34 BoYoioLo 274; Mo McGrath 0 "Extradition; Another Irish 
Problem" Winter (1983) 34 NoLLoQoa ChoLo Cantrell 0 "The Political Offence 
Exception in International Extradition; A Comparison of the United States 0 
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland" (1977) 60 Marquette LoReVPPo 777-
824; Ao McCall-Smith and Pho Magee 0 "The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Report 
in Historical and Political Context" (1975) .Q.•L·E-• p. 200. 
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Instead extraditiou is based upon an administrative process whereby •.;rarrants of 
arrest are issued in one country and sent to the other country for endorsement 
and execution in that country. These procedures are governed by the Backing of 
Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 (3), hereinafter referred to as ("the 
1965 Act") in the United Kingdom and Part III of the Extradition Act 1965 (4) 
("the Irish Act") in the Republic of Ireland. 
In 1921 the Anglo-Irish Treaty established the Irish Free State. The Irish 
Free State became a self-governing dominion comprising twenty-six of the counties 
of Ireland. But the remaining six north-easterly counties remained within the 
United Kingdom. In December 1957 the Council of Europe 0 s Convention on Extra-
dition was opened for signature and it entered into force in April 1960. The 
Irish Extradition Act of 1965 is based on this instrument. By basing the 1965 
Act on the European Convention on Extradition, this meant that Ireland adopted 
the approach to extradition which civil law countries use. Very importantly, one 
difference between common law countries (the United Kingdom, United States) and 
civil law countries in the matter of extradition, is the rule that a prima facie 
case should be established when the fugitive offender is extradited. In Britain 
this is considered of paramount importance in order to ensure a broad alignment 
of extradition proceedings with domestic criminal proceedings and to guard 
against unnecessary surrender. The 1870 Extradition Act and the Fugitive 
Offenders Act 1967 both enact this requirement. Thus there is no objection made 
in the common law countries to the extradition of nationals. In civil law states 
however there is no rule that prima facie evidence be adduced before an extra-
dition order is made, but these states normally reserve the right to exempt their 
nationals from extradition. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the 
3. Came into force on 15 November 1965; Backing of Warrants (Republic of 
Ireland) Act 1965 (Commencement) Order 1965 S.I. 1965 No. 1850. 
4. No. 17 of 1965 0 an Act passed by the Oireachtas of the Republic of Ireland. 
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European Convention on Extradition, Ireland did not include the prima facie case 
requirement in the 1965 Act at all. 
The United Kingdom did not ratify the European Convention on Extradition and 
the failure to provide for the prima facie evidence requirement is one of the 
major reasons why not. This requirement has been omitted in Part III of the 
Irish Act. As 0°Higgins states, the Republic had to omit the requirement for 
evidence of a prima facie case if not it would have been in the absurd position 
of having to admit this requirement in surrenders to the United Kingdom while not 
requiring it for surrenders to any other country apart from the United King-
dom.(5) The 1965 scheme for surrendering offenders between the Republic of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom removed many of the technical difficulties that 
were present in cases arising in both countries prior to the legislation. But, 
one of the most sensitive problems in relation to extradition, that of the 
political offender, was not resolved by the legislation.(6) Before engaging in a 
detailed discussion of this topic 8 the procedural aspects of extradition between 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland will be set out. 
II Procedure (7) 
Provisional Warrants 
Under the Extradition Act 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, there 
are, on average, two cases of extradition per year involving extradition. This 
compares with some thirty to forty cases every year between the United Kingdom 
and the Republic. The geographic proximity and the lack of emigration and travel 
restrictions are said to encourage movement between the two countries. Therefore 
5. 0°Higgins 8 (1966) 15 I.C.L.Q. 369, p. 391. Note also R/85 Cmnd. 9421 
February 1985 Government paper on new recommendations concerning 
extradition. 
6. M. McGrath, op.cit. 8 p. 298. 
7. See V.E. Hartley-Booth, op.cit., p. 209. Halsbury 0 s Laws of England Vol. 18 
(4th ed.) (1977). 
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some method was needed to facilitate the speedy apprehension of fugitive 
offenders faster than it took to invoke the full administrative process under the 
1965 Act. Thus section 4 of the 1965 Act authorises a Justice of the Peace to 
issue a "warrant in the prescribed form" known as a "provisional warrant" for the 
arrest of a fugitive offender on the application of a constable. 
Evidence 
The 1965 Act does not require that at the time the application is lodged 
with a Justice of the Peace for the endorsement of the Irish warrant, there 
should be adduced sufficient, or any evidence to show that there is a prima facie 
case against the requested person. Re Arkins.(B) The House of Lords affirmed 
this in Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison.(9) Their Lordships, in 
dismissing Keane 0 s application for a writ of habeas corpus, held that the 1965 
Act makes no provision for a magistrate to inquire whether a prima facie case has 
been made out. The 1965 Act simply requires proof that the warrant was duly 
issued in the Republic and proof of the particular law of the Republic in 
question. 
Dual Criminality 
The 1965 Act in listing these offences which it specifically excludes from 
its operation, states that the return of a fugitive offender to the Republic will 
not be ordered by the court where it appears to the court that the offence 
against the laws of the Republic specified in the warrant does not correspond 
with any offence which is indictable or punishable on summary conviction with six 
months 0 imprisonment (10) under the law of that part of the United Kingdom in 
B. (1966) 3 All E.R. 651. 
9. (1972) A.C. 204. 
10. Section 2(2). 
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which the court acts.(ll) In the first instance the justices are not required to 
to consider in detail whether there is a corresponding offence or not by a full 
consideration of the corresponding offences.(12) The magistrates 0 court must be 
satisfied that the offence specified in the warrant was one against the laws of 
the Republic and where this is not clear on the face of the warrant itself 0 the 
magistrates must have a fuller investigation to enable them to determine the 
question. 
There is no application of the speciality principle" But it has become the 
practice of the Attorney-General in the Republic of Ireland to apply the rule for 
the purpose of habeas corpus applications, in that the offence must be specified 
in the accompanying affidavits although the same practice does not exist in the 
United Kingdom.(13) 
III The Political Offence Exception - section 2(2) 1965 Act and section 50(2) Irish 
Act 
These apply the principle of the political offence exception, but there is a 
difference in the terminology used. The Irish Act states that a person may not 
be surrendered if the offence with which he is charged "is a political offence or 
an offence connected with a political offence" (section 50(2)). By section 2(2) 
of the 1965 Act (the United Kingdom Act), no order is to be made under section 
2(1) of the Act for the removal of requested persons to the Republic if it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the court "that the offence specified in the warrant 
is an offence of a political character". This difference between the two 
statutes is worth emphasising because it lends to the uncertainty at 
llo Ibido 
12. Re Marks (1973) 12 December (unreported) Div. Crt. See Hartley-Booth, 
op.cito, p. 224. 
13. I. Stanbrooku The Law and Practice of Extradition (1980). p. 72. However 0 
note 0°Rourke v. Magee. see supra. 
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internationctl level. And this uncertainty favours states rather than 
individuals. When interpreting section 50 the Irish courts have given the term 
"a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence" a wide 
interpretation. which thus permits the encompassing of a wider range of offences. 
Bourke v. Attorney-General (14) 
The case concerned a British request for the extradition of an Irish 
national who had assisted a detained prisoner in his flight abroad. Bourke had. 
while he was himself serving a sentence in prison in England 0 become acquainted 
with one Blake 0 a Soviet spy who had been condemned to a very long term of 
imprisonment on account of espionage. As soon as he had served his sentence. 
Bourke assisted his friend Blake to escape from prison and helped him to flee to 
the Soviet Union. The applicant was arrested in Ireland. The District Court 
ordered that the accused be delivered to England. Bourke argued that he had 
committed the act out of friendship for Blake, whose penalty he had found 
unreasonably long. The court held that it considered Bourke 0 s act a political 
crime since it was "connected with" a purely political crime 0 namely the 
espionage committed by Blake.(l5) 
The application of the political offence doctrine in Ireland has been 
complicated by the continuing dispute with the United Kingdom about the status of 
Northern Ireland and in particular by the activities of para-military groups like 
the I.R.A. and the I.N.L.A., a more recent group, which carry out their 
activities in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. The point of contention is 
whether or not these organisations can or should be classified as political 
organisations.(l6) The Irish Act is sufficiently wide enough to encompass the 
14. (1973) 107 I.L.T.R. 33; (1972) I.R. 36. 
15. (1973) 107 I.L.T.R. 0 p. 296. 
16. A. McCall-Smith and P. Magee. "The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Report in 
Historical and Political Context" (1975) C.L.R. 200-214. 
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activities of theoe groups and the refusal by the Irish Republic to extradite to 
the United Kingdom persons accused or convicted of offences in the United 
Kingdom 0 in the context of the disturbances in Northern Ireland 0 has soured 
Anglo-Irish relations. 
The State (Magee) Vo 0°Rourke (17) 
Magee was a garage proprietor and in the course of his business he did work 
for members of the British army in their private capacity. In connection with 
this work he had access to British military barracks situate•l at Hollywood, 
County Down. An armed raid was carried out on these barrackE and a quantity of 
arms and explosives were stolen. Magee was arrested and ques:ioned about the 
raid. He stated when questioned that although not a member of the LR.A., he 
sympathised with them and was on friendly terms with a number of them. To 
connect him with the raid, Magee thought that the police had evidence in the form 
of photographs and witnesses. The inference was that the raid was carried out to 
secure explosives and ammunitions for violent and political purposes. And 
because Magee was questioned about his connections to the I.R.A. it showed that 
Magee was suspected of subversive activities prior to the raid. The person who 
took the photographs was with him and they were taken, as Magee put 0 "hiddenly" 
with a view to a raid on the barracks. Thus he was concerned with the prep-
arations for the raid which was, the court believed 0 clearly a raid of a 
political nature. Implication in the raid would normally lead to a prosecution. 
Magee left Northern Ireland in September 1964 and went South. He feared that if 
he was removed from the state he would also be charged with conspiracy in 
connection with the armed raid. The court believed that no valid reason existed 
why the evidence given should have been rejected. They thus held that the 
evidence and the inferences properly drawn from it lead to the conclusion that 
u 
17. (1971) I.R. 205. 
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that there were substantial grounds for believing that Magee. if removed from the 
state under the 1965 Act would be prosecuted or detained for a political offence 
or an offence connected with a political offenceo Budd Jo (18) stated "The 
obvious inference in the absence of any other explanation is that the raid was to 
secure explosives and ammunition for violent political purposeso Previous to 
this raid Magee had been questioned many times about IaRoAo activities which 
showed that prior to the raid he was a person suspected of subversive 
activities"o 
This decision can be contrasted with Arton (19), where the court refused to 
allow the fugitive offender to question the good faith or bona fides of the 
French ("a friendly nation") state's request for his extradition" An important 
factor worth noting is the dissenting opinions of Fitzgerald Jo In both Bourke 
and Magee Vo O'Rourke" In the latter he stated: "I am not prepared to hold 
that the requesting country is likely to be guilty of a breach of faith by pro-
secuting or detaining the alleged offender for a political offence"a(20) This 
view would appear to be more in line with the position adopted by the British 
courts which, as we have seen. refuse to impute bad faith to a requesting state 
with which a treaty has been concludedo(21) But here no treaty existed and no 
explicit speciality duty" Despite this fact, the majority view in these cases 
illustrate that the Irish courts do not approve of the "political incidence 
theory" at present, and take a more liberal view of "political motivation" and 
thus lean more towards the continental approacha(22) However there have been 
18o (1971) IoRo 215o 
19o (1894) 2 QoBo 415o See Ante Po 
20o (1971) IoRa 50 at Po 216o 
21o Mo McGrath, opocitoo Po 302o Note Royal Government of Greece Vo Governor 
of Brixton Prison (1971) AoCo 250" 
22o Co Van den Wijngaert 0 Opocito, Po 120o 
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relatively few reported cases to judge whether a distinctive trend has emerged 
since the 1965 Acto 
The main case upon \vhir.h thP. Ir.i Rh gnvP.rnmFmt hi'lses its ar'}ument in relation 
to the question of extradition for political offences is The State (Duqgan) Vo 
Tapleyo(23) The case concerned obtaining money by false pretences and had 
nothing to do with a political offence, but the accused contended that section 29 
of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 0 by virtue of which his delivery to 
England was sought 0 had ceased to apply in Ireland on the coming into operation 
of the Constitution because the section would 0 if still effective. allow a person 
to be delivered even if the offence for which his delivery was sought was a 
political oneo He argued that the non-extradition of political offenders was a 
generally recognised principle of international law and then relied on Article 
23a3 of the Irish Constitution which states 9 "Ireland accepts the generally 
recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its 
relations with other states"a The High Court and the Supreme Court unequivocally 
rejected this contentiono Maguire CaJo stating: "The farthest that the matter 
can be put is that international law permits and favours the refusal of extra-
dition of persons accused or convicted of offences of a political character but 
allows it to each state to exercise its own judgment as to whether it will grant 
or refuse extradition in such cases and also as to the limitations which it will 
impose upon such provisions as exempt from extradition"o(24) 
One has to acknowledge that the legal aspect of Anglo-Irish extradition is 
inseparable from the political background of Irelando The IaRoAo have conducted 
a campaign of "terrorist" violence to publicise their anti-British message during 
the 1970°s when the political institutions in Northern Ireland were dismantled 
23o (1952) IoRo 62o 
24o Ibidoo Po 84o 
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and the province became administered by means of direct rule from Westminster. 
This violence which commenced in Northern Ireland. spread to the Republic and 
into Great Britain. The problem was most strongly felt in Northern Ireland where 
most terrorist violence was centred. The perpetrators of the violence would then 
usually flee to the security of the South. 
In Ireland no legislation has been passed dealing with the definition of a 
political offence and the interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions 
have been left to the courts. The Irish courts have accepted that where there is 
sufficient evidence of a political motive on the plaintiff 0 s part in committing 
the alleged offence he should not be extradited. (Note. however, Fitzgerald 0 s 
dissenting judgment in Bourke and 0°Rourke). However the trend is moving 
away from the above statement of practice. 
Hanlon v. Fleming (25) 
Here the plaintiff, who was wanted in the United Kingdom for the offence of 
handling stolen goods, namely. a number of electronic detonators and a small 
amount of high explosives. sought to argue that this was "a political offence or 
an offence connected with a political offence". Hanlon brought forward evidence 
of his involvement with the I.R.A. and it was contended that the proceeds of 
several robberies and cheque card frauds which he perpetrated in England over 
many years had been transferred to the I.R.A. Without any corroborative evidence 
the court was not prepared to accept that any of the proceedings of his criminal 
activities were used for the purposes of the I.R.A. in such a way as to lend 
"political colours to the offence".(26) The Supreme Court confirmed the decision 
of the High Court. What is considered to be the most significant development in 
recent years is the case of McGlinchey v. Wren. 
25. 6 October 1980 unreported. See A. Connelly. "Non-Extradition for Political 
Offences; A Matter of Legal Obligation or Simply a Policy Choice?" (1982) 
~oJ c~ p. 59 at p. 77. 
26. Per Doyle J. 0 p. 7. 
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McGlinchey v. Wren (27) 
The accused was wanted by the authorities in Northern Ireland for the murder 
of an elderly woman who had been shot and killed when her home was attacked by a 
gang firing Armalite rifles. The attack was made by the IoRoAo of whom 
McGlinchey was an active membero Before the High Court McGlinchey relied on 
section 50(2)(a) of the 1965 Act claiming that at the time of the killing he had 
been an active member of the IoRoAo and that this organisation had claimed 
responsibility for the murdero On appeal to the Supreme Court he no longer 
sought to rely on this provision but 0°Higgins C.J. while finding it unnecessary 
to delineate the boundary between an ordinary criminal offence and a political 
offence in the instant case 0 pointed out that "It should not be deduced that if 
the victim were someone other than a civilian who was killed or injured as a 
result of violent criminal conduct chosen in lieu of what would come directly or 
indirectly within the ordinary scope of political activity, the offence would 
necessarily be classified as a political offence or an offence connected with a 
political offence. The judicial authorities on the scope of such offence have in 
many respects been rendered obsolete by the fact that modern terrorist violence 
whether undertaken by military or para-military organisations or by individuals 
or groups of individuals, is often the antithesis of what could reasonably be 
regarded as political either in itself or in its connections"o(28) McGlinchey 
did rely, however 0 on section 50(2)(b) contending that there were substantial 
grounds for believing that, if removed from the state 0 he would be prosecuted for 
a political offence or an offence connected therewith. In holding that the onus 
of proof which the plaintiff bore had not been discharged the court stated: "The 
excusing per se of murder and of offences involving violence and the infliction 
of human suffering 0 done by 0 or at the behest of, self-ordained arbiters, is the 
27. (1982) I.R., pp. 154-160. 
28. Ibid., Po 159. 
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very antithesis of the ordinances of Christianity and civilisation and of the 
basic requirement of political activity"o(29) 
'T'hP. SnprP.lllP. C.nnrt_ seem t.o have accept.ed that there is a distinction to be 
made between firstly barbarous or terrorist acts which are to be classified as 
ordinary crimes irrespective of motivation and secondly. political activity which 
even if formally criminal. should not entitle a person to be exempted from 
extraditiono(30) 
The release of John Ouin (31) by a London magistrate after a three year 
battle for his extradition from Ireland led to political embarrassment in Dublin 
and Londono Although Quinn was charged with obtaining ¢600 from a London bank in 
1980 0 he was said to be a fund raiser for the IoNoLoA., which admitted respons-
ibility for the murder of the Conservative M.P. Mro Airey Neave at the House of 
Commonso Quinn°s counsel argued successfully that there had been munjustified 
delay by the prosecutiono Although senior Treasury counsel asked a High Court 
judge to order Quinn°s release at the instigation of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Quinn managed to leave the country from Heathrow and subsequently 
went into hiding in Dublin" Apart from this procedural aspect 0 it is difficult 
to see how Quinn would have avoided the test laid down in Littlejohn and 
Keane a 
The political sensitivity in the matter of extradition between the Irish 
government and London is well illustrated in the case of Miss Evelyn 
Glenholmesa(32) The Irish government were upset after leaks emanating from 
30o Note, in The Times 10 October 1985 0 McGlinchey was successful in his appeal 
to the High Court in Ulster.against his sentence for the murder. The Crown 
proposes an appeal to the House of Lordso 
31. The Guardian July 26 1985 0 Po 3a (Magistrates Court decision)" 
32o The Guardian November 12 1984 0 Po 1 and 28o 
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London claimed that politicians and police in thG Republic were reluctant to 
hand over for extradition 0 Evelyn Glenholmes 0 who is identified by Scotland Yard 
as an alleged terrorist bomber. Dublin°s reaction induced the Attorney-General 0 
Sir Michael Havers 0 to issue a statement clearing the Irish government of either 
negligence or bureaucratic feet dragging. A. Connelly (33) suggests that the 
judiciary have 8 through such case(s) as McGlinchey v. Wren 0 embarked upon a 
road which the government have been reluctant to tread. She suggests that the 
test which the Supreme Court would now apply if faced with a political offence 
plea is whether "the person charged was at the relevant time engaged, either 
directly or indirectly in what reasonable civilised people would regard as 
political activity".(34) However what specific offences the court will accept as 
coming within the ambit must remain a question for the future. She vigorously 
asserts that nothing generally in international law nor 0 as far as Ireland is 
concerned 0 in its Constitution 0 exists to fetter the state 0 s freedom from 
granting or refusing the extradition of political offenders. "The decision 
whether or not to do so is purely political".(35) Clearly much would be gained 
in this arena if Ireland were to become a party to the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism 1977. The advantage would arise due to the fact that 
the Convention specifically outlaws certain activities. These acts of violence 
are "depoliticised" (an important word where the Irish situation is concerned) 
and would remove the politico-legal burden which the courts face when called upon 
to determine extradition cases concerning the I.R.A. and I.N.L.A. 
i The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 
This Act gives effect to the European Convention. Section 1 implements 
33. A. Connelly 0 op.cit. 0 pp. 80-83. 
34. McGlinchey v. Wren per 0°Higgins C.J. 8 p. 7. 
35 A. Connelly 0 op.cit. 0 p. 82. See also A. Connelly0 "Ireland and the 
Political Offence Exception to Extradition" (1985) Vol. 12 J .J~.,~s .. 
pp. 153-183. 
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Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention by providing that for the purposes of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 0 the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 
1965 and the Extradition Act 1870 no offence specified in Schedule 1 of the Act 
shall be regarded as an offence of a political character 0 when a request is made 
on behalf of a "convention country" (i.e. 0 a party to the Convention). The Act 
makes of both Article 1 and Article 2 offences from the political exception 
mandatory on courts and executive alike. Nor is there any strict requirement of 
reciprocity between the convention country and the United Kingdom so that the 
United Kingdom will not invoke a requesting state 0 s reservation as a ground for 
not applying the Convention. 
A.Jurisdiction and Trial 
The Convention is said to be based on the principle aut dedere aut judicare. 
The precise obligation is laid down in Article 7.(36) There is no question of an 
obligation on a state to try any suspected terrorist held by it until that state 
has received and refused a request for his extradition. Moreover, any such 
request must accord with Article 6.(37) The effect of Article 6 would seem to be 
that where a state requests extradition on a basis of jurisdiction which existly 
equally in the requested state, for example, on the basis that the offence was 
committed within its territory (that offence being punishable on the territorial 
principle in both states), Article 6 is satisfied and the requested state must 
either extradite the suspect or establish its jurisdiction over the alleged 
offence and submit the case to its competent authorities. The establishment of 
its jurisdiction over him will involve a departure from the territorial principle 
since the offence will have been committed in the territory of the requesting 
state. Where the request is based on a ground of jurisdiction not recognised by 
the requested state 0 no such obligations arise under Article 6. For example, 
36. Article 70 supra. 
37. Article 6 0 supra. 
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were Britain requested by West Germany to extradite a person on the basis that he 
he is suspected of having committed an offence against a West German national 
outside West Germany 0 the obligation would not arise because the extra-
territorial commission of an offence against a British national is not 0 under 
British law 0 a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by British courts. 
B. Section 4 Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 
This is concerned with the interpretation of the judicare obligations of the 
Convention. Section 4(1) and (2) deal with those acts which if committed in a 
convention country would have been offences if co~mitted in the United Kingdom. 
Because English courts mostly exercise jurisdiction only in respect of offences 
committed within the United Kingdom 0 drastic changes were needed to establish 
jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by non-nationals in the circumstances 
required by Article 6 0 i.e. 0 where a suspected offender present in this country 
is not extradited after an extradition request has been received from a contract-
ing state whose jurisdiction is based on a rule of jurisdiction existing equally 
in English law. Section 4 extends jurisdiction over acts committed in a 
convention country which 0 if done in a part of the United Kingdom would have 
constituted one of a specified selection of Schedule 1 offences in that part of 
the United Kingdom. The effect of this sub-section is to give the English courts 
extra-territorial jurisdiction over a number of the scheduled offences - those 
which correspond roughly to those in Article 1 of the Convention (with the 
exception of offences against protected persons) where jurisdiction is exercised 
in another convention country on the basis of the territorial principle. Section 
4(2) establishes extra-territorial jurisdiction regardless of the nationality of 
the offender 0 in a similar manner over certain additional offences where these 
are committed against a "protected person". Jurisdiction is extended only to 
cases where the relevant act took place in a convention country 0 where that state 
would have jurisdiction over the offence on the territorial principle. 
- 123 -
The creation of extra-territorial offences by section 4 is necessary not 
only so that fugitives be punished in the United Kingdom if they cannot be 
extraditedv but also that they can be extradited at all if the offence for which 
their extradition is requested is extra-territorial by the law of the requesting 
state. Unless the circumstances were such that the offence was among the 
exceptional ones which are also extra~territorial by English law0 there could be 
no extraditionv regardless of any political character of the offence for want of 
double criminality.(38) The safeguard against the surrender of genuine political 
refugees contained in Article 5 has been enacted in section 2. Section 4(1) (b) 
and (c) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 already contains such a provision. 
Thus only the Extradition Act 1870 and the Backing of Warrants Act 1965 have to 
be brought into line. Article 5 was included in order to ensure respect for the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (39) and confers a right 
under treaty to question the motive of the requesting state. As far as the 
Extradition Act is concerned 0 despite the fact that provision was made for the 
fugitive to prove that "the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made 
with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character"Q the 
courts have so interpreted this as to exclude bringing forward evidence to 
challenge the good faith of the requesting state. Also, all attempts to argue 
more generally that the surrender of the fugitive might be unjust, and that he 
might suffer as a result of his political activities have been in vain.(40) 
The Suppression of Terrorism Act follows Article 5 by providing that where a 
request for extradition is made by a convention country in respect of a 
38. g v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Rush (1969) 1 All E.R. 316; and 
now Nielsen v. Government of Denmark (1984) 2 All E.R. 0 Po 81. 
39. I. Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights (1971), p. 338; European 
Convention on Human Rights 0 4 November 1950 0 Council of Europe E.T.S. No. 5. 
40. Atkinson v. United States Government (1971) A.C. 197; Royal Government 
of Greece v. Governor of Brixton Prison (1971) A.C. 250. But note 0 
Magee v. 0°Rourke (1971) I.R. 205. 
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Convention offence, ~the Extradition Act 1870 shall have effect as if at the end 
of paragraph ( 1) of section 3 there were added the words "or with a vievl to try 
to punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinions, or that he might, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or 
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, 
religion 0 nationality or political opinions"o(41) Despite some fears that 
Article 5 effectively negatives any effect that the abolition of the political 
offence exception might have 0 Lowe and Young suggest that it differs from the 
political offence exception in two vital respects; first, it assumes that unless 
the fugitive can show that there is an actual risk of political prejudice, then 
the fact that his offence may be tied up with politial matters is irrelevanto 
Thus the good faith of the requesting government and the integrity of the legal 
system are assumed unless evidence is shown to the contraryo Secondly 0 the 
offence for which extradition is requested does not need to be one of a political 
character for extradition to be refusedo The two exceptions overlap but do not 
coincideo(42) An excellent analysis of the application of the Suppression of 
Terrorism Act to the development of the political offence exception in English 
case law is made by Jo Barretto(43) She notes that Schtraks is an important 
case in analysing the position of the terrorist as regards the political offence 
exceptiono The essential element of the offence was said to be that the fugitive 
is at odds with the requesting state on some connected with the political control 
or government of the country and that the requesting state is pursuing him for 
4L Lowe and Young, (1979)N·e~.;]pt.L.Revp305 at Po 327 believe that it is 
unfortunate that the Act cannot be amended to bring it into line with the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, but they acknowledge that this would involve a 
renegotiation of many bilateral treatieso 
42o Lowe and Young, opocito, Po 327o 
43o Jo Barrett, "The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and 
the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978" ( 1980) T. L, Po 1 at 
PPo 2-17 o 
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reasons other than the ordinary enforcement of the criminal lawo(44) This 
reasoning was developed in Cheng (45) where the court held that for an offence 
to be political in character it must have been directed against the government of 
the state requesting extradition and since criminal jurisdiction is territorial 
the offence will usually have to be directed against the government of the state 
where the offence was committed This limitation would prove fatal to any 
terrorist whose political campaign is not restricted to one countryo Therefore 
if a terrorist offence committed in furtherance of the Palestinian Arab Cause 
outside Israel it would not qualify as a political offence 8 nor would any of the 
Baader-Meinhoff attacks against centres of United States imperialism in Europe 
be regarded as politicalo(46) Cheng is considered to be the one British 
reported case which deals directly with what the members of the Council of 
Europe see as the dangerously prevalent violence against which the European 
Convention is aimed 0 and as such gives some guidance on how the British courts 
might approach the problem of international terrorism0 quite apart from the 
Conventiono(47) One question Cheng does not answer is the case where the 
offence is intended to effect a change in the requesting state 0 s foreign policy 
in order to weaken the government of another stateo This was not at issue in 
Cheng but some groups have professed this as their aim when committing acts of 
violence in Western Europeo(48) 
Another requirement which terrorists are not likely to be able to meet is 
that the offence committed must have a close link with the political goal sought 
to be achievedo The wrongdoer must have had some direct ulterior motive of a 
44o (1962) 3 All EoRo 529o 
45o (1973) 2 All EoRo 204o 
46o Jo Barretto OPoCitoo Po So 
47 0 Lowe and Young 0 OPoCitoq Po 322o 
48o Ibido 
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political kind when he committed the offence (49) (ex parte Littlejohn). 
Activities such as robbing banks in order to raise funds for a political 
organisation are not sufficiently linked to the political purpose (50) (Keane)o 
Most terrorist acts such as random bombings and kidnappings carried out with the 
intention of attracting publicity to the political cause would not be considered 
to further the political aim in a direct enough mannero J. Barrett concludes 
with the assertion that terrorists are not going to be easily assimilated 
within the traditional notion of the "political offender" as developed in English 
case law. There is a vast difference between the romantic Castioni and the 
indiscriminately violent Meunier or Baader-Meinhoff groupo International 
terrorists often do not possess the necessary connection with the requesting 
state 0 since their campaigns are frequently directed against a government other 
than one of the state in which they are operating 0 or against no government in 
particular a 
From the analysis of British practice one can safely say that the occasions 
prior to the 1978 Acto where terrorists could avail themselves of the political 
offence exception 0 are few and far between (Cheng). The fluidity of the 
concept has left enormous judicial discretiono The particular prevailing 
international political conditions are always likely to play a part in the final 
decision by the judiciary. A1so 0 at the national level it is possible to imagine 
incidents arising out of a campaign of separatist violence directed against 
public installations or where offences are committed in the course of demon-
strations against a particular item of a government 0 s programme 0 such as against 
nuclear power 0 where what would be characterised as terrorist violence by the 
government against which it is directed0 might yet be regarded as a political 
49o (1975) 3 All EoRo 208o 
50o ( 1971) 3 All EoRo 1163 0 
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offence according to Castioni and Schtraks)o(51) DoNo Schiff (52) suggests 
that a new low point in the protection of the individual was achieved with the 
passing of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978o Prall was arrested on 
September 9 1978 in the United Kingdomo She was alleged to have committed the 
offences of attempted murder and robbery whilst a member of the Baader-Meinhoff 
terrorist groupo West Germany requested her extradition but certain 
complications arose due to her attempts to argue that she was a British citizen 0 
as a result of her marriage to a British nationalo Importantly for the purposes 
of this work Schiff notes the unwillingness of the Home Secretary to register 
her as a British citizen and the timing of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 
along with "the implications of the more restrictive safeguard of section 2(1) of 
the Act 0 in relation to the safeguard of the political exemption to extra-
dition"o(53) He concludes by saying that "Judicial review of extradition 
proceedings appears no longer to be an adequate counter to greater political co-
operation"o(54) 
One important angle to the Irish problem is the interpretation which a 
foreign court would put on the plea from a member of the IoRaAa or IaNaLaAa that 
his offence was politicala An excellent survey was made by Co Warbrick (55) of 
McMullen (56) 0 a case which was decided in the United States of Americaa The 
case was decided by Judge Woeflen in the United States District Court in the 
Northern District of Californiaa The facts were that McMullen was a deserter 
51o Jo Barrett, OPoCitoo Po 6a 
52o Astrid Prol!Ds case (1979) P.L. Pa 353 at Po 369a 
53o Ibido 0 Po 370 0 
54o Ibido 0 Po 37L 
55 a Co Warbrick (1980) Summer P.Lo PPo 113-122o 
560 In the matter of the extradition of Peter Gabriel John McMullen May 11 1979a 
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from the British army who was wanted by the British authorities for his alleged 
part in bomb explosions at army barracks in England in 1974a McMullen was 
arrested as an illegal immigrant to the United States in May 1978 and detained in 
custody until the disposal 0 a year latera of the request for his extradition made 
by the British governmenta Among other objections to his being returned, 
McMullen pleaded that his offences were of a political character and fell outside 
the terms of the United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treatyo(57) McMullen 
also claimed that he was protected by Article V(2) of the Treaty on the grounds 
that he would face physical or mental ill treatment if he were handed over to the 
United Kingdom authorities" Judge Woelflen upheld McMullen°s claim that his 
offences were political by applying the rule in Castionia The judge accepted 
that there had been a disturbance of sufficient intensity in Ulster in 1974 to 
allow McMullen°s defence to succeedo The British government has tried to deny 
that there has been a civil war in Ulstero It has attempted to challenge the 
IoRoAa by different methods which have included the use of troops in assisting 
the local police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary" The court procedures for 
the trial of terrorist offences also differ from those for the trial of ordinary 
offences in Ulstera The trials are before a single judge in the absence of a 
juryu there are restrictions on access to bail, and evidential rules 0 especially 
those on confessions 0 have been altered in favour of the prosecution" Judge 
Woelflen did not accept the British government 0 s contention that the disturbances 
in Northern Ireland were not sufficiently intense to form the context for a 
political offence" He relied on the emergency declaration made by Her Majesty 0 s 
Government when ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (58)3 "The record shows that highly placed officials in the British 
57o UoKoToSo (1972) Noo 2 Cmndo 5040 in force January 1 1977a 
58o UoKoToSa (1977) Noa 6 Cmndo 6702a See Co Warbrick (1980) Summer P,L, 
Po 116a 
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government made di~~cc aQmissions than an insurrection was occurring in 1970 and 
1974"o(59) Ca~ti~ni requires that there be a political disturbance and that 
the alleged offences have been committed in furtherance of ito The court 
accepted that McMullen had no private motivation for his acto The judge pointed 
out that McMullen was a member of the Provisional IoRoAo in 1974 and the IoRoAo 
was a distinct "organisation existing in an era of political upheaval 0 which was 
engaged in and conducted political violence of the most extreme nature with a 
solely political objective"o(60) 
More recently 0 another case has been decided in the United States by Judge 
John Aprizzio in New Yorko Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty (61) was convicted of 
murdering a British soldier in Belfasto He escaped from gaol in June 1981 0 two 
days before a judge found him guilty of murderu attempted murder 0 possession of 
illegal weapons and membership of the IoRoAo The judge in New York refused to 
extradite him0 accepting the argument that his crime was a political acto He is 
currently being held in New York prison without bail 0 as an illegal alieno 
Meanwhile 0 he has applied for political asylumo If turned down he will be 
deportedo 
William Quinn (62) was accused of murdering an off-duty policeman in 
London in 1975o He fled to the United States where he was held in custody 
pending an extradition hearingo In 1983 Quinn was freed in California on the 
grounds that the alleged crime was "incidental to a polltical uprising"o The 
Doherty decision caused alarm in the United States and Britaino Mro Stephen 
Trotto head of the criminal division of the United States Justice Departmento 
59o Judgment Po 3o See Co Warbrick 0 ibido 
60o Judgment Po 5o See Co Warbrick 0 ibidoo Po 117o 
61o The Times December 19 1984 0 Po 1o 
62 The Observer September 15 1985u Po 4o 
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acknowledged that moves had to be mado to renegotiate the extradition treaty the 
United States had with the United Kingdomo His concern was that the United 
States may become a "sanctuary for violent criminals" which was the same argument 
of Lord Salmon in Chen~o "We have got to get rid of this political nonsense 
among free 0 friendly nations" he stateso Although his last words may cause great 
alarm to those who hold as paramount the granting of asylum for political 
offenders 0 the Home Office in July 1985 acknowledged the need for a renegotiation 
of the treaty with the United Stateso This was a direct result of the Beirut 
hijacking of American hostages in June/July 1985 and the plea by the United 
States that all nations should join forces to find solutions to the problem of 
international terrorismo The latest developments on the issue of a new extra-
dition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom 0 at the time of 
writing this work 0 has been the realisation by the British officials that the 
treaty will be opposed by a powerful Irish Republican lobby 0 despite the present 
anti-terrorist feeling following the Beirut hijack of this summero The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has decided to hold an extended series of hearingso 
Numerous people have spoken against the treaty and such persons include 
academics 0 lawyers 0 congressmen and inevitably special interest groupso The 
treaty when presented eventually to Senate will need a two-thirds majorityo The 
director of the Irish National caucus is Father Sean McManuso He bases his 
argument on three groundso Firstly0 that the treaty legitimises British rule in 
Northern Ireland 0 that the Ulster courts are oppressive and unfair and that the 
treaty sets a dangerous precedento(63) It is believed to be this last point 
which is causing the senators most concern 0 because of the United States 0 long 
tradition of receiving political refugeeso However Sir Oliver Wright 0 the 
British Ambassador to the United States 0 has been busy lobbying on Capitol Hill 
and meeting important senators to urge the view of Her Majesty 0 s Government as 
63o The Observer September 15 1985 0 Po 4o 
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strongly as possibleo 
In Parliament in the United Kingdom 0 the then Home Secretary 0 Leon Brittanu 
gave a written answer on the question ot the supplementary treaty to the present 
United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treatyo(64) He stated that the effect 
of the supplementary treaty would be to deny fugitives accused or convicted of 
certain serious offences of violence the ability to avoid extradition on the 
grounds that their offences were politicalo He stated that both governments 
believe that the present political offence to extradition 0 as it applies to 
violent offences 0 is not suitable to extradition arrangements between two 
democratic countries sharing the same high regard for the fundamental principles 
of justice and operating similar independent judicial systemso 
The supplementary treaty0 he suggested0 would represent a most significant 
contribution to the efforts being made by western democracies to counter the 
threat posed by international terrorismo 
In his letter to the Senate 0 on July 17 1985 0 President Reagan asked that 
the Supplementary Treaty be given early and favourable considerationo(65) The 
Supplementary Treaty Supplements and amends the Extradition Treaty between the 
United States and the United Kingdom signed at London on June 8 1972o(66) The 
Supplementary Treaty would exclude specific crimes of violence typically 
committed by terrorists 0 from the scope of the political offence exception to 
extradition a 
Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty effectively limits the scope of 
Article V0 paragraph (1)(c)(i) of the current Extradition Treaty- the political 
64o Weekly Hansard Issue Noo 1353 24 to 28 June 1985 0 81 HoCo Debe Colo 287o 
See also ( 1985) I o L o :M o p o 1104 for President Reagan ° s 
letter to Senate 0 of July 17 1985 and the Supplementary Treatyo 
65o ( 1985) Po ll04o 
66o 28 UoToSo; TIAS 8468o 
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offence except: ion - by 1 i.st:ing t:he c:ri_mes which shall not be regarded as 
offences of a political character 0 namely~ aircraft hijackingy aircraft sabotagea 
crimes against internationally protected persons 0 including diplomatsa hostage 
takinga as well as murdera manslaughter, malicious assault3 kidnapping and 
specified firearms 0 explosives 0 and serious property damage offences" 
Article 2 of the Supplementary Treaty amends Article V0 paragraph (l)(b) 
of the current Extradition Treaty by providing that extradition shall be denied 
if prosecution would be barred by the statute of limitations of the requesting 
stateo The current treaty provision permits the statute of limitations of 
either the requesting or requested state to applyo 
Article 3 of the Supplementary Treaty amends Article VIII 0 paragraph (2) of 
the current Extradition Treaty by providing that the requesting state shall have 
as much as 60 days following provisional arrest to submit evidence in support of 
an extradition request 0 and that if by that time such evidence has not been 
submitted the person arrested shall be set at libertyo The current treaty 
allows only 45 dayso 
Article 4 of the Supplementary Treaty provides that its provisions shall 
apply to any offence committed before or after the entry into force of the 
Supplementary Treaty 0 but shall not apply to an offence committed before the 
Supplementary Treaty enters into force if the offence in question was not an 
offence under the laws of both contracting parties at the time of its 
commission a 
Article 5 of the Supplementary Treaty provides that it shall form an 
integral part of the current Extradition Treaty and sets forth its territorial 
application for the United States and the United Kingdom 0 respectivelyo 
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SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY CONCER}JING THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVER~lENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT 
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELANDu SIGNED AT LONDON ON JUNE 8 1972 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelando 
Desiring to make more effective the Extradition Treaty between the 
Contracting Partiesu signed at London on June 8 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Extradition Treaty~)a 
Have resolved to conclude a Supplementary Treaty and have agreed as 
follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty 8 none of the following offences 
shall be regarded as an offence of a political character: 
(a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraftu opened for signature at The Hague on 
December 16 1970; 
(b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 0 opened for 
signature at Montreal on September 23 1971; 
(c) an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons 8 
including Diplomatic Agents 0 opened for signature at New York on 
14 December 19731 
(d) an offence within the scope of the International Convention against 




(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm0 
(h) kidnappingu abductionu false imprisonment or unlawful detentionu 
including the taking of a hostage11 
(i) the following offences relating to explosives~ 
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause 
serious damage to propertyN or 
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosionu or 
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person 
who intends either himself or through another person to endanger 
life or cause serious damage to propertya 
(j) the following offences relating to firearms or a1nmunition~ 
(1) the possession of a firearm or ainmunition by a person who intends 
either himself or through another person to endanger life; or 
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent 
the arrest or detention of himself or another persona 
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless 
disregard as to whether the life of another would thereby be 
endangered; 
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenceso 
ARTICLE 2 
Article V 0 paragraph (1) (b) of the Extradition Treaty is amended to read 
as follows: 
"(b) the prosecution for the offence for which extradition is 
requested has become barred by lapse of time according to the law of the 
requesting Party, or" 
ARTICLE 3 
Article VIII 0 paragraph (2) of the Extradition Treaty is amended to read 
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as follows~ 
"(2) A person arrested upon such an application shall be set at 
liberty upon the expiration of sixty days from the date of his arrest if a 
request for his extradition shall not have been received. This provision 
shall not prevent the institution of further proceedings for the extra-
dition of the person sought if a request for extradition is subsequently 
received." 
ARTICLE 4 
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offence committed before or 
after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force 0 provided that this 
Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an offence committed before this 
Supplementary Treaty enters into force which was not an offence under the laws 
of both Contracting Parties at the time of its commission. 
ARTICLE 5 
This Supplementary Treaty shall form an integral part of the Extradition 
Treaty and shall apply: 
(a) in relation to the United Kingdom: to Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 0 the Channel Islands 0 the Isle of Man and the territories for 
whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible which 
are listed in the Annexe to this Supplementary Treatyg 
(b) to the United States of America; 
and references to the territory of a Contracting Party shall be construed 
accordingly. 
ARTICLE 6 
This Supplementary Treaty shall be subject to ratification and the 
5nst~tments n~ rat5f1 cat1on shall be exchanged at London as soon 
as possibleo It shall enter into force upon tbe exchange of 
instruments of ratificationo It shall be subject to termlnation 
in the same manner as the Extradition Treatyo 
IN ','\JITNESS 'R!BEREOF 9 the undersigned 9 beine; duly authorised 
thereto by their respective Governments 9 have signed this 
Supplementary Treatyo 
Part III 
I. International Terrorism 
The substantial increase in the acts of violence com~itted 
for political ends 9 and the increasing international nature of 
these acts have caused a great deal of alarm and concern in the 
international community. One specific reaction of states has been 
to introduce practical restr:lctions on the cla:'Lm by individuals 
that their actions came within the pr:'Lnciple of the "political 
offence exceptiono 11 Another reaction has been the creation of 
new offences like hijacking and yet another has been the elabor-
ation of special duties of protectiono These restrictions are 
known as the Hdepoliticising formula" or the exception to the 
political offence exception. The first example of the pollticising 
formula is the Belgium attentat clause of 1856o(67) This inter-
national trend towards the outlawing of certain forms of vi alent 
activity commenc.ed with a response to specific activities which 
threatened the international order as well as national order, such 
as hijacking and the kidnapping and killing of diplomatic per~ 
sonnel and has developed to encompass a wide range of socially 
disruptive behaviour, especially violent behaviour which 9 even if 
politically motivated, involved death 9 or injury of persons or 
serious injury to private propertyo Such activities have been 
67o Moniteur Belge March 27 1856o 
labelled "acts of terrorism" and have been vnriouoly descrlben as 
0 acts of violence which endanger or take lnnocent hurr:.an lives or 
jeopardise fundamental freedoms" (68) 9 or which are udirectod 
against the life 9 physical integr:l ty or liberty of persons or 
against property where they create a collective danger for persons 9 
including attempts of or threats of or participation as accomplice 
in these acts."(69) As regards definitions 9 J. Dugard (70) states 
that the correct defi ni ti on of "terrori sm 11 is of paramount im= 
portance to the starting point of any debates about "terrorism." 
At the international level 9 the trend is associated with the dev= 
elopment of the notion of an international crime 9 particularly a 
crime against humanity, that is 9 behaviour which is regarded as so 
barbarous as to be repulsive to a sense of humanity and as de-
serving the condemnation of all civilised people. The United 
Kingdom is a party to a number of international conventions which 
deal with various types of 
68. Preamble to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 
measures to prevent international terrorism 9 18 December 1972 ( 1973) 12 I .L.M. 9 218. 
69. Recommendation No. R. (82) 1 of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe concerning International Co=operation 
in the Prosecution and Punishment of Acts of Terrorism 9 
15 January 1982 (1982) 21 I.L.M., 199. 
70. J. Dugard, 11 Towards the Definition of International Terronism" 
(1973) 67 Am. Soc. Int. L. Proc., pp. 94=100. 
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acts which are considered to be "terroris·t" activity a ( 72) Tho Hijacking Act 1971 
implements the Hague Conventionu the Protection of Aircraft Act 1973 (72) 
implements the Montreal Convention3 the Internationally Protected Persons Act 
1978 implements the New York Convention; the Genocide Act 1969 implements the 
Genocide Convention; the Hostages Act 1981 has also been enacted by the legis-
lature in the United Kingdomo 
The relevant Article in the Genocide Convention is Article 7 which provides 
that genocide and other crimes enumerated in Article 30 
will not be considered as political crimes for the purposes of extraditiona 
However this particular provision of the Genocide Convention caused vehement 
opposition in several stateso The United Kingdom waited until 1969 before 
ratifying the Convention because it could not agree with the depoliticising 
formula of Article 7o The British government had ~ade it clear that it preferred 
to avoid a formal extradition arrangement for war criminals and to employ instead 
71a (a) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraftg The 
Hague 0 December 16 1970 0 IoaAoOo Doco 8920 0 the "Hague Convention"a 
(b) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation 0 Montreal 0 September 23 1971 0 IoCaAoOo Doca 8966 0 the 
"Montreal Convention"; 
(c) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons 0 Including Diplomatic Agents 0 New Yorkg 
December 14 1973 0 UoNa Doco A/3166 (XXVIII) 0 the "New York Convention"; 
(d) International Convention Agsinst the Taking of Hostages 0 New Yorko 
December 17 1979 0 UaNo Doco A/Reso 34/146 (January 24 0 1980) the "Hostages 
Convention"1 
(e) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 0 
December 9 1948 0 78 UoNoToSoo Po 277o 
Note also 0 Jo Murphy 0 "United Nations Proposals on the Control and 
Suppression of Terrorism" in MaCho Bassiouni 0 International Terrorism and 
Political Crimes (1975)g PPo 493 et seqo1 Bo De Schutter0 "Prospective Study 
of the Mechanisms to Repress Terrorism" in Reflexions sur la Definition et 
la Repression du Terrorisme (1974) 0 Po 253; Yo Alexander and SoMa Fingers 0 
Terrorism; Interdisciplinary Perspectives (1977). 
72o The Aviation Security Act 1982 (Co 36 S.Io F. 9) Scho 3 
replaces earlier Statutes. 
- 139 -
its statutory powers to deport undesirable alienso(73) The main reason for 
British hesitancy was due to the attempted restriction on the concept of 
political offences and the British tradition of granting agylnmo(74) In the 
United States there were strong objections raised against its ratification and 
Article 7 is one of the reasons why 0 to date 0 the Convention has not yet been 
ratifiedo Article 7 of the Genocide Convention has never been explicitly 
appliedo There have been a number of cases in which extradition was granted for 
genocide 0 but the refual to apply the political offence exception in these cases 
was not based on Article 7 but on other criteria such as the barbarity of the 
acto(75) 
In the United States the position has now altered with regard to ratification 
of the Genocide Conventiono(76) On September 5th 1984 President Reagan asked the 
Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Genocide Conventiono 
On October 11 Senate voted eighty-seven in favour 9 two against and eleven 
abstentionso Resolution 478 (77) was adopted; it expressed its support for the 
principles embodied in the Convention. On September 24 1984 the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations reported favourablyo Of Article 7 the Committee noted that 
the main concern was that American citizens might be extradited for trial in 
foreign courts without the protection of United States constitutional guarantees. 
But the Committee stated that ratification of the Genocide Convention would only 
open the way for one more crime - genocide - to be added to the list of crimes 
73o Green, "Political Offences 9 War Crimes and Extradition" (1962) 
.XaC·oLoQ
1
o Po 329. See also Garcia-Morae "Crimes against Humanity and the 
Princ~pie of Non-extradition of Political Offenders" (1964) 62 Micho L. Rev. 
Po 927; Mo Whiteman 9 Digest of International Law Volo 6 (1968) 0 PPo 846-847o 
74o IoAo Shearer 0 op.cito 1 Po 186o 
75o Bohne 0 "Supreme Court of Argentina" (1968) 62 Amo JoioLoau Po 784o 
76o MoNo Leich 0 "Contemporary Practice of the United States relating to Inter-
national Law" (1985) Amo JoioLoo p. 116 at p. 124o 
77o For text see 130 Congress Reco So 14 0 076 (daily edition0 October 10 1984)o 
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for which Americans may be extradited under ratifieu extradition treatieso They 
noted that extradition treaties are carefully worded to be as explicit as 
possible about the definition of the crimes covered and the procedure under which 
a citizen will be surrendered to another nation for trialo(78) 
Since October 1975 there is a second international instrument which excludes 
genocide from the political offence exception; Article 1(a) Additional Protocol 
to the European Convention on Extraditiono(79) This article provides that crimes 
against humanity 0 as provided by the Genocide Convention 0 will not be considered 
as political crimes for the purposes of extraditiono With respect to the 
Genocide Conventionu however 0 this article does not add anything now because the 
Convention already provided for the duty to extraditeo During the drafting of 
the Protocolu several states were reluctant to accept the proposed "depoliticis-
ation" of genocide and the other crimes provided in Article 1o Thus 0 the 
question to be asked is whether the new Protocol will have the success hoped foro 
The most important international convention however is the Council of Europe 0 s 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorismo(80) This Convention has been enacted 
in United Kingdom law as the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978o The Convention 
and the Act have arguably made the most important change in extradition law since 
1870o(81) Before considering the national and international impact of the Act 
and the Convention 0 a survey of previous attempts to come to grips with the 
problem of terrorism is necessary" Jo Dugard (82) considers that the most 
relevant precedent of an anti-terrorist nature is the 1937 Convention for the 
78o The Genocide Convention of 9 December 1948 now has 95 ratifications 
including the United Stateso 
79o October 15 1975 EoToSo NOo So 
BOo Signed at Strasbourg on January 27 1977 EoToSo Noo 90 0 Cmndo 7031 (1977)o 
81o VoEo Hartley-Booth 0 OPoCitou Po 83o 
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P.r:eve11tion and Punishinent of Te:erurismo ( 83) This Convention \'las signed by 
twenty-four states but never came into force3 it was s direct response to the 
assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934 by persons 
who today would probably have been described as terroristso The Convention was 
intended to suppress acts of terrorism having an international character only 
and most of its definitions were devoted to a definition of the international 
elemento "Acts of terrorism" were characterised in Article 1 as acts directed 
against a state which were intended or calculated to create a state of terror in 
the minds of a section of the publico Dugard argued that an ideal treaty which 
aimed at combatting international terrorism should 0 firstly 0 reaffirm that all 
states have the duty in all circumstances to refrain from encouraging guerilla 
activities in another statea secondly 0 prohibition should be made of acts of 
terrorism which disturb the international order and clearly identify the inter-
national element which brings the act within the jurisdiction of international 
lawa thirdly 0 oblige states to extradite or to punish the offender under the 
Convention; and fourthly 0 the Convention should reaffirm the international 
community 0 s abhorrence of state controlled terrorism as expressed in the 
Nuremberg Trials 0 the Genocide Convention and the human rights provisions of the 
Chartero But he suggests that there are two obstacles to such a Convention; 
firstly 0 the dubious status of wars of national liberation; secondly 0 the right 
of states to grant asylum to political offenderso The United Nations Charter 
clearly permits use of force in the exercise of the right of self-defence and 
under the authority of the Security Council 0 Dugard points out 0 in referring to 
wars of national liberationo He adds that political toleration of wars of 
national liberation is a fact of international life which cannot be ignored by 
the drafters of a convention on terrorismo Thus a compromise convention is 
necessary which omits all reference to support for armed bands in the concept of 
83o League of Nations Doco Co 546 Mo 383 1937 Vo and UoNo Doco A/Co 6/418o 
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inte.r:national ten:o:r.-ism. He states that self-determination is a prime value to 
many states. As regards the granting of asylum to political offenders 0 he 
argues that from a doctrinal point of view 0 the international terrorist does not 
fall within the category of a political offender. He rightly points out that 
political offenders were given asylum for the precise reason that their acts did 
notu like those of the common criminalu present a threat to the life or property 
of citizens of other states 0 but modern terrorist activity is geared to have such 
results and as such the terrorist becomes a criminal under international law. He 
concludes by stating that "a full appreciation of the raison dvetre of the non-
extradition of political offenders might persuade states to adopt a less in-
transigent attitude to the extradition of international terrorists and lead them 
to accept the principle of aut dedere aut punier". Dugard considers that the 
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Inter-
national Terrorism (84) 0 the "u.s. Draft" which was submitted to the General 
Assembly of the United Nationsu faces most of the difficulties to which he 
refers. Under Article 1 an act of terrorism assumes "International significance" 
if it meets four requirements. Firstlyv it is committed or takes effect outside 
the territory of which the terrorist is a national1 secondly 0 if it is committed 
or takes effect either outside the territory of the target state or within its 
territory but is directed at non-nationals of the target state; thirdly 0 if it is 
not committed in the course of military hostilities; fourthly 0 if it is intended 
to damage the interests of or obtain concessions from a state or international 
organisation. 
This definition of terrorism does not permit a war of self-determination to 
come within its ambit because in such cases the act either takes place inside the 
territory of the target state or is committed by a national of the target state. 
84. September 25 1972 0 U.N. Doc. A/C 6/L 850. 
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But acts such as the Palestiuictn taking of Israeli hostages during the Munich 
Olympics in 1972 would be coveredo Dugard suggests that two principles need to 
be stated more clearlyo Firstly 0 that the motive of the terrorists is irrelevant 
in determining whether an act of terrorism has been committed0 secondly0 that the 
act should be intended to or calculated to inspire terror in a section of the 
publico Article 3 of the UoSo Draft obliges a state either to extradite an 
offender or to try him "without exception whatsoever" before the local courtso 
One important achievement of the UoSo Draft is that it succeeds in localising 
internal conflict situations by providing international measures for the punish--
ment of those zealous revolutionaries who seek to dramatise their cause by acts 
of terrorism in foreign countries. 
On the particular issue of wars of national liberation 0 Lowe and Young (85) 
note that Third World states emerging from colonialism resort to use of arms when 
the possibility of self-determination achieved through constitutional channels is 
unavailable because of the repressive nature of the government. These groups 
argue that since attacks on the ruling regime are unlikely to result in any 
changeu attacks on other targets may be necessary. And these acts ought not to 
be considered as terrorist activity. One should look not at the means employed 
but at ends which the violence serves. Both authors note that these arguments 
are used by those individuals involved in national liberation movements in 
Europe. Acts of violence have been used by groups seeking regional autonomy 
within Europe, these groups which include the Bretons and Basque separatistsu 
have openly argued that their actions were motivated by their quest for self-
determination. The authors point out that if this argument were accepted 0 these 
secessionist movements within Europe would have to be treated differently from 
terrorists 0 and the approach among the Western states is not to accept this 
85. A.V. Lowe and J.Y. Young 0 (1979) Neth. Int. L.FBv.p. 305 at p. 306. 
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nrgnmenL ( 86) 
II The Council of Europe 0 s Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
One of the fundamental prnhlems is that there i:::: no international ctyLeement 
as to whether and to what extent 0 political asylum should be restricted with 
respect to acts of terrorism. There is not even agreement among states as to the 
necessity to suppress terrorism at all.(87) The treaties which have been 
drafted so far in the framework of the United Nations do not deal with terrorism 
in general but have confined themselves to a number of specific terrorist 
offences, hijacking 0 unlawful acts against the safety of international aviation 0 
unlawful acts against internationally protected persons and the taking of 
hostages. None of these treaties 0 however 0 contains a provision declaring that 
the political offence exception will be excluded for the crimes in question. 
Instead extradition is left as a matter of the domestic law of each contracting 
party 0 thus leaving the application of the exception to their own discretion. 
Nor have proposals to restrict asylum been accepted. For example 0 a proposal to 
establish a duty to extradite for hijacking 0 regardless of the motivation of the 
perpetrator 0 was rejected.(88) 
Europe has led the way in meeting or attempting to meet the issue of 
terrorism head on. Unlike the United Nations 0 with the 1977 Convention on the 
86. Note 0 however 0 the refusal of the Federal German courts to authorise the 
return of Croatian separatists 
The Times, September 15 1978. 
N. Ronzitti 0 "Wars of National 
I.Y~I.L. 9 p.-192. 
_,__....._._.... ' --~.- . -
wanted for offences committed in Yugoslavia. 
(See C. Warbrick (1980) · _P.L. 9 .• p. 1211 
Liberation - a Legal Definition'' (1975) 
87. Witness the lukewarm response that has occurred despite United States and 
United Kingdom pleas for urgent international discussions to consider ways 
and means to effectively combat terrorism0 following upon the hijacking by 
Amal 0 an extreme Lebanese political-religious group, of American passengers 
aboard an aeroplane at Beirut airport in June/July 1985. 
88. A. Abramovsky 0 "Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure and Interference with Aircraft" (1974) 13 Col. J. Trans. L •• p. 401; 
P. Van Kreken 0 "Hijacking and Asylum" (1975) 32 Neth. Int. L.Rr;v. p. 17. 
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Suppression of TAr:r.o:r.ism 0 the Council of Europe has agreed upon a considerable 
restriction of political asylum with respect to terrorist offenceso Certain 
offences have been depoliticised interse between those members of the Council of 
Europe which are parties to the Convention and extradition procedures have been 
strengthened in order to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist acts do not escape 
prosecution and punishmento The intention is to ensure that it should be im-
possible for terrorists to find a safe refuge in Europeo(89) Thus its impact is 
limited territorially and states outside Europe can still grant political asylum 
to terroristso Since extradition for political offences is usually excluded in 
extradition treatiesu the Convention provides that certain offences are not to be 
regarded as political offenceso Thus Article 1 provides "for the purposes of 
extradition between contracting statesu none of the following offences shall be 
regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political 
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives; (a) an offence within 
the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraftu 
the 11 Hague Convention"; (b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviationu the "Montreal 
Convention"; (c) a serious offence involving an attack against the lifeu physical 
integrity or liberty of internationally protected personsu including diplomatic 
agents; (d) an offence involving kidnappingu the taking of a hostage or serious 
unlawful detention; (e) an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade 8 rocketu 
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons; (f) an 
attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice 
of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence"o Article 2 addsu 
(1)"for the purposes of extradition between contracting states, a contracting 
state may decide not to regard as a political offence or as an offence connected 
with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives a serious 
89o Jo Barrett, "The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 
Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978" ( 1980) To I~_, 5_ p 0 1 o 
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offeilc:e involving an act of violence 0 other than one covered by Article 1 0 
against the life 0 physical integrity or liberty of a person• (2) The same shall 
apply to a serious offence involving an act against property 0 other than one 
covered by Article 1 0 if the act created a collective danger for persons; (3) The 
same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or 
participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such 
an offence". 
Article 5 provides 0 however 0 "Nothing in this Convention shall be inter-
preted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requsted state has sub-
stantial grounds for bel:Lving that the request for extradition for an offence 
mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of his race 0 religion 8 nationality or political 
opinion 0 or that the person°s position may be prejudiced for any of these 
reasons". It is reported that this provision was incorporated at the request of 
the Irish Republic; it is therefore called the "Irish Clause".(90) 
In the case where the requested offender is found in the territory of the 
contracting state and that state does not extradite him Articles 6 and 7 provide 
that the contracting state "shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over an offence mentioned in Article 1" and "shall 
submit the case without exception whatsoever and without undue delay to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall 
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious 
nature under the law of that state". This is the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare. Article 13 provideso "Any state may at the time of signature or when 
depositing its instruments of ratification 0 acceptance or approval 8 declare that 
90. P. Weiss 8 "Asylum and Extradition" (1977) 
pp. 37-43. 
Rev, Int, Cornrn. Jur o 
lt resArves the rte;ht to refuse extr>ao'l tton ln respect of any 
offence mentioned in Article 1 which it considers to be a political 
offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives, provided that it undertakes to take 
into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, 
any particularly serious aspects of the offence, including li(a) 
That it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity 
or liberty or persons; or (b) that it affected persons foreign to 
the motives behind it; or (c) that cruel or vicious means have been 
used in the commission of the offenceo" As at January 1 1982 
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom were party to the Convention. The Convention 
entered into force in December 1978o(91) It isM. Wood 1 s(92) 
opinion that a major weakness of the Strasbourg Convention is that 
Article 13 permits this 11major and somewhat obscure reservationo 11 (93) 
Article 13(3) provides that a reserving state may not claim the 
application of Article 1 by any other state; but it may, if its 
reservation is partial or conditional, claim the application of 
that Article in so far as it has itself accepted it. 
91. At the time of signing the Convention, France, Italy, Norway 
and Portugal made a number of reservations and declarations; 
(1976) 16 I.L.M., po 1329. 
92. (1981) 1 Y.E.L. 9 Po 307 at p. 324o 
93. Ibid., p. 324. 
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=j,Wood notes that even ~hough no mention is made of other reservations, this 
does not mean that they are prohibited since Article 13 does not provide that 
only the specified reservation may be madeo "Other reservations may be made 
unless they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and 
the rules of general international law".(94) Lowe and Young note that the 
inclusion of Article 13 reinforces the impression that the Convention will not 
necessarily have any significant effect upon state practice in this mattero 
"Such states as might have stretched the political exception to include terrorist 
acts are likely to enter reservations in order to avoid the necessity for a 
change in their practice".(95) The distinction between Articles 1 and 2 is that 
the former is mandatory whereas the depoliticisation of the offences contained in 
Article 2 is left to the discretion of the contracting parties. However the 
distinction is off-set by Article 13 which 0 as noted above 0 creates the 
possibility of formulating a reservation with respect to Article 1. J. Barrett 
(96) points out that it is clear from the travaux. preparatoires that the 
Convention was only intended to be a partial solution to the terrorist problem. 
The Consultative Assembly acknowledged that such regional action was a 
temporary measure whilst waiting for a long-term universal solution - with 
particular attention being paid to the Arab governments which provide havens for 
terrorists.(97) 
Before considering the various debates and controversies which the 
Convention has caused 0 a consideration of its application will be carried out. 
94. Ibidog Po 324. 
95. Lowe and Young 8 p. 319. 
96. J. Barretto op.cit. 8 p. 1. 
97. Council of Europe AS/POL/Tl (24) Assemblee Consultative. Commission des 
Question s. Politiques 0 Sous - Commission sur le terrorisme internationale 0 
25 April 1973. 
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Article 3(1) of the European Convention on Ext..radition states 0 "Extradition shall 
note be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by 
the requested party as a political offence or as an offence connected with a 
political offence'1 • Terrorist acts might be considered as political offences for 
this purpose as a result of the lack of a generally accepted definition of 
"political offence". There existed therefore as the Council of Europe pointed 
out "serious lacuna in existing international agreements with regard to the 
possibility of extraditing persons accused or convicted of terrorism".(98) The 
importance of this lacuna depends upon the likelihood of states regarding acts 
of terrorists as coming within the ambit of the political offence exception. 
The dictum in Re Ockert (99) suggests the likely response of European courts 
to terrorist activityu "acts which are not related to a general movement directed 
to the realisation of a particular political object in such a way that they 
themselves appear as an essential part of incident thereof 0 but which serve 
merely terrorist ends so as to facilitate a future political struggle 0 can raise 
no claim to asylum". Generally the exception is limited to acts which form an 
integral part of a general political uprising or outbreak of political violenceu 
or which are intended to make an effective contribution to an immediate struggle 
concerning the political organisation of the state. Also the courts tend to 
weigh the means employed against the objective in order to determine whether the 
act is excusable 0 because of its predominantly political purpose and the 
perpetrator 0 worthy of asylum.(100) Only separatist movements 6 in attempts to 
98. Council of Europeu Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (1977) 0 p. 12. 
99. Ann. ;2_ig. (1933-34) 0 p. 369. 
100. J.H.W. Verzijl 0 International Law in Historical Perspective Part V Ch. VII 0 
pp. 303-310 and 339-351 (1972) on European Practice; B.A. Wortleyu 
"Political Crimes in English Law and International Law" (1971) XLV B.Y.I.L., 
p. 219; Garcia-Mora 0 "The Nature of Political Offences" ( 1962) 48 . Va. 
L.Rev.p. 1226, L.C. Green 8 "The Nature of Political Offences" (1976) 7 
J. Ind. L. Inst. 6 pp. 1-26. 
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overthrow the government of a rcgionu may meet these requirements. However 0 
because they are concerned with essentially regional issues 0 they are less likely 
to operate on an international level than some other groups 0 particularly when 
they have a measure of local sympathy.(101) 
The continued support for this approach is illustrated in the request by the 
United States for the extradition from France of William Holder Kerkow on charges 
arising from the hijack of an airliner in 1972. The United States memorandum of 
law addressed to the French Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Justice stated that 0 
"It is well established that political motive alone does not give a common crime 
the character of a political offence 0 violent crimes committed by terrorist and 
other political activists do not constitute political offences unless the crimes 
form part of an action aimed at the immediate overthrow of the state".(102) But 
extradition was not granted by France on the grounds that the offence was 
political. In 1981 0 following a decision by the United States Court of Appeals 0 
seventh circuit (103) 0 Ziyad Abu Eain 0 a member of the Al Fatah branch of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation 0 was surrendered to Israel 0 notwithstanding 
that the applicable extradition treaty between Israel and the United States 
provides that extradition shall not be granted when "the offence is regarded by 
the requested party as one of a political characte~ 1 (104) and thatthe aocused p~drl 
that his offence was of this character. He was accused of placing a bomb in a 
rubbish bin in a crowded market in the Israeli city of Tiberias. The bomb 
exploded 0 killing two young boys and injuring more than thirty other people. 
101. Lowe and Young 0 op.cit. 0 p. 315. 
102. Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1975) 0 pp. 170-17 ; 
also U.S. Digest (1976) 0 pp. 124-125. See C. Wijngaert 0 Court of Appeal of 
Paris November 15 1976. 
103. 641 Fed. Reporter (1981) 2nd series 504; (1982) 21 I.L.M. 6 p. 342. 
104. Article 6(4). 
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According to evidence at the extradition proceedings~ he had carefully avoided 
any contact with military personnel~ and it was clear that the intended victims 
of the bombing were not soldiers but members of the civilian populationo The 
United States Court of Appeals placed great emphasis on the indiscriminate nature 
of the form of violence used and drew a distinction between acts which are 
destructive of the social as opposed to the political structure of a stateo 
"Terrorist activity seeks to promote social chaos" (105)~ the court statedo "We 
recognise the validity and usefulness of the political offence exception 0 but it 
should be applied with great care lest our country became a social jungle and an 
encouragement to terrorists everywhere"o(l06) Such a distinction between what 
might be termed "social" as opposed to "political" offences might be criticised 
as somewhat artificial 0 imprecise and at times difficult to draw 0 but it has also 
found favour in recent years with courts in Franceo(107) Under an extradition 
treaty between France and the Federal Republic of Germany 0 "L 0extradition ne sera 
pas accordee si l 0 infraction pour 1aquelle e11e est demandee est consideree par 
la partie requise 0 d 0 apres les circumstances dans lesquelles elle a ete commise 0 
comme une infraction politique ou comme un fait commis pour preparer une telle 
infraction0 l 0 executer 0 en assurer le profit (ou) en procurer l 0 impunite".(l08) 
Acting under this treaty 0 Germany requested the extradition from France of Klaus 
Croissant 0 a lawyer for the Baader-r4einhoff group (109) o In 1977 Croissant had 
105o (1982) 21 IoLoMoo Po 352o 
106. Ibidoo Po 353o 
107o Ao Connelly0 "Non-extradition for Political Offence; A Matter of Legal 
Obligation or Simply a Policy Choice (1982) I ,J. · Po 59o 
lOB. Article 4 quoted in Julien-Laferriere 0 "L 0 evolution 
francais de Pextradition" (1970) · B.ev, D. Pub a 
9 
See Ao Connelly 0 Opocitoo p. 76o 
recentre du droit 
p. 793 at 859o 
109. Th.E. Carbonneau 0 "Extradition and Transnational Terrorism; A Comment on 
the Recent Extradition of Klaus Croissant from France to West Germany" 
(1978) 12 Into Lawyer 0 pp. 813-823. 
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been the attorney of ct nwnbe:t of Baader-r>leinhoff members and the German 
authorities suspected him of (a) forming a net of communications for the benefit 
of a criminal organisation and (b) granting indirect assistance to a criminal 
association 0 consisting of the organisation of hunger strikes and the carrying on 
of an intense propaganda campaign for the Baader-Meinhoff groupo Croissant 
invoked the political offence exception contending that the 83 acts were related to 
the political crimes of the Baader-Meinhoff groupo The Court of Appeals of 
Paris 0 however 0 did not accept this argumento It found that the crimes of this 
group were not inherently political and added that political motivation in itself 
is not sufficient to consider a given offence as a political offenceo(110) 
"Maitre Bore 0 for the state 0 said that the right of asylum did not apply to 
common law crimeso Neither the activities of the Baader-Meinhoff gang, nor those 
of Herr Croissant, had been political in charactero Both were guilty of social 
crimes 0 not of political ones 0 because they attacked the nation 8 not the 
structure of the state"o(lll) This position was confirmed in Piperno (112) a 
case which arose out of an Italian extradition request introduced in 1979o 
Piperno was suspected of inter alia 8 participation in the kidnapping and murder 
of Aldo Mora in the Spring of 1978o Rejecting Piperno 0 s plea that his offence 
was of a political character 0 the Court of Appeal of Paris held 0 "the court 
reveals the extreme seriousness of the facts alleged since in addition to the 
physical and mental torture implied by a sequestration of many weeks 0 they have 
consisted of the killing of the innocent hostageso Whatever be the purpose 
pursued or the context in which such acts are located, they cannot 8 taking into 
110o Croissant 0 Court of Appeal of Paris 0 November 16 1977 2nd decision, (1978) 
93 Jo Tribo, Po 52o See Co Wijngaert, Po 124 for referenceo 
111o The Times July 8 1978o See Lowe and Young 8 OPoCitou Po 316o 
112o Piperno 0 Court of Appeal of Paris, October 17 1979 8 arret noo 1343-79, Po 14 
(not published); Le Monde October 19 1979 0 Po 4o See Co Wijngaert, Po 124 
for referenceo 
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account their ocrlousnoGG 0 be considered as being of a political character".(l13) 
The Netherlands has adopted the same criterion in dealing with terrorist 
offences. Wackernagel 0 Schneider and Folkerts 0 three members of the Baader-
Meinhoff group were requested by the German Federal Republic for the kidnapping 
and murder of the industrialist Herr Schleyer. Extradition was granted by the 
Dutch courts.(114) Pohle was extradited from Greece to Germany the Athens 
Supreme Court having reversed a finding of an Athens appeal court that his 
offences 0 connected with the kidnapping of Herr Lorenz as a hostage for the 
release of other Baader-Meinhoff mernbers 0 were political.(115) But there have 
been decisions which have not followed the general European trend: witness the 
refusal of France to extradite Abu Daoud on charges connected with the attack on 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. But it seems quite clear that the basis 
of the decision not to accede to extradition requests from Germany and Israel 
were wholly unconnected with the question of whether or not the offences in 
question were "political" for the purposes of French law.(116) 
However 0 one aspect of the terrorist question has to be noted. In Great 
Britain and the United States 0 the required relationship between the struggle for 
power and the political crime is given a more liberal application when the 
requesting state is a "totalitarian regime" in which the normal struggle for 
power is not possible.(117) Thus 0 a hijacking committed by three Yugoslavs 0 
Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic was considered a predominantly political crime 
113. Ibidoo Po 14. 
114. Keesing 1 s Contemporary Archives 0 p. 28919 (1978); The Times October 16 
1978. See Lowe and Young 0 p. 316 for reference. 
115. Ibidoo Po 23923 (1978). 
116. Lowe and Young, op.cit., p. 317; R. Greenfield 0 "The Abu Daoud Affair" 
(1977) II J. I .~ L. E. .• 3 pp. 539-582. As quoted 
in Lowe and Young 0 p. 317. 
117 C. Van den Wijngaert, op.cit., p •• 128. Note 0 Kolczynski and Gonzales. 
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by the Swiss Federal Tribunal 0 although there was no political struggle in 
Yugoslavia to which the acts could possibly have been relatedo(118) 
Au litl_l)UL t..ant point to make when considering such case::; a::; Croissant is that 
extradition to a state with a high interest in punishing the offender is 
necessary because some states (the majority) do not want to risk potential 
terrorist activities designed to secure the release of the terrorist, and the 
potential cost of innocent lives which may result from such retaliatory violenceo 
An example, not connected with extradition 0 is supplied by the Swedish govern-
ment 0 s expulsion of four members of the RoAoFo from Sweden following the raid on 
a Stockholm embassy in 1975, intended to secure the release of Andreas Baader and 
others from prisono Baader was one of the leaders of the Red Brigade (the 
RoAoFo) and in 1975 his trial began in Frankfurt on charges of murder 0 attempted 
murder, bombings and other offenceso(119) 
Part~ Conclusions 
From the outset the Convention provoked controversyo One of the main 
problems was that it constitutes the end of political asylum in Europe because 
practically all political offences are excluded from the scope of political 
asylumo However this must not be exaggerated since asylum may be granted to 
people who are not criminalso The terms of the Convention 0 especially in Article 
2 are said to be very vague and thus nearly any offence could qualify for the 
application of the Conventiono Some authors have centred the debate on the 
question whether political asylum ought to be restricted or abolished within 
certain regional frameworkso Those who subscribe to the restriction of asylum 
state (quite correctly) that it is illogical for states with similar political 
118 0 (1952) 19 IoLoRo Po 374o Also Co Warbrick (1980) PoLo 9 
Po 120 footnote 39o 
119o Keesing 0 s Contemporary Archives 0 Po 27261 (1976)o See Lowe and Young Po 317 
for referenceo 
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institutions to protect persons who jeopardieD these institutions because an 
attack against one state would affect the others. Thus states with a great 
identity of interests are correct to seek restrictions on the scope of the 
applicability of the political offence exception.(l20) Those against this idea 
posit the view that political asylum is one of the fundamental democratic 
principles from which no departure whatsoever should be allowed; they refer to 
Nazi Germany and facist Italy 0 where the political offence exception was one of 
the first rules to be abolished. They argue that when a choice is to be made 
between either punishing the crime and its underlying political motivation 0 or 
not punishing it at all 8 the latter alternative must be chosen. This choice 0 
they argue 0 is the only possible option for a liberal democracy. Wijngaert (121) 
dos not accept this view. She asks the question 8 "do we want to keep this 
implication of the ruler i.e.u immunity from prosecutions 1 at any price even 
vis-a-vis a form of political criminality which has a pronounced tendency towards 
internationalisation and which at the same time is often accompanied by very 
serious common crimes".(l22) She accepts that the criminal law is the only 
(though not totally adequate) means available to combat political terrorism; and 
as such the criminal laws ought not to halt at the frontiers of states. Inter-
state co-operation and the combatting of terrorism by the criminal law should not 
be rendered impotent because of the political motivation of the acts in question. 
But she rightly points out that whatever means are used to combat terrorism 8 the 
rights of the individual should be respected. The justification which protagon-
ists of the Convention claim for the restriction of political asylum is that it 
120. M. Traverso Le Droit Penal International (1921) Vol. II No. 2060-61; 
C.H. Thornberry 1 "Is the Non-surrender of Political Offenders Outdated?" 




contains a number of essential individual safeguards which \-Jar:n:tnt the exclusion 
of certain crimes from the scope of the political offence exceptiono Firstlyu 
they argueu the Convention is open to accession only to member states of the 
Council of Europe 8 which are pledged to support democracy and the rule of law 
and which 0 in addition have all signed the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedomso Secondly 0 Article 5 of the Convention 
creates the possibility to refuse extradition if there are substantial grounds to 
believe that the request has been made "for purposes of prosecuting or punishing 
a person on account of his race 0 religion 0 nationality or political opinion or 
that the person°s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons"o(123) 
One problem worth emphasising is that to accept that all Member States of the 
Council of Europe are democratic states is subject to debate. States 0 under the 
external appearance of democracy may in fact be undemocratic in material 
respects; and precisely because of the closed regional framework such as the 
Council of Europe, the states concerned may not have the political courage to use 
the safeguards provided by the Convention against each other by refusing extra-
dition notwithstanding the quasi-automatic extradition system created by the 
treaty. 
P. Weiss, it is submitted 0 correctly states that it is going too far to say 
that the Convention jeopardises the right of asylum.(124) But he does point out 
that it could become a dangerous precedent if its principles were followed in 
other areas of the world where political conditions are different and democratic 
regimes are not present 0 and thus not bound by the rule of law. However 0 in 
concluding this analysis one must note the wise observation of one author who 
states that when individuals claim the application of Article 5 of the 
Convention 0 they are likely to run across the formal assumption that Member 
123. P. Weiss 0 op.cit. 0 p. 41; Co Wijngaert, opocit., p. 153. 
124. Po Weiss 0 op.cit •• p. 42. 
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States of the Council of Europe respect human rights" Here lies the paradox. 
"The general confidence in the respect given to human rights by European states 
is for the individual the greatest barrier to find support in proving effective 
violations thereof~.(125) 
~ Conclusion to the Irish Angle 
In December 1973 representatives of the British and Irish governments. 
together with representatives of the prominent political parties in Northern 
Ireland met at Sunningdale in Surrey to seek political solutions to the problems 
in Northern Ireland. A joint communique was issued in which the group stated 
that they were concerned at the ease with which persons who had committed crimes 
of violence in Ireland successfully evaded being held to account for their crimes 
through the normal judicial process by simply crossing the border from one 
jurisdiction in Ireland to the other. 
In considering ways of tackling the situation 0 it was realised that there 
were "problems of considerable legal complexity involved".(126) The result was 
that a Law Enforcement Commission was set up jointly by the two governments to 
consider the matter. The members completed their report and submitted it to the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Justice in the 
Republic of Ireland in May 1979.(127) The Commission considered four proposals 
for dealing with the problem. These were 0 (1) the all-Ireland court method 0 a 
common law enforcement area in which jurisdiction would be exercised by an all-
Ireland court; (2) the extradition method 0 by which the existing law would be 
125. B. Swart 0 "Terrorisme en Uithevering" (1978) Recht en Kritiek 0 p. 345; 
G. Fraysse-Druesne 0 "La Convention Europeenne pour la Repression du 
Terrorisme" (1978) 82 Rev. Gen. D. Irit. Pubo p. 969. 
126o Para. 10 0 Joint Communique 0 December 1973. 
127. Report of the Law Enforcement Commission. Cmnd. 5627 0 1974. 
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amended, (3) the extra-territorial method 0 which involved Lhe confe:rring of 
additional extra-territorial jurisdiction upon the court of each jurisdictiona 
(4) the mixed court method 0 which amounted to the exercise in each jurisdiction 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction by special courts consisting of three judges 0 
at least one of whom would be a judge of the other jurisdiction. The first 
method was not accepted because it was thought to be too cumbersome. The fourth 
method 0 seen as a less satisfactory form of the third proposal was not analysed 
in detail by the Commission. Thus the Commission concentrated their arguments 
around the extradition method. Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution is the 
relevant constitutional provision which is said to protect politcial offenders. 
It has been advanced by Ireland as a reason for declining to become a party to 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977. In her article 
A. Connelly (128) examines the soundness of the interpretation of the effect of 
the constitutional provision at the present time. Part of the issue (a most 
important part) is the justification for the interpretation with the increase of 
indiscriminate and international acts of violence of which the I.R.A. are some-
times guilty parties. The four Irish members of the Commission rejected the 
proposal to adopt the method of extradition in dealing with offences which were 
claimed to be of a political character. They based their arguments on the 
following reasons 0 firstly 0 on the grounds of public international law it was 
argued that it was a well recognised principle of international law that the 
extradition of a person accused of a political offence should not take place and 
that the Irish government did not feel that a departure from a principle of 
international law so firmly established0 could be justified. The case of Tapley 
was doubted as authoritative. They argued that the case was not in any way 
concerned with a political offence and that the statutory provision in question 0 
128. A. Connelly 0 "Non-extradition for Political Offences; A Matter of Legal 
Obligation or Simply a Policy Choice?" (1982) I-, J o P p. 59. 
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section 29 of the Pet:ty Sessions Act 1851 0 never purported to be a p:t·ovlsion for 
international extraditiona They were of the belief that nothing in the decision 
in Tap~ indicated that the state could have passed a law on the question of 
extradition which would run counter to the general principles of international 
lawa But is this principle correct? Connelly asks whether there does in fact 
exist a generally recognised rule of international law that political offenders 
ought not to be extraditeda(129) She thinks not and she makes an extensive 
survey of the leading authorities to justify her conclusionso Brownlie (130) 
states that "no general rule forbids surrender"3 and Whiteman (131) is of the 
same beliefo To quote BaAo Wortley 0 "International law8 in the absence of a 
specified treaty obligation. a sovereign state has a right to hand over to 
another civilised state any criminal, political or otherwise"a(132) The Irish 
members of the Commission argued, secondly0 that notice had to be taken of the 
European Convention on Extradition 1957a Ireland is a contracting party to this 
Convention and it would be a breach of Ireland 0 s obligations if they acceded to 
extraditiono(133) Thirdly 0 allusions were made to the procedural complexity of 
international extraditiono 
It was argued that this complexity could be considerably increased as a 
consequence of the strong public feelings and emotions which are generated by 
efforts to extradite for offences which are in law or in the public mind 
political offences or offences connected with political offencesa(134) 
130o Principles of Public International Law (3rd eda) (Oxford 1979) 0 Po 19o 
131o Whiteman 8 Digest of International Law Vola 6 0 Po 853o 
132a Wortley 0 "Political Crime in English Law and in International Law" (1971) 
45 BaYoiaLo 219 at 253o 
133o Cmndo 5627 1974o Po 24o 
134o Cmndo 5627 1974 0 Po 25o 
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The United Kingdom members of the CoM~ission challenged these argumentso 
They argued that the extradition method would not involve a breach of the 
Constitution of Ireland0 nor would it infringe any generally recognised principle 
of international law and it would not constitute a breach of the Irish govern-
ment0s international obligationso The United Kingdom members argued that inter-
national law recognises the right 0 without imposing the duty 0 to refuse extra-
dition of such offenders and that whatever be the true extent of the principleu 
or practice of international law0 the practice of exceptions with regard to the 
enormity or barbarism of the crime justifies an exception (135); terrorists 
operating in Northern Ireland0 whatever their motivation 0 come within this 
exception, they alleged. In commenting on Tapley the United Kingdom members 
stated the case was authority for two propositions 0 (a) that no rule or principle 
of international law compels a state to surrender a fugitive offendera and (b) no 
rule or principle of international law compels a state to withhold surrender of a 
fugitive political offendero They noted Maguire C.Jo 0 s (136) statement 0 "If a 
recognised principle exists forbidding the extradition of political refugees it 
should be possible to state it in terms sufficiently definite to be applied by a 
court of law"o The United Kingdom members then analysed Article 29o3 which they 
saw as containing two phrases 0 "as a guide" and "its relation with other 
states". They argued that the latter phrase puts on inquiry whether Article 29o3 
applies at all to a situation such as the present one under discussion. The 
words "as a guide" were seen as illuminating the functions of Article 29.3. In 
conclusion, the United Kingdom members pointed to the Resolution on International 
Terrorism 24 January 1974 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
as proof of a changing international attitude in relation to crimes of terrorism. 
This Resolution stated "that the political motive alleged by the authors of 
135o ~ou PPo 29-34. 
136o (1952) IoRo 77o 
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certain acts of terrorism should not have as d result that they are neither 
extradited or punished"" In their final submission they emphasised that "The 
right to refuse extradition is that of the requested statey it may be waived and 
confers no right on the alleged offenderJbY waiving the right a state commits 
no breach of international law since there is no rule or principle which compels 
a state to grant asylum"c(137) The statement emphasises the concept of state 
supremacyo The individual is in effect possessed of no rights which are worthy 
of recognition (so the quotation suggests) and the final determination as to 
whether a person is to be extradited is a matter between states and their 
respective interestso No consideration is given to the interests of the individ-
ualo It is submitted that this position ought to be modifiedo McGrath suggests 
that the inability of the two groups of lawyers to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion indicates not only the complexity of the issues 0 but more especially 
the political dimensions of the debateo(138) McCall-Smith and Magee state 0 
"The Irish representative on the Commission framed their objections to extra-
dition in legal terminology 0 but they were probably disguising a much more 
fundamental political objective"c(139) In essence, the Irish representatives 
were seeking at the international level to show that a state does not have to 
send offenders or alleged offenders back to the requesting stateo The British 
authorities held the correct viewc Because the Commission was equally divided 
it was unable to recommend extradition as a means of dealing with the problem. 
The third proposal was subsequently adopted by the governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.(140) The Commission members were aware of 
137o Cmnd. 5627 1974 0 p. 40. 
138. M. McGrath 0 op.citc, Po 306. 
139o (1975) C.I~oR. 200 at p. 219. 
140c In Ireland 0 the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976 and in the United 
Kingdom 0 the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975o 
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the inherent difficulties of this method, they emphasised that its effect.ive11ess 
would depend upon the securing of the requisite evidence from one jurisdiction 
for a trial in the other.(141) This method was accepted and implemented by the 
respective governments and is still in effect. The two Acts confer on the 
courts of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 0 respectively 0 juris-
diction to try fugitive offenders accused of committing serious crimes of 
violence outside the jurisdiction in which they are apprehended 0 but within the 
island of Ireland. The Acts further provide for the taking of evidence on 
commission in either jurisdiction in connection with a trial conducted in the 
other. 
Both statutes came into force simultaneously on June 1 1976. Very few 
lawyers and politicians felt it would deal effectively with the problem; this has 
been proved correct. There have been few prosecutions under this legislation. 
"The Acts are not in fact practical instruments suitable for routine use. It is 
simply not feasible for the authorities in one jurisdiction to collate evidence 
in relation to an offence committed in another".(142) 
Connelly concludes by stating that though there is no legal obstacle to 
Ireland becoming a party to the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism0 or to her passing restrictive legislation 0 "there are reasons 0 many 
of them not unrelated to Ireland 0 s history 0 for denying the extradition of 
politically motivated offenders to the United Kingdom. But the constitution 
should be removed from this essentially political debate".(143) 
II General Conclusion 
Asylum is the basis upon which the concept of non-extradition of political 
141. Commission Report 0 Ch. IV 0 pp. 17-22. 
142. M. McGrath 0 op.cit., p. 308. 
143. A. Connelly 0 op.cit. 0 p. 83. 
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offenders is foundedc From its naive 8 raw expression in the nineteenth century 
to the present time 0 one has seen how the concept of the political offence 
exception has been narrowed down first in English law by the decisions of 
Schtraks and Cheng most notably and in relation to the Irish conflict 8 by 
Littlejohn and Keaneo Terrorism has always been objected to by the judiciary 
(Meunier - anarchists) and at the international leve1 8 objection to terrorism 
has expressed itself in the various hijacking conventions 8 the Genocide 
Convention 0 and most recently and importantly 8 the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorismo With these limitations to the undefined concept of an 
offence of a political character and to the equally elusive understanding of what 
"terrorism" actually means within a legal frameworkv the fear is that the rights 
of the individual are being subordinated to the interests of "free 0 friendly 
nations" in their attempts to contain indiscriminate violenceo But does the 
individual have a right to be granted asylum? "The right to refuse extradition 
is that of the requested state; it may be waived and confers no right on the 
alleged offender~ by waiving the right a state commits no breach of international 
law since there is no rule or principle which compels a state to grant 
asylum"o(144) There is a connection between the political offence and asylum 
but they are not necessarily the opposite sides of the same coino The Irish 
members of the Law Enforcement Commission of December 21 1973 made this mistake 0 
by seeking at the international level to show that a state does not have to send 
alleged fugitive offenders back to the requesting stateo The right not to be 
returned can be distinguished from the concept of asylumo Asylum is a state 
right 0 not a right which the individual can invoke in self-protection during 
proceedings for his extraditiono 
144a Cmnd o 562'7 19'74 ~ p. 40. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
T~ RT<;FUG'fl,'E 9 ASYJ ..;UJVI and IDJf1AN ~I~HTS 
Part One Asylum 
In the preceding Chapter we noticed how the narrowing of the political 
offence exception has led some authors (1) to consider whet~the E$C~ has not 
effectively been removed in all but realityo With this fear comes the worry 
about the political violation of individual rights 0 where such traditional 
protections as the political offence exception have existed (at least in theory 
at any rate)o In this Chapter one will attempt to identify areas which may hold 
out individual protectionso Asylum and the human rights concept will be studiedo 
The importance of the principle of asylum is to be found in the law relating to 
the status of refugeeso At the outset it is best to explain the concepts of 
asylum; non-refoulement and the definition of a refugee 0 as these all form the 
matrix of our study in this Chaptero 
I Asylum 
The Institut de Droit International at its 1951 Bath Session defined asylum 
as "The protection accorded by a state on its territory or in another place under 
1o On asylum and refugees, see (1) Go Goodwill-Gill, The Refugee in Inter-
national Law (1983) New York; (2) Ao Grahl-Madsen0 The Status of Refugees in 
International Law (1972) Volo II, PPo 6 0 22 0 79 et seqo; (3) MoRe Garcia-
Mora0 International Law and Asylum as a Human Right (1956) Washington; 
(4) Fo Morgenstern 0 "The Right of Asylum" (1949) 26 BoYoioLo 327; (5) Po 
Weiss 0 "Territorial Asylum" (1966) 6 Indo J o Into Lo 0 Po 174 and Po 178; 
(6) SoPo Sinha 0 Asylum in International Law (1971) 0 PPo 73 0 156 0 2791 
(7) Go Gilbert 0 "Asylum; A Change of Direction?: (1983) 32 I.CoLoQo 0 Po 633; 
(8) Do Johnson 0 "Refugees 0 Departees and Illegal Immigrants" (1980) 9 
S:;n LoDevo Po 11; (9) Do Martino "Large-Scale Migration of Asylum Seeks" 
(198~) Amo JoioLo 1 Po 598; (10) Co Van den Wijngaert 0 The Political Offence 
Exception to Extradition (1980) Kluwer 0 Netherlands; (11) EoWo Vierdag, 
"Asylum and Refugees in International Law" (1971) 24 Netho Into L~__li':.:-::v, 
PPo 287-303o 
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its jurisdiction to an individual who has come to seek it"o(2) The debate about 
asylum is centred around the question of whether the right of asylum is vested in 
the state absolutely 0 or whether recent trends in international law have shifted 
this right 0 so that it is now a right which the individual can invokeo Hugo 
Grotius (3) considered the right of asulym as a natural right of the individual 
and felt it to be the corresponding duty of states to grant asylum on behalf of 
the international communityo In contra-distinction 0 traditional international 
law sees the right as one of states to grant at their own discretiono The basis 
of this, some authors suggest 0 is the state exercise of territorial sovereigntyo 
II The Refugee 
The first major statute which deals with the issue of the refugee is the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugeeso(4) Article (1) defines the 
term "refugee" and this definition is still in use 0 with a slight amendment 
attachedo A refugee is defined "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 
1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race 0 
religion 0 nationality 0 membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion 0 is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such 
fear 0 is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events 0 isuneNe cr owing to such fear 9 is 
unwilling to return to it"o The 1951 Convention was primarily concerned with the 
refugee problems consequent upon the ending of the Second World War and the 
resultant Cold War 0 east-west difficulty prior to 1951o But this difficulty in 
2o Article 2(1) Resolution 0 concerning L 1asile en droit international public, 
adopted on September 11 1950o See Co Wijngaerto opocitoo Po 66o 
3o De Jure Belli ac Pacis 0 Book II Cho XXI V(l) 1625o See Co Wijngaert 0 
OPoCitoo Po 66o 
4o Resolution 429(V) General Assembly 0 December 14 1950 and Geneva July 28 
1951o 189 UoNoToSoe Po 137o 
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terms of date in the 19~1 Refugee Convention was remedied by the conclusion of 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees at New York on January 3 1967o(5) 
This Protocol omits the definition found in the 1951 Convention "As a result of 
events occurring before January 1 1951" and adds the \17ords "As a result of such 
events"o This provision recognises that there have been events since 1951 that 
have created situations where individuals are persecuted or become statelesso 
The definition or description of refugee is to facilitate and to justify aid and 
protectiono Thus the definition of a refugee contained in Article 1 is vital in 
determining who is entitled to the protection and assistance of the United 
Nations 0 because it is the lack of protection by their own government which 
distinguishes refugees from ordinary aliens. Goodwin-Gill points out that the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (6) (UoNoH.CoRo) (the main UoNo 
agency concerned with refugee problems) Statute contains an apparent contra-
diction. It affirms that the work of the office ought to relate to groups and 
categories of refugeesa yet it proposes a definition of the refugee which is 
essentially individualistic 0 requiring a case by case examination of subjective 
and objective elementso No state has objected to U.NoH.C.Ro taking up 
individual cases as sucho(7) Thus Goodwin-Gill states that one can conclude that 
5. Go A o Resolution 2198 (CCI) December 16 1966 entered into force October 
4 1967. 97 ratifications (1984) HoRoLoJ • 9 :- Algeria 0 
Angola 0 Argentina 0 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Beni;, Bolivia, Botswana 8 
Brazil 0 Burkina Faso, Burindi 0 Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmarku Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic 8 Ecuador 8 Egypt 0 El Salvador 8 Ethiopia, Fiji 8 Finland0 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Germay/Federal Republic, Ghana 0 Greece, Guatemalao 
Guinea 0 Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Iceland, Iran 8 Ireland 0 Israel, 
Italy8 Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan 8 Kenya, Lesotto, Liberia 8 Liechtenstein0 
Luxembourg, Mali 0 Malta 8 Morocco 8 Netherlands, New Zealandu Nicaragua, 
Niger 0 Nigeria 0 Norway 0 Panama 0 Paraguay8 Peru 0 Phillipines 0 Portugal, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe Senegal 0 Seychelles 0 Sierra Leone 8 Samalia 8 
Spain 0 Sudan, Suriname 0 Swaziland, Sweden 0 Switzerland0 Tanzania 0 Togo, 
Tunisia 0 Turkey, Uganda 0 United Kingdom 8 United States, Uruguay, Yemen, 
Yugoslavia 0 Zaire 0 Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
6. Goodwin-Gill 0 op.cit. 0 suprao No 1 0 pp. 129-131. 
7. Sadruddin Aga Khan "Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced 
Persons" Hague Recueil (1976-I) 8 331-2. 
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the class of persons within the mandate of or concern to the UoNaHaCoRa includes 
(1) those who 0 having left their country can 0 on a case by case basis be 
determined to have a well-founded fear of persecution on certain specified 
groundsa and (2) those 0 often large groups or categories or persons 0 who likewise 
having crossed an international frontier 0 can be determined or presumed to be 
without 0 or unable to avail themselves of 0 the protection of the government of 
their state of origino This is said to be the broad meaning of the term 
''refugee" for the purposes of the United Nationsa There are thus four elements 
which Convention refugees are said to possesso (1) They are outside their 
country of origin3 (2) they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the 
protection of that country or to return therea (3) such inability or unwilling-
ness is attributable to a well-founded fear of being persecuted and (4) The 
persecution feared is based on reasons of race 0 religion 0 nationality of a 
particular social group or political opiniono 
Within the 1951 Refugee Convention 0 certain important safeguards for the 
individual existo The most important is contained in Article 33(1) which states 
that "(1) No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion 0 nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion; (2) The benefit of the present 
provision may not 0 however 0 be claimed by a refugee when there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is 
or who 0 having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime 0 constitutes a danger to the community of that country"o This principle is 
known as the non-refoulement principleo This is a principle of recent origino 
The first reference to the principle is found in an international agreement 0 
contained in Article 3 of the Conveneon relating to the International Status of 
Refugees 1933 0 where the contracting parties undertook not to remove resident 
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refugees or keep them from their territory 0 unless dictated by national security 
or public ordero 
So much for the preliminary outline. The refugee issue has gained in 
prominence with the two world warso Although the concept of asylum pre-dates 
World War Two 0 the vast numbers of persons displaced as a result of the war 
focused attention on the refugee problema But this focus concerned itself with 
the problem from an inter-state angle rather than primarily from the point of 
view of the individual refugeeo It was (is) based on the idea that states 
claimed the right to give sanctuary to persons threatened with unconscionable 
treatmento In contrast to political offendersp refugees had not usually actively 
challenged the ruling regime in their countrieso They were passive victims of 
the changing political structure within their countrieso The principle grew up 
that those aliens liable to "persecution" in their home states ought not to be 
returned thereo This new concept has developed into the law of asylum and the 
law relating to refugeeso 
III The Refugee and Asylum 
The United Nations High Commmissioner for Refugees is the main United 
Nations agency concerned with refugeeso At its 1950 session, the General 
Assembly formally adopted the statute of the UoNoHoCoRo as an annexe to 
Resolution 428(V} on December 14 1950o The functions of the UoNoHoCoRo extend to 
"providing international protection" and "seeking permanent solutions" to the 
problems of refugees by way of voluntary repatriation or assimilation in new 
national communities"o(B) The Statute also provides that "the work of the High 
Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be 
humanitarian and social and shall relate 0 as a rule 0 to groups and categories of 
So Statute 0 parao 1; Goodwin-Gill 0 The Refugee in International Law (1983) (New 
York) 0 Po 130o 
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refugees"a(9) The function considered to be the most important i~:~ the p.rovision 
of international protection because without protection by the UoNoHaCaRa to 
intervene to secure the admission of refugees 0 there can be no possibility of 
finding lasting solutionsa The UaNaHaCaRa statute prescribes the relationship of 
the High Commissioner with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council (EaCaOaSaOoCo) identifies ways in which the High Commissioner is to 
provide for protection and financing of any constructive schemesa(lO) The 
specific type of protection envisaged includes promoting the conclusion of inter-
national conventions for the protection of refugeesu supervising their appli-
cation and proposing amendments to them, promoting through special agreements 
with governments the execution of any measures calculated to improve the 
situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protectionu as well as 
promoting the admission of refugeesa 
In relation to the General Assembly and to general international organs 0 the 
UoNoHaC.Ra was set up by the General Assembly as a subsidiary organ under 
Article 22 of the UoNo Chartero The relationship of the two organisations is 
clarified in the statute which states that the UaNaH.CaRa acts "under the 
authority of the General Assembly" (11) and that it shall "follow policy 
directives given by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council"o 
(12). The Statute also states that the UoNaHoCaR. "shall engage in such 
additional activitiesu including repatriation and resettlementu as the General 
Assembly may determine"o(13) The High Commissioner has to report to the 
9. Ibid. 0 paraa 2a But para. 3 obliges the High Commissioner to follow 
policy directives of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Councilo 
lOa Statuteu para a So 
lL Ibid au para a 3a 
12o Ibida u para a 4a 
13a Ibid a q para a 9a 
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General Assembly annually 0 through the Economic and Social Council and such 
report has to be considered as a separate item on the agenda of the General 
Assemblyo(14) The High Commissioner is also called upon by the Statuteu in cases 
of difficulty 0 to seek the opinion of the Advisory Committee on Refugeeso(15) 
This kind of committee was first established in 1951 and replaced four years 
later by the UoNo Refugee Fund Executive Committeeo This organisation was then 
replaced by the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner 0 s Programme 0 at the 
instigation of the General Assemblyo This was set up by the Economic and Social 
Council in 1958. Its present membership is forty-one, after the initial number 
of twenty-four stateso The Committee 0 s terms of reference include advising the 
High Commissioner 0 on request, in the exercise of the Office 0 s statutory 
functions and advising on the appropriateness of providing international assist-
ance through the Office in order to solve any specific refugee problemso In 
1975 0 the Executive Committee set up a Sub-committee of the whole on Inter-
national Protectiono(16) This Sub-committee is said to make a continuing 
contribution to the development and strengthening of refugee lawo(17) 
The specific value of these organisations is that it involves the 
participation of states at varying levels in the international institutions 
protecting refugees. "The practice of such organisations is relevant in assess-
ing the standing of both the U.N.H.C.R. and of the rules benefitting refugees in 
general internatioanl law".(18) 
Although the 1951 Convention defines refugees and provides for certain 
14. Ibid., parao 11o 
15. Statute 0 para. 1. 
16. Report of the Executive Committee 26th Session 1975. U.N. Doc. A/AC 96/521, 
para. 69(h)o 
17. Goodwin-Gill, OPoCitoo Po 132. 
18. Ibid. 
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standards of treatment to be accorded to refugees 0 it says nothing about 
procedures for determining refugee status and leaves to states the choice of 
means as to implementation at national levelo Unless an alien can prove a well~ 
founded fear of persecution 0 he is not a refugee and cannot qualify for asylumo 
Goodwin-Gill suggests that a decision on the well-foundedness or not of a fear of 
persecution is essentially an essay in hypothesis 0 an attempt to prophesy what 
might happen to the applicant in the future if returned to his or her country of 
origino(19) The refugee need not have fled by reason of fear of persecution 0 nor 
that persecution should have actually occurredo The persecution could have 
arisen whilst the individual or group were abroado Subjective and objective 
factors have to be taken into accounto If the applicant 0 s statements in regard 
to the fear are consistent and credible 0 then little more can be required in 
way of formal proofo The next stage is to determine whether the subjective fear 
is well-founded, whether there are sufficient facts to permit the finding that 
the applicant would face a serious possibility of persecutiono The Convention 
provides five relevant grounds of persecutions race 0 religion 0 nationality0 
membership of a particular social group0 political opinion= ~ur of persecution 
and lack of protection are considered to be interrelated elementso Those who are 
persecuted do not enjoy the protection of their country of origin and converselyu 
any evidence of lack of protection on either the internal or external level may 
create a presumption of persecution and the well-foundedness of any fearo Though 
persecution includes the threat of deprivation of life and physical freedomo 
measures such as the imposition of serious economic disadvantage 8 denial of 
access to employment or restrictions on freedoms normally guaranteed in a 
democratic society 0 such as freedom of speech may sufficeo In his article (20) 
19o Goodwin-Gill 0 OPoCitoo Po 22o 
20o Go So Gilbertu "Asylum~ A Change of Direction" ( 1983) 32 . ! .. ~_n.!.I'~: (1.. PPo 
633-650 0 
- 172-
Go Gilbert considers the elements which constitute or can amount to perse-
cutiono(21) He correctly points out that evidentiary difficulties will arise 
when the refugee tries to prove the fear is well-founded because it is only his 
testimony that will be providedo The state of origin is not likely to provide 
records to back up his claimso (Note 8 Canada has recently announced changes in 
the regulations that will give a presumption that the refugee is telling the 
truth unless there is clear evidence to the contrary - Toronto Star February 21 
1982 8 Po A2 colo l)o(22) He suggests that refugees basing their claims on social 
or political persecution are going to have to show some personal connections such 
as leadership of a political party or previous arrestso In Re Inzunza and the 
Minister of Em~~o~e~tand Immigration (1979) (23) 0 a Canadian case 0 it was 
held that the Immigration Board ought to look at whether the controlling govern-
ment considers his activity to be political 0 not whether the Board thinks it iso 
Also 0 previous treatment as a political activist 0 even if completely unfounded 0 
should be enough to establish a prima facie case of fear of persecutiono 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (24) originally intended to 
provide for an individual right to asylumo According to the original text 0 
everyone would have "the right to seek and to be granted asylum in other 
countries from persecution"o(25) But the United Kingdom delegation vigorously 
opposed this provision and thus it was reduced to "the right to seek and to 
\( enjoy asylum:-''! Article 14 of the UoNo Universal Declaration of Human Rights thus 
/' 
2lo Ibidog PPo 644-646o 
22o Ibidoo Po 645o 
23o (1979) 103 DoLoRo (3d) 105 at Po 109 (FoCoAo) See Go Gilbert 0 opocitoo 
Po 646o 
24o December 10 1948 UoNo DOC 0 A/Reso 217 (III)o 
25o UaNa Doco E/CNa 4/713 Po 8 for activities of the various organs of the UoNo 
in connection with the right of territorial asyluma 
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reads 0 "(1) Everyone has a right to seek asylwn and enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution, (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of 
prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations" Thus the traditional view 
that the right of asylum belonged to states was reinforced. Sir Ho Lauterpacht 
characterised the formulation of Article 14 as 'lartificial to the point of 
flippancyn.(26) Another author considers the Universal Declaration as "a mere 
statement of pious hope as to the standards of conduct that might one day be 
achieved"o(27) The problem with the so-called right of asylum lies in the 
refusal of states to accept an obligation to grant asylum in the sense of 
residence and lasting protection against the jurisdiction of another and the 
element of protection 0 particularly by residence 0 granted to a foreign national 
against the exercise of jurisdiction by another state 0 is the whole basis of the 
concept of asylumo 
As far as international treaties are concernedu only the 1948 American 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights 
provide for an individual right to asylumo(28) But Gilbert suggests that the 
1967 Protocol is the document which has "given vent to the wind of change blowing 
through the domestic policy in this area"o(29) Before returning to Gilbert 0 s 
useful discussion on the effect the 1967 Protocol has had on domestic 
26. Ho Lauterpacht 0 "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 25 
BoY. LLo 374 Lo 
27o Greene "TheRight of Asylum in International Law (Inaugural lecture at the 
University of Malaya 0 1961)o 
28o The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Arto XXVII (1948) 
43 Amo Jo !.o : Loo Po 133 (suppo 1949)o The American Convention on Human 
Rights Art. 22(7) (1969) 9 IoLoMoo p. 673. "Everyone has the right to 
seek and be granted asylum in the event he ·is being pursued for political 
offences or related common crimes"o 
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inunigration le9islalion, the:r:e are important qualifications at the international 
level which must be referred to, because these have the effect of limiting the 
right of states to refuse asylum. These can also be seen as important safe-
guards for the individual. Articles 31-34 of the Refugee Convention contain the 
safeguards. Article 31 states that contracting states ought not to impose 
penalties on account of the illegal entry or presence of refugees who have come 
directly from a territory where their life or freedom has been threatened in the 
manner prescribed by Article 1, as long as they go straight to the relevant 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry. Article 32 provides 
that contracting states will not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save 
on grounds of national security or public order. Article 34 states that the 
contracting state in which the refugee seeks asylum must make such provisions as 
far as is possible, to help with the assimilation and potential naturalisation of 
refugees. However Article 33(1) is the most important provision; the~ 
refoulement principle. As far as Goodwin-Gill is concerned, "There is 
substantial, if not conclusive authority that the principle is binding on all 
states, independently of specific assent. State practice before 1951 is, at 
least, equivocal as to whether in that year, Article 33 of the Convention 
reflected or crystallised a rule of customary international law. State practice 
since then, however, is persuasive evidence of the concretisation of a customary 
rule, even in the absence of any formal judicial pronouncement".(30) 
This belief that Article 33 of the Convention is a rule of customary inter-
national law has been extensively debated by international law authors. 
Historically, Article 33(1) is the result of an international compromise as the 
final text is a substantially weakened version of the originally intended formu-
lation. Whereas the principle of non-refoulement as it was formulated in the 
30. Goodwin-Gill, op.cit., p. 103. 
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draft also applied to the admission of refugees at the border (31) and to extra-
dition, these two words were removed from the text during the discussions. Thus 
the rule of non-refoulement in principle only applies to exf~~ sion, not to 
admission and extradition.(32) But some writers suggest that the rule also 
applies to admission and extradition since it is formulated broadly enough so as 
to encompass also admission and extradition.(33) Wijngaert shares this opinion 
because, she states, "the humanitarian purpose of this rule could be totally 
circumvented if a person who cannot be expelled, according to the principle of 
non-refoulement, would still be liable to extradition. In such cases, extra-
dition would amount to a 0 disguised expcl'~ion°".(34) 
As alluded to above, Goodwin-Gill 0 s belief is that the non-refoulement 
principle has become a customary rule of international law and is thus binding 
upon states which have not ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. He is supported in this contention by some other eminent authors.(35) 
But other authorities in the international law arena do not consider the 
principle has achieved the status of a customary rule of international law.(36) 
Wijngaert for her part suggests that the discussions with regard to this question 
are partly irrelevant because of the lack of enforcement machineries.(37) She 
31. s. Sinha, op.cit., supra. N. l, p. 110; Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., Vol II, 
p. 94, et seq. (1972). 
32. S. Sinha, Ibid.; Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., supra. N. 1. 
33. P. Weiss, "The U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum" (1969) 7 Can. Y.I.L., 
p. 143; M.Ch. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 
(1974), p. 102. 
34. c. Van den Wijngaert, op.cit., p. 75. 
35. M.Ch. Bassiouni, op.cit.; Th. Vogler, Auslieferung und Grundgesetz (1970), 
pp. 215-223. 
36. Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., p. 98; s. Sinha, op.cit., p. 110. 
37. Op.cit., p. 76. 
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considers it to be of more importance to emphasise the humanitarian principle 
which underlies the rule of non-refoulement by pointing out that it would be 
inhuman to return a person to a country where his life or liberty would be 
seriously jeopardised for purely subjective reasons such as race 0 religion. 
nationality or membership of a particular social group.(38) She assumes that 
this was the opinion of the drafters of the Refugee Convention. But she admits 
that from a legal point of viewf the least that one can say is that "states which 
have ratified the Convention are legally bound to comply with the principle of 
non-refoulement". Non-refoulement is limited in two ways by the Refugee Con-
vention. Article l(F) provides that the provisions of the Convention "shall not 
apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for 
considering that (a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to 
make provisions in respect of such crimes; (b) He has committed a serious non-
political crime outside of the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the U.N." 
Article 33(2) is the other provision. The difference between the two 
provisions is that Article l(F) stipulates the conditions for the granting of the 
status of political refugees, whereas Article 33(2) refers to the withdrawal of 
the same status with respect to persons who have already been recognised as 
political refugees. But in applying the two Articles, the same practical 
consequences will occur; the alien can be returned to the state where his life or 
liberty is jeopardised on account of racef religion, nationality or membership of 
a particular social group. A point worthy of notice is that the two provisions 
do not require proof; derogation from the principle of non-refoulement is 
justified as soon as there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person 
38. Ibid., p. 76. 
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concerned has committed one of the facts enumeratedg the p:r.-oof ueed not be 
furnished. The dangers to the individual or group is obvious hereg and as 
Wijngaert statesu the fact that a person is alleged to have committed serious 
crimes ought not to result in the denial of the protection of non-refoulement, 
especially if there is no proof that he has committed the crimes. Even though no 
states today claim any general right to return refugees or bona fide asylum 
seekers to a territory in which they may face persecution or danger to life or 
limb, the attitude of states to the principle is sometimes uncertain. The main 
basis by which states will claim not to be bound by the obligation will normally 
rest on the grounds of threats to national security. As an example of state 
practice in this area one can point to the United States treatment of Cuban 
refugees. In 1980, following the arrival of some 125,000 Cuban asylum seekers 
in the United States, the U.N.H.C.R. was requested by the authorities, inter 
alia, to advise on asylum applications which were likely to be refused on account 
of the applicant 0 s criminal background.(39) The size of the flux made individual 
case by case assessment difficult and it was later decided to accord the 
majority interim status in anticipation of their situation being regularised by 
special legislation.(40) Suspected criminals, however, were examined in a joint 
U.N.H.C.R./State Department exercise. In order to promote consistent decisions, 
the U.N.H.C.R. proposed that, in the absence of any political factors, a 
presumption of the serious crime might be considered as raised by evidence of 
commission of any of the following offences; homicide, rape, child molesting, 
wounding, arson, drugs traffic and armed robbery. (The evidence in question was 
provided by the asylum seekers themselves in interviews with United States 
officials). However, that presumption should be capable of rebuttal by evidence 
39. Evans, "Observations on the Practice of Territorial Asylum in the United 
States" ( 1962) 56 Am. J .I. L. p. 148; 19 I.L.M. 1296. 
40. "Cuban-Haitian Arrivals in United States Current Policy" in No. 193, June 
20 1980. 
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of mitigating factors. The elements were, minority of the offender;parole1 a 
lapse of five years since conviction or completion of sentence~ general good 
character, offender was merely accomplice, other circumstances surrounding 
commission of the offence, such as provocation and self-defence.(41) But 
convicted felons are usually excluded (Fernandez v. Williamson).(42) These 
criteria are potentially of general value in the interpretation of the Convention 
and the Statute, "bearing in mind that the objective of such provisions is to 
obtain a humanitarian balance between a potential threat to the community of 
refuge and the interest of the individual who has a well-founded fear of 
persecution".(43) 
The area where non-refoulement and asylum meet without much dispute is 
usually found when the state is called upon to determine the position of a single 
refugee. Naturally the burden of the state (or more accurately the pressure) to 
grant asylum is not likely to be magnified by media attention, unless the indivi-
dual is a famous person, for example a Russian dissident from the world of music, 
literature or science. However specific problems arise when the refugees are 
large in numbers and continous over a number of years. The reasons for recent 
large-scale population movements are mainly of two types; wars and economic hard-
ship. (Asia and Ugandan Asians of East Africa in particular). The difficulties 
attendant to such cases of mass influx are based not just on the sheer size of 
41. See Goodwin-Gill, op.cit., pp. 62-63. "There was plenty of evidence in 
statements by convicts from different gaols that an incentive to leave 
Cuba had been the threat by officials of a further term of imprisonment. 
Others, particularly former convicts, were threatened with up to four years' 
imprisonment under Cuba's Ley de Peligrosidad, while some were issued with 
passports on simple production of their release certificates at local police 
stations. The greater part of the case load provided few problems, in that 
the commission of serious crimes were clearly indicated". Goodwin-Gill, 
op.cit., p. 63. 
42. Slip Opinion, December 31 1980 (D.C. Kansas). 
43. Goodwin-Gill, op.cit., p. 63. 
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the numbers involvecl 0 bu·t the cross-cultural and potentially serious political 
problems that can arise" Neighbouring states of Africa can often bear no 
similarity in politics or social culture to one another and the problem is 
further complicated where race is in question" (Witness the Ugandan Asians and 
their attempts to enter the United Kingdom in the early 1970°s)c The question of 
large-scale refugee problems highlights the essentially individualistic-
orientated approach of the 1951 Conventiono The dilemma for states is that 0 
while they might be prepared to admit the non-refoulement principle in the 
individual case, where very large numbers of persons are involved 0 to accept an 
obligation not to send them back to their state of nationality 0 can impose 
undesirable financial (Pakistan and the Afghans) 0 security (Thailand and the 
Carnbodians) 0 social (Malaysia and the Chinese Vietnamese) problems; non-
refoulement becomes tantamount to a right of asylum, which states will not 
accepto The fact of mass influx is the wedge which has driven states away from 
accepting the concept of a right of asylurno The Indo-China exodus of the mid-
1970°s is illustrative of the issues involvedo This episode caused new efforts 
to be made to deal with the issueo Some commentators are sceptical of the 
amount of commitment which the various participants have brought to this arena 
in terms of attempting a positive solution to the problemo In his article (44) 
Johnson concentrates on the effect the Vietnamese boat people had on the 
Australian state. Australian commentators of which Johnson is one, suggest that 
the world has not really distanced itself from the European centred approach 
where the individual was the main concerno Australia, in 1979 and 1980 0 urged 
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner 0 s programme 0 to recognise and 
elaborate a concept of "temporary refuge", an intermediate level of protection 
appropriate to large-scale influxeso Australia believed that states were 
44o Do Johnson 0 "Refugees 0 Departees and Illegal Immigrants" (1980) 9 
.Sy.L. Rev. See also, Martino "Large-Scale Migration. of Asylum Seekers" 
(1982) Am. JoioLog Po 598o 
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reluctant to allow large-scale influxes because Lhey felt admission was 
tantamount to a grant of asylum in the strongest sense of the word. Thus 
Australia sought clarification of the receiving states immediate obligations and 
burden sharing at the international level in order to reduce the tensions 
attendant on mass flux. 
However 0 other states felt that temporary refuge would erode present 
practices on asylum and would undermine the principle of non-refoulement, it was 
a "new concept" and states had no need of it. In fact, temporary refuge is not 
a new practice according to various commentators on the subject. Only the 
terminology is different. It is an advantage in that the fact of the presence of 
the refugees permits the possibility of local integration of some or all of them, 
and allows for protection for them, whilst a durable solution is sought. This 
way minimum rights and standards of treatment can be secured. Non-refoulement 
however, is the principle which allows admission and awakens the international 
community to a sense of awareness and attempts to find solutions. Solutions in 
cases of mass exodux will vary but they include repatriation and resettlement 
which require fundamentally different provisions. 
In order to see the effect that the Refugee Convention, the Protocol of 
1967 and the principle of non-refoulement have had on states, one has to turn to 
domestic legislation. A treaty generally creates no enforceable rights for an 
individual. It merely places on the party state the burden of securing domestic 
legislation, compliance of which may involve the enactment of giving rights to 
individuals. To see the change of direction 0 if any, that has occurred one has 
to turn to national approaches.(45) As far as the United Kingdom is concerned 8 
entry and residence within the United Kingdom is governed by the Immigration Act 
1971 and the rules laid down in this legislation. The revised rules which 
45. Gilberto "Asylum; A Change of Direction?" (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q., 633. 
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entered into force on March 1 1980 widened the ambit of the refugee entrdnce 
requirements to bring them into line with the Convention and Protocolo Article 
16 is said to be all-pervasiveo "Where a person is a refugee full account is to 
be taken of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the status 
of refugees" (Cmndo 9171 and Cmndo 3906). Nothing in these rules is to be 
construed as requiring action contrary to the United Kingdom 0 s obligations 
under these instruments"o The provision of the rules which are of most import-
ance to the refugee are said to be Articles 73. 153 and 165a They deal with the 
right to enter the United Kingdom and deportation if he is already residing 
therein a 
Article 73 
"Special considerations arise where the only country to which a person 
could be removed is one to which he is unwilling to go owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race. religion. nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion. Any case in which it appears 
to the immigration officer as a result of a claim or information given by the 
person seeking entry at a port that he might fall within the terms of this 
provision is to be referred to the Home Office for decision regardless of any 
grounds set out in any provision of these rules which may appear to justify 
refusal of leave to entero Leave to enter will not be refused if removal would 
be contrary to the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol relating to the 
status of refugees"o 
Though this provision might on the surface seem very comforting to a 
refugee. the reality of it may (and usually is) otherwisea What constitutes a 
"social group" is of particular interest where United Kingdom law is concerned. 
Gilbert (46) gives the example of a situation where the concept might apply; he 
46. Go Gilbertu Opocito, Po 640. 
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refers to .:1 successful left-wing coup subsequent to which the propertied clo.sse8 
flee. If they did not express political views in their state of origin they 
would not come within the "political opinion" qualification".(47) But Gilbert 
suggests that they could be persecuted because of their membership of a 
particular social group. They would be economic refugees. 
Article 165 
This concerns the refugee who is already in the United Kingdom and these 
rules relate to deportation. Article 165 states that a deportation order will 
not be made against any person if the only country to which one could send such 
a person would persecute him. This is expressed to be in order to keep the 
United Kingdom in line with the Convention and Protocol. It is this provision 
that the Iranian groups facing deportation from the United Kingdom seek to use. 
They supported by and large the propertied or at any rate, pro-Shah. regime in 
Iran. But with the revolutionary takeover by the religious fundamentalists. they 
fear persecution if returned to Iran. The Home Office argument is that if they 
have not been back to Iran since the revolution. how can their fear of 
persecution be well-founded? 
In essence this is an area where the strength of the non-refoulement 
principle can be tested. Even if there is no specific proof that they will be 
persecuted. humanitarian considerations ought to be taken into account (the basis 
of non-refoulement) and the benefit of the doubt given to these people. This is 
particularly so where the Iranians and other such groups have integrated them-
selves into the community successfully. 
IV The United States 
Regarding the United States. the Protocol entered into force on November 1 
47. R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Teja (1971) 2 All E.R. 11 
at p. 22. 
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1968.(40) Thus in 1968 the Protocol becatne pa.:ct of the domestic law of the 
United States. The existing domestic legislation on the question of deportation 
was discretionary and only applied to "deportable aliens"~ these are understood 
to be those aliens already in the United States either legally or illegally. 
"Excludable aliens" were those aliens already in the United States but who had 
been refused entry. i.e •• those refugees from persecution who were permitted to 
stay whilst their cases were considered. These aliens were not allowed the 
protection of the domestic legislation. even though they were within the ambit 
of the Protocol. This conflict needed resolution. 
The Refugee Act 1980 (49) made amendments with the aim of resolving the 
conflict. The Immigration and Naturalisation Act 1952 is considered to be one of 
America 0 s worst laws and the Refugee Act 1980 had the effect of amending its 
provisions as regards refugees. Gilbert suggests that because the 1980 Act was 
passed at approximately the same time as the United Kingdom was issuing its new 
immigration rules. "this almost simultaneous change of approach may well pave the 
way for universal recognition of the right to asylum".(SO) Under section 203(e) 
of the Refugee Act 19800 8 u.s.c •• section 1253(h) of the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Act 1952 is reformed so as to comply with the Protocol. It now 
applies to all refugees who are de facto in the United States. The discretion 
to deport refugees who qualify for admission under the prescribed tests is also 
removed. In the Matter of McMullen (51) the Board of Immigration Appeals held 
that relief under section 1253(h) is mandatory for an eligible alien. unlike 
asylum; (1) The Attorney-General shall not deport or return any to a country if 
48. 19 U.S.T. 6223; T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
49. P.L. 96-212; 94 Stat. 107. 
50. Gilbert. op.cit., p. 642. 
51. 1980 Bd. Imm. App. I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2831; 658 F.2d. 1312 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
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the Attorney-General determines that such alien 1 s life or freedom \vould be 
threatened in such country on account of race 0 religion 0 nationality 0 membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.(52) 
In the United States an individual can qualify as a refugee but as regards 
asylumu this may still be refused on two principle grounds, firstly 0 that the 
alien has been involved in the persecution of others on grounds of race 0 
religion. etc.(53) The individual has acted contrary to the principles of the 
United Nations and cannot avail himself of humanitarian measures. Secondly 0 as 
stated previously. if the Attorney-General considers them to be a danger to the 
security of the United States.(54) However, in a recent case (55) 0 a high burden 
was put on the individual to prove the possibility of persecution. if returned. 
The facts were that the respondent alien in 1977 was ordered to surrender to 
deportation. In 1977 he sought relief under section 243(h) of the Immigration 
and NaturalisationAct 1952 which then authorised the Attorney-General to withhold 
deportation of an alien upon finding that the alien "would be subject to 
persecution" in the country to which he would be deported. The case went to 
several appeals. Meanwhile the United States had acceded to Article 33 of the 
1968 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. and enacted the 
Refugee Act 1980. The respondent thus argued that he no longer had the burden of 
showing "a clear probability that he would suffer persecution", but simply a 
"well-founded fear of persecution"u thus bringing domestic law into line with 
the international standard. But the Supreme Court rejected this assertion and 
stated that the applicant still has to show that he is more likely than not to 
52. 8 u.s.c. section 1253(h)(l). 
53. 8 u.s.c. section 1253(h)(2)(a). 
54. 8 u.s.c. section 1253(h)(2)(d). 
55. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service v. Stevie 104 s. Crt. 2489; 
81 L. Ed. 2d. 321 1 52 U.S.L.W. 4724. 
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suffer persecution on one of the specified grounds. The Retugee Act 1980 did not 
alter this position. The interpretation adopted by the immigration authorities 
prior to 1980 was still to be maintained. 
As a conclusion to this chapter on asylum one notes that Goodwin-Gill 
concludes with the assertion that "the individual has no right to be granted 
asylum". "The state has discretion whether to exercise its right 0 as to whom it 
will favour 0 as to the form and content of the asylum to be granted. To pursue 
an ideal of asylum in the sense of an obligation imposed on states to accord 
lasting solutions, with or without a correlative right of the individual 0 is 
currently a vain task. Asylum remains an institution which operates between 
subjects of international law. In an era of mass exodus, of actual or 
perceived threats to national security 0 states are not prepared to accept an 
obligation without determinable content or dimension".(56) Gilbert reaches a 
different conclusion. He admits that granting asylum is a "delicate balancing 
operation". Who is a refugee and what amounts to persecution will always involve 
a complex of objective and subjective factors. However he continues, "What is 
true is that the interest is vested in the individual as a subject of inter-
national law. Further, the Protocol and domestic legislation based on it ought 
to lead to a situation where if an individual qualifies as a refugee he will be 
given asylum. This is a great advance. Typically 0 in the closely weighted case, 
a lot will depend on what the refugee has to offer and the state of refuge 0 s 
opinion on the state of origin".(57) Perhaps Goodwin-Gill was referring to mass 
exoduses in his conclusions; Gilbert 0 s arguments were expressed in the context 
of individual refugees. It is submitted that the real solution lies in the 
concluding words of Johnson (58), where he argues that countries where refugees 
56. Goodwin-Gill 0 op.cit., p. 121. 
57. Gilbert, op.cit., p •• 650. 
58. Johnson, op.cit. 
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first arrive can only be expected to adhere to the 19~1 Refugee Convention and 
to the 1967 Protocol and to carry out the provisions of these instruments if they 
can be assured that they will not bear the burden aloneo Burden sharing. ioeou 
re-settling of refugees in various countriesi may be the answer albeit an 
idealistic oneo 
Asylum is a state right in international law and states show no inclination 
to depart from this positiono Non-refoulement is an important protection for 
individuals. short of asylum. The only way such a protection can be made 
effective is by national proceedings and sympathetic interpretation of the 
international standard by domestic decision makers. However making non-
refoulement more effective makes it tantamount to a right of asylum in many 
cases which states are not prepared to accept; especially where mass refugees 
are concernedo Therefore there is a movement to burden sharing with states 
other than the state of first refuge accepting some responsibility for refugees. 
But this is an inter-state process. 
Part T\vo Human Rights 
In the domain of hurnan rightsa one finds the most pm·!erful rebuttal to the 
positivist argument that individuals are merely objects of international law and 
not subjects; that they do not have any rights at the internationallevelo The 
focus on human rights as a principle inherent within international law was 
rapidly developed as a direct consequence of the Second World Waro "A new legal 
consciousness has emerged in which the human being has occupied a more central 
position".(1) Although there has always been a recognition of certain standards 
by which human beings ought to be treated, certain acts and forms of activity, 
sparked off the international recognition that there ought to be a universal 
system by which states could be monitored within the international arena as 
regards treatment of individualso 
I Historical Review 
Two factors are said to have completely changed the status of individuals 
under international law after the Second World War.(2) These two factors are 
related to the actions of the Nazis and the attendant cruelty which they 
1. C. Van den Wijngaert 0 op.cit., p. 64. 
See generally, (1) A.H. Robertson 0 Human Rights in the World (1982); A.H. 
Robertson, Human Rights•in Europe (1977); (2) Po Siegart, The International 
Law of Human Rights (1982); (3) C. Van den Wijngaert 0 op.cit., pp. 64-66 and 
p. 89 et seq; (4) I. Brownlie 0 Principles of Public International Law 0 PPo 
552-599; (5) L.Bo Sohn "The New International Law, Protection of the Rights 
of Individuals rather than State" (1982) 32 Am. U.L.Rev.pp. l-65; (6) R" 
Higgins, "Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law" 
(1978) 4 B.J .I .S. pp. 1-19 at p. 11 er seq.; (7) A. Lestero 
"Fundamental R1ghts; the United Kingdom Isolated?" (1984) P.L., pp. 46-
72; (8) A. Drzemczewskiu "The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention 
on Human Rights" (1980) 29 ~~.; (9) P.T. Muchlinski, "The Status of 
the Individual under the European Convention on Human Rights and Con-
temporary International Law" (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q., p. 376; (10) P. Duffy 0 
"Procedural Innovations at the European Court of Human Rights" (1983) P.L. 0 
p. 32. 
2. L.B. Sohnu "The New International Law; Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals rather than States" (1982) 32 Am. U.L.lkv. pp. 1-65. 
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initiated. 'I'he Nuremberg Trials e:u; well as the Tokyo Trials were the first 
factor whilst the second was the determination at international level never to 
let loose again any such mephistophelean evil and the consequential crimes 
against humanity. The attempt by those indicted at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nurembergp on November 14 1946 and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, on February 15 1946 to November 12 1948, to 
argue that they acted on behalf of the state or that they were merely following 
orders of the superiors, were rejected. But the Tribunals pointed out that 
international law was not concerned only with the actions of sovereign states, 
but "imposed duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states".(3) 
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states that one of the purposes of 
the United Nations is "To co-operate in promoting respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all". These provisions considered to be the most 
important where human rights are concerned are contained in Articles 55 and 56. 
Article 55(C) provides that the United Nations shall promote "Universal respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distintion as to race, sex, language, or religion". Article 56 states "All 
members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with 
the organisation of the achievement of purpose set forth in Article 55". The 
Charter was signed in June 1945 and entered into force on October 24 of the same 
year. 
The Economic and Social Council was entrusted with the task of establishing 
a Commission on Human Rights which would prepare an International Bill of Rights. 
The Commission was established in 1946.(4) Two years later the first document 
3. The Nurnberg Trial 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). 
4. E.s.c. Res. (5) 1 U.N. E.s.c.o.R. Supp. (No. 1) at p. 163, U.N. Doc. E/1 
( 1946) 0 
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was ready~ this was tho Universal Declaration of Human Rightso(S) This was 
approved by the General Assembly on December 10 1948 after some amendments with 
48 votes in favour. none against and 8 abstentions (the Soviet Bloc. South Africa 
and Saudi Arabia)o 
When the Commission on Human Rights finished the Universal Declaration. it 
began preparing for the other part of the International Bill of Rights. a 
Convention containing precise obligations that would be binding on the state 
partieso The initial work of the Commission concentrated on civil and political 
rights, but in 1950 after consultation with the General Assembly. it was decided 
that economic. social and cultural rights should be includedo(6) However two 
separate covenants were then decided upon, but with as many similar provisions as 
possible and also with both covenants including an article on "the right of all 
people and nations to self-determination".(?) What caused the most difficulty 
to the Commission were the articles on measures of implementation. rather than 
the narrative provisionso This was because the views of its members were greatly 
divided on the basic question of how far governments could be expected to accept 
a system of international control with respect to their treatment of their own 
nationals. The Commission eventually decided in favour of the establishment of 
a permanent Court of Human Rights to consider complaints of violations of human 
rights on an inter-state basis. But it rejected the possibility of considering 
complaints by non-governmental organisations and petitions by individuals.(8) 
In essence, until 1945 international law considered that the way in which a 
5. Approved December 1 1948 G.A. Res. 217A 0 U.N. Doc. A/810 at Po 56 (1948). 
6. Res. 421(V) December 4 1950. 
7. Res. 543(VI) and 545(VI) February 5 1952. 
8. L.B. Sohn, "A Short History of U.N. Documents on Human Rights"• in The 
United Nations and Human Rights 18th Report of the Commission to study the 
Organisation of Peace. New York 1968 0 pp. 39-186 at pp. 51-52. 
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state treated its own nationals was a gue~;;Lion within its own jurisdiction and 
competence. But this belief has been altering with the passage of time and it is 
now argued that where states have accepted obligations in international law 0 the 
unfettered rule of national sovereignty no longer applies.(9) This view is 
substantiated by the !unis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Case (10). The Advisory 
Opinion given by the Permanent Court was that "whether a matter is or is not 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state is essentially a relative question; 
it depends on the development of international relations. "In a matter which, 
like that of nationality, is not, in principle regulated by international law, 
the right of a state to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by 
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other states. In such cases, 
jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the state is limited by 
rules of international law". 
In 1966, the Third Committee of the General Assembly agreed to the 
establishment of a Human Rights Committee with its members elected by the states 
parties instead of by the International Court of Justice, as had been proposed by 
the Commission. Concerning the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Committee retained the system of reports by contracting parties to the 
Economic and Social Council, on the basis of which the Council may adopt 
recommendations "of a good nature", i.e., not referring to particular situations 
or even particular states".(ll) Where the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
was concerned, the Committee decided in favour of a double system of imple-
mentation, i.e., a compulsory system of reporting to the new Human Rights 
Committee and an optional system of fact-finding and conciliation which would 
9. A. Robertson, Human Rights in the World (1982), p. 31. 
10. (1923) P.C.I.J. Rep. Series B, No. 4. 
11. L.B. Sohn, op.cit., pp. 163-164. Article 21. 
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apply only in relation to states which had expressly agreed to this procedure. 
The Covenants were finally approved unanimously by the General Assembly on 
December 16 1966. They required thirty-five ratifications.(12) The reporting 
procedure is the principal measure of implementation as regards the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. States party to the Covenant submit reports which 
are then examined by the Human Rights Committee. These reports are meant to 
show the extent to which states have complied with their international 
obligations. 
Importantlyq the form and contents of the reports are divided into two 
parts; the first part has to describe the general legal framework within which 
the civil and political rights are protected 0 including information as to 
whether they are protected in the constitution or by a separate Bill of Rights, 
whether the provisions of the Covenant are directly enforceable in internal law, 
and what remedies are available to an individual who thinks his rights have been 
violated. The second part should deal with the legislative, administrative or 
other me~~res in force in regard to each right and include information about 
restrictions or limitations on their exercise.(l3) Paragraph 4 of Article 40 
deals with the powers and procedure of the Committee when it has received the 
report of states parties. The Committee firstly studies the reports; secondly 
draws up its own report "and such general comments as it may consider 
appropriate". These are then transmitted to the states parties. The Committee, 
thirdly, may also transmit these comments to the Economic and Social Council 
together with the reports of the states parties. In the next stage, parties may 
12. January 3 1976 G.A. Res. 2200A 21 U.N. G.A. OR. Supp. (No. 16) at 49 U.N. 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). As regards the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, entered into force March 23 1976 G.A. Res. 2200A 21 U.N. G.A. OR. 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). At the time of writing, 
E.c.o.s.o.c. has 83 ratifications, r.c.c.P.R. has 80 ratifications. 
13. A.Robertson, Human Rights in the World, p. 24 et seq. 
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submit to the Cowmittcc their observations on the latter's co~"ents on their 
reports. By Article 45. the Committee is then required to submit an annual 
report on its activities through E.c.o.s.o.c. to the General Assembly. 
As has been put forward. the main deficiency of these procedures is the fact 
that the Committee can only make general comments. Nor are the states concerned 
required to take any action on the comments made by the Committee on their 
reports. They may submit their observations on any comments that may be made 
but they may ignore them completely. Thus the "compulsory" process under the 
Covenant is an inter-state one with no standing for an aggrieved individual. 
In her article (14) D. Fischer assesses the effectiveness of the reporting 
system as it has evolved in the Committee's first five years. She notes that the 
disparate conceptions of the Committee's role have divided the members on the 
meaning of "its report" and "general comments" right from the start. Some 
members felt that Article 40(4) required the Committee to prepare a report on 
each report submitted by a state party7 thus the reporting function was seen 
simply as a means to an end. since the parties' reports are intended to enable 
the Committee to determine whether states are in fact giving effect to the 
rights recognised in the Covenant. The other view was that the reports referred 
to do not differ from the annual report required under Article 45. Most import-
antly, according to this argument, the Committee is not called upon to make an 
appraisal or to determine whether a given state has fulfilled its obligations. 
The adherents of the first view felt that the Committee could make comments 
on a particular state provided they were general in character, i.e., that they 
did not relate to named individuals. The second opposing view was that the 
"general comments" provision precluded recommendation to particular states. The 
14. D. Fischer, "Reporting under the Covenant 
the First Five Years of the Human Rights 
Po 142o 
on Civil and Political Rights; 
Committee" ( 1982) 76 .llm.J. !.Log 
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arguments pu·t forward in the first view we.r-e lhm;e of the Western European 
members of the Committee whilst the arguments of the Eastern Europeans were 
encompassed in the second view. By the 11th Session (October 1980) a major 
compromise was reached. There was agreement to proceed with the adoption of non-
country-specific comments in exchange for the possibility of further consider-
ation of issuing separate Committee reports om each state report. 
Fisher (15) correctly notes that the compromise reached "amounts to one step 
backward and two steps forward. The Committee is no closer than it was when the 
issue first arose to making specific recommendations on the law and practice of 
the states parties". However Fischer notes that the first efforts of the 
Committee "are not without merit" (16), despite the doubt about the efficacy of 
non-country-specific general comments. She hopes that future general comments 
will be addressed increasingly to the application and content of specific 
articles of the Covenant. The substantive provisions of th~ Covenant are 
designed to set a minimum standard. Although the Committee is divided on the 
interpretation of substantial portions of that standard, on issues not impli-
cating distinctly political freedoms, the division slackens. "Here there appears 
to be, if not agreement, then the faint promise of agreement on the inter-
pretation of some parts of the standard".(17) Ultimately the real test of the 
Committee's reporting system is whether it has effected change in the law and 
practice of the states parties. She concludes by suggesting that the Committee 
should give maximum publicity to undertakings by governments to alter their 
domestic law or practice in response to their obligations under the Covenant. 
"By publicising the positive aspects of compliance with international human 
15. D. Fischer, op.cit., p. 149. 
16. Ibid., p. 150. 
17. Ibid., p. 150. 
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rights norms. the Committee can play an important role in removing the stigma 
that many states continue to feel is attached to any international oversight of 
domestic human rights practices"a(l8) 
Before considering the substantive law in relation to the Covenant and its 
relation to this essay, one needs to look at the regional arrangements concerning 
human rights and their procedural mechanismo 
lo The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The history of the United Nations Covenants illustrates the difficulties of 
negotiating detailed human rights provisions that will be acceptable to the 
governments of states of widely differing cultures, traditions. ideologies and 
stages of economic and social developmento Agreement on such matters is easier 
to achieve amongst governments within the same geographical region and sharing a 
common history and cultural traditiono The European case illustrates this fact 
clearly.(l9) Less than two yems after the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and in fact, inspired by it, the West European Member States of 
the Council of Europe drafted the European Human Rights Convention which they 
signed on November 4 1950 and which entered into force on September 3 1953a(20) 
The growth towards the concept of a European Convention on Human Rights was 
due to the Nazi and Facist regimes (as stated earlier) and their vigorous denial 
of the basic principle of human dignityo The organs of control are (1) a 
Commission (21) and (2) a Court of Human Rightsa(22) But the right of 
18. Ibido, Po 153. 
19. Siegartu op.cit •• p. 26. 
20. EoT.S. Noo 5; UoK. TaSo 70 (1950) Cmnd. 8969. Twenty-one ratifications at 
the time of writing. 
2lo The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 19(1). 
22. Ibid., Article 19(2). 
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individuals to lodge complaints with the Commission was made conditional on the 
express acceptance of this procedure by the state concerned.(23) The possibility 
of bringing a case before the court was also made conditional on the agreement 
of the state concerned to accept the court 0 s jurisdiction.(24) The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe is the final arbiter in cases which are not 
referred to the Court of Human Rights. Under Article 24 any party may refer to 
the Commission an alleged breach of the Convention by any other party. The first 
thing the Commission must do when it considers an application is to decide 
whether it is admissible. Article 26 lays down two rules which apply both to 
inter-state cases and to individual applications. (1) The Commission may deal 
with a case only after domestic remedies have been exhausted; (2) and within a 
period of six months from the date of the final decision at the national level. 
Article 27 which only applies to individual applications, the Commission must 
reject as inadmissible applications which are (1) anonymous; (2) manifestly ill-
founded; (3) those which constitute an abuse of the right of petition and (4) 
those which are incompatible with the provisions of the Convention. The 
Commission is not competent to make a final determination on the merits of an 
application. This is a decision for the Committee of Ministers or the Court but 
the Commission must reject the application as inadmissible if it is "manifestly" 
ill-founded. If the case is admissible under Article 28 the Commission must 
examine the application with a view to ascertaining the facts. This means in 
practice a judicial hearing at which the individual applicant and the respondent 
government are represented by counsel on a completely equal footing. Once the 
Commission has completed its investigation, Article 28(b) of the Convention 
requires it to try to secure a friendly settlement of the matter. If a friendly 
settlement is not achieved. the Commission draws up a detailed report. setting 
23. E.C.H.R., Article 25(1). 
24. E.C.H.R •• Article 48. 
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out the facts and stating its opinion as to whether the facts as found disclose a 
violation of the Convention. The Report is transmitted to the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe~ the Commission can make in its report such 
proposals as it thinks fit.(25) 
As regards the European Court of Human Rights, a case may be referred to it 
only by the Commission or a state party concerned and not by an individual 
applicant (Article 44) and if the defendant state has accepted its jurisdiction" 
This can be done ad hoc for a particular case (Article 48) or by a general 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory, in accordance 
with Article 46. After being set up in January 1959 after eight contracting 
states had made declarations recognising its compulsory jurisdiction, the Court 
adopted its own Rules of Court in September 1959o These rules have been revised 
recently (1983) and will be discussed later ono 
Perhaps at this stage it would be constructive to detail present-day 
procedural practice of the United Nations with regard to human rights" As 
mentioned (26), there exists a Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities" The twenty-six members of the Sub-commission are 
elected by the Commission on Human Rights every three years taking into account 
geographic representation.(27) The Sub-commission considers instances of human 
rights violations in specific countries in three ways" Firstly, by use of the 
procedure established by Economic and Social Council (EoCoOoS.O.C.) Resolution 
1503.(28) Secondly, under the specific agenda item authorised by E.c.o.s.o.c. 
25. E.C.H.R., Article 31. 
26. See Introduction. 
27. The 1984 U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities (1985) Am. J. I.~. pp. 168-180. 
28. E.S.C. Res. 1503 (XLVIII) 48 U.N. E.S.C. OR. Supp. No. 1A at 8 U.N. 
Doc. E/4832/ Add 1 (1970). 
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Resolution 1235.(29) Thirdly, under a general agenda item wl1ere violations in 
a specific country are used to illustrate or highlight a problem covered by the 
agenda item. The Working Group on Communications" established pursuant to 
E.c.o.s.o.c. Resolution 1503 considered hundreds of petitions submitted to the 
United Nations alleging human rights violations in specific countries in the 
August 1984 session. The Working Group, Sub-Commission and Commission consider 
1503 related matters in closed sessions and the only public source of information 
is the statement made by the head of the Commission prior to its public debate. 
By E.c.o.s.o.c. Resolution 1235, the Sub-Commission annually devotes an 
agenda item to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This agenda 
item has evolved to the point where is provides a flexible and public forum for 
publicising human rights violations in specific countries. Though the Soviet 
expert at the 1984 session attempted to halt the procedure of mentioning specific 
countries by Sub-Commission members (30), both Sub-Commission members and non-
governmental organisations (N.G.0. 0 s) detailed instances of violations of human 
rights in specific countries under the agenda item. (N.G.0°s are considered very 
useful in this field. They provide Sub-Commission members with information 
relating to the human rights in specific countries through oral interventions, 
written statements and informal discussions. They also lobby for the adoption of 
specific resolutions). This practice is clearly a positive step by the experts. 
To conceal abuses of human rights behind nebulous or unidentified entities 
defeats the whole purpose of the Sub-Commission. An illustration of the plus 
factor of the practice of mentioning specific countries can be seen by reference 
to the situation in Japanese mental hospitals. The human rights abuse of the 
mentally ill in Japan was expressed by N.G.0. 0 s. The newspaper notoriety that 
29. E.S.C. Res. 1235 (XLII) 42 U.N. E.S.C. OR. Supp. No. 1 at 17 U.N. Doc. 
E/4393 (1967). 
30. U.N. Press Release H.R./1583. 
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resulted caused the Japanese to effect legislation to :t'e<Julate the admission and 
treatment of mental hospital patients within weeks of the exposure. Japan has 
consistently responded swiftly to complaints about domestic human rights 
violations when raised by Western N.G.0. 0 s. For example 0 in 1980 the Inter-
national Human Rights Law Group submitted a 1503 communication concerning the 
Korean minority in Japan. Following the intervention 0 the Law Group was 
assured that steps would be taken to remedy the situation legislatively. It is 
clear that Japan°s way in responding to public exposure is not typical of the 
trend as regards the major offenders. But their approach is symbolic of the 
ideal which all responsible 0 intelligent and concerned groups would like to see 
expressed universally. But for every forward step there is invariably one 
backward. In 1979 the Working Group on Universal Acceptance of Human Rights 
Instruments was established to encourage acceptance of international human 
rights instruments.(31) It had power to call upon governments that had not 
ratified the various human rights instruments to explain their inaction.(32) 
The sad fact is that few governments have bothered to partake in the Working 
Group 0 s sessions. Thus the Sub-Commission asked the Secretary-General to review 
the possibility of offering technical assistance and designating regional 
advisers to facilitate the adoption of human rights instruments by more 
countries.(33) And by appointing a member of the Sub-Commission to prepare a 
Status Report (34) 0 by suspending the Working Group, the Sub-Commission has 
reacted positively to governmental/state lethargy in this area. 
At the August 1984 session the Sub-Commission considered various 
31. E.S.C. Res. 1979/1B (XXXII) U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1979/L. 716. 
32. Weissbrodt 0 "A New U.N. Mechanism for Encouraging the Ratification of 
Human Rights Treaties" (1982) 76 Am.J. I._ L. 0 p. 418. 
33. E.S.C. Res. 1984/36 U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984 CRP 2/Add 2 at 11. 
34. Ibid. 0 at 12. 
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resolutions. The experts from the Uniled Stales and the Soviet Union each 
introduced three resolutions that the Sub-Commission found too controversial to 
consider. These concerned the plights of Andrei Sakharov (35) 0 Raoul Wallen-
berg (36) 0 Jews in the Soviet Union (37) 0 Leonard Peltier (38) and the citizens 
of Northern Ireland (39) and President Reagan°s remarks on the launching of a 
nuclear attack.(40) However the Sub-Commission did not debate the resolutions 
on the grounds that they were "political". By so characterising the resolutions 
as "political" because of the countries named in them makes sure that the 
powerful countries cannot be made the subject of resolutions. 
2. Procedures with Specific Relevance to the Individual 
At the universal level,during the formative stages of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Netherlands proposed a further optional clause intended 
to provide for individual petitions. But this was not successful. The Third 
Committee by a narrow majority of 41 votes for to 39 against 6 with 16 abstentions 
decided that a text permitting individual petitions or communications to the 
Human Rights Committee be incorporated in a separate "Optional Protocol" to the 
Covenant 0 and thus apply to states which, by a separate act, ratify the 
Protocol.(41) The Optional Protocol to the Covenant provides that "Any State 
Party to the Covenant which ratifies the Protocol thereby recognises the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from 
35. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984/L. 13. 
36. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984 L. 12. 
37. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984/L. 42. 
38. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984/L. 28. 
39. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984/L. 31. 
40. U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1984/L. 29. 
41. L.B. Sohn, OJ2oCitoo pp. 164-169. 
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individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by 
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant". As 
Robertson (42) rightly points out the real test of the effectiveness of a system 
of international control for the protection of human rights is to be found in 
the answer to the question whether or not it permits the individual whose rights 
are violated to seek a remedy from the international organa Articles 2 and 3 
make it a rule that all domestic remedies have to be exhausteda Article 4 and 
the final paragraph of Article 5 deal with the procedure of the Committee when 
dealing with individual communications. They must be communicated to the state 
party concerned, which must within six months, submit to the Committee written 
explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that 
may be taken by that statea 
Article 5, paragraph 1 states that the proceedings must be based on all 
written information made available by the individual and the state party 
concerneda Article 5, paragraph 4 states that the Committee shall forward its 
view to the state party concerned and to individualsa The procedure is not 
contentious nor is it a judicial procedure in the sense of leading to a decision 
on the question of violation by the Human Rights Committeeo "Nevertheless, even 
with these limitations, it marks a big advance on any measures of implementation 
previously established by the United Nationso Much will depend on how the Human 
Rights Committee interprets its powers under the Protocol particularly in 
forwarding "its view" to state parties under Article 5(4) and in reporting to the 
General Assembly under Article 6"o(43) 
As regards the protection of human rights in Europe, under Article 24 any 
party may refer to the European Commission of Human Rights an alleged breach of 
42o Ao Robertson, ibido 6 p. 54o 
43o Ibidoq Po 58o 
- 201 -
Lhe Convention by any othEJr party. The competence of the Commission t.o c:onsider 
individual applications entered into force on July 5 1955 when six states had 
recognised the "right of individual petition", i.e., the right of redress 
accorded by Article 25 to "any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contract-
ing Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention". Thus the right of 
individual petition was made optional and applies only in relation to states 
which have expressly declared that they accept it, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 25.(44) Robertson notes (45) "It is the great merit of the 
European Convention on Human Rights that it institutes a procedure which permits 
an individual to complain to the European Commission even against his government. 
This was a remarkable innovation in international law; so much so that govern-
ments refused to accept it". In his article A. Lester (46) refers to the United 
Kingdom position in this area. He states when speaking of the United Kingdom 
participation in the early stages of the drafting of the Conventionu "The matters 
to which they took the greatest objections were the proposed right of individuals 
and others to petition the European Commission of Human Rights in respect of 
alleged violations of the Convention by the United Kingdom and the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases. At [that] stageu the draft 
Convention made acceptance of the proposed right of individual petition mandatory 
rather than optional".(47) The initial argument by the United Kingdom was 
founded on the belief that such a system of appeal to an international authority 
would be politically unsettling in many colonial territories where the people 
44. There have been seventeen Declarations regarding Article 25 at the time of 
writing. 
45. Op.cit., p. 87. 
46. A. Lesteru "Fundamental Rights; The United Kingdom Isolated?" (1984) P.L., 
pp. 46-72. 
47. Ibid., p. 50. 
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were considered "politically immature"o These people needed to luok up to "[a] 
single undivided authority as responsible for their affairs"o This right of 
petition to an international body might have the effect suggesting to the 
colonial people that the Crown was not their ultimate authority or that they 
have a choice as to which authority to pay allegiance too The fear was that 
political extremists might try to undermine the Crown in the colonieso(48) 
The issue is that as far as human rights is concerned the Convention has the 
objective of attempting to protect the rights of individual citizenso If his 
rights are violated this will in most cases be done by the authorities of his own 
stateo Classic international law states that the individual has no locus standi 
on the theory that his rights will be championed by his governmento But the 
essence is. how can the individual 0 s government be his champion when it is in all 
truth the offender? The argument that another state will take up the violation 
on his behalf against his government is not realistic (though possible)o There 
are not many foreign offices that will jeopardise good relations with a useful 
(military or economic) ally for the sake of rectifying mistreatment of the 
latter 0 s citizeno To be able to collate sufficient information might also cause 
difficultieso The danger of another state interfering raises the risk of an 
inter-state dispute. something few states would willingly risko 
The individual applicant has no locus standi before the European Court of 
Human Rightso A case may be referred to it only by the Commission or a state 
party concerned and not by an individual applicanto(49) The Rules of Court 
adopted in September 1959 have been revised and the most recent full-scale 
revision entered into force on January 1 1983 in relation to cases referred to it 
48o Memorandum circulated by the Colonial Secretary Jim Griffiths CoPo (50) 179 
CAB 129/41 34611o See Ao Lester. "Fundamental Rights; The United Kingdom 
Isolated?" (1984) PoL 01 Po 50o 
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after that datco(SO) These RulcG arc said to have considerably improved the 
position of the individual in getting a case to the Courto(51) The case law 
prior to the Revised Rules provided some hope however for the individualo In the 
first case to come before the Court. Lawless Vo Ireland (52) 0 the Court 
recognised that the interests of justice required that the Commission 0 as the 
defender of the public interest. be able to inform the Court of the applicant 0 s 
views on the issues being arguedo Maloney notes that Article 6(1) of the 
Convention guarantees the individual a "fair hearing" and hence "equality of 
arms" before the domestic courts in civil and criminal matters; this was lacking 
in proceedings at the European Courto The Court. for want of a genuine hearing 
of both sides in contention, sometimes had difficulty in gaining a full picture 
of the issues at stakeo Therefore the unequal treatment given to the individual 
who has allegedly suffered a breach was not easily reconcilable with the 
principles of fair procedure to be found in the substantive provisions of the 
Convention and some authors (53) say that it was not very useful in the practice 
of proper administration of justiceo With this in mind, the 1983 reforms were 
introducedo The revised Rules of Court provide for the establishment of direct 
relations between the Court and the applicant and for separate representation of 
the applicant once a case has been referred to the Court by a contracting state 
or the Commission in accordance with Article 48 of the Conventiono However, in 
view of the wording of Articles 44 and 48 of the Convention, the denial to the 
applicant of any entitlement to decide whether or not his case is to be brought 
before the Court remains unaffectedo As regards direct relations. paragraphs 1 
and 2 of New Rule 33 provide that on receipt of an application (from a 
50o Rule 67 (final clause)o 
SL Po Maloney, "Developments in the Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights; The Revised Rules of Court" 3 Yo Eo L o Y p o 127 o 
52o April 7 1961 Series A Noo 2 0 24o 
53o Po Maloney, Opocito 8 Po 131o 
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contracting state) or request (from tho Commission) originating proceedings, the 
Registrar is obliged to transmit a copy of the originating document and of the 
Commission°s report not only to the judges and 0 as the case may be 0 the 
Commission and "any contracting party mentioned in Article 48 Convention"o but 
also to "the person. non-governmental organisation or group of individuals who 
lodged the complaint with the Commission under Article 25 Convention". 
But importantly 0 as regards the representation of the applicant, New Rule 30 
requires legal representation whilst making provision for exceptions. Rule 30 
provides 0 (1) The applicant shall be represented by an advocate authorised to 
practise in any of the contracting states and resident in the territory of one of 
them 0 or any other person approved by the President. The President may 0 however 0 
give leave to the applicant to present his own case 0 subject if need be, to his 
being assisted by an advocate or other person aforesaid. Gradually over the 
years the role of the applicant 0 s lawyer has become increasingly independent of 
the Commission's control. (54) The position has much progressed since 
Lawless.(55) In the important case of The Sunday Times (56) 0 the applicants 
were allowed to lodge a lengthy independent memorial and their lawyer, Anthony 
Lester Q.C., addressed the Court fully on the issues before it. Previously 0 
before the New Rules 0 the applicant 0 s lawyer has technically only been before the 
Court as assisting the Commission's delegates. Duffy (57) notes that "the 
recognition of an independent role for the applicant puts an end to this sub-
tefuge and clarifies the situation". The other major innovation is contained in 
Rule 37(2) 0 "The President may in the interests of the proper administration of 
54. P. Duffy 8 "Procedural Innovations at the European Court of Human Rights" 
(1983) P.L.o p. 32. 
55. Op.cit. 
56. April 26 1979 Series A No. 30 App. No. 6538/74. 
57. P.Duffy, op.cit., p. 33. 
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justice, invite or grant leave to any contracting state which is not a party to 
the proceedings to submit written comments within a time limit and on issues 
which he shall specifyo He may also extend such an invitation to grant such 
leave to any person other than the applicant"o Prior to this New Rule there had 
been only two occasions on which the Court had accepted representations from 
parties other than the Commission and the states actually involved in the 
particular case before ito In Winterwerp Vo Netherlands (58), the United King-
dom government asked to be heard at the oral hearings under the former Article 
38 paragraph 1 on a point of construction regarding Article 5 paragraph 4 of the 
Conventiono Pending before the Commission were a number of applications from the 
United Kingdom in which this particular point of construction described as being 
"of major importance for the government" was in issueo The President of the 
Chamber did not accede to the United Kingdom 0 s request but at the hearing the 
delegates of the Commission were given leave to submit a written statement from 
the United Kingdom government on the interpretation of Article 5 paragraph 4o 
The second occasion was in the case of Young, James and Webster Vo United 
Kingdom (59), the so-called "closed shop" caseo The Court decided following a 
request by the Trades Union Congress, to hear a representative of the Congress, 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, under Old Rule 38 paragraph 1 "on certain questions 
of fact (including English law and practice) and for the purpose of informationo 
In addition, during the hearings the delegates of the Commission filed a document 
entitled "Memorial (submissions of fact and law) of the Trades Union Congress"o 
One of the applicant 0 s lawyers, who was "assisting" the delegates, protested 
vigorously at the developments, speaking of "an attempt to abuse the process of 
this Court, because in truth what is being sought is that the Trades Union 
5Bo October 24 1979 (Merits) Series A Noo 33 and November 27 1981 (Arto 50) 
Series A Noo 47o 
59o Judgment of August 13 1981, Series A Noo 44, parao Bo 
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Congress is seeking to intervene in these proceedings as a pd.r::-ty". The Cour·L 
subsequently decided that it would take into account the "Memorial" as regards 
any factual information but not any arguments of law 0 which it contained.(60) 
The position was completely clarified in the revised Rule 37(2). Thus 
overall there have been improvements of the individual 0 s position vis-a-vis the 
European Court of Human Rights. He is still denied full locus standi 0 but 
nonetheless these gentle inroads are to be welcomed. In the conclusion to this 
work 0 discussion will be made of the comments by other authors on this topic. 
3. Other Regional Arrangements for Human Rights 
I The American Convention on Human Rights 
The March 1945 Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held 
in Mexico considered the possibility of setting up an Inter-American system in 
the post-war world. At the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in September 1947 
and this still forms the basic instrument of collective security of the Inter-
American system. At Bogota in 1948 a whole review of the Inter-American system 
was made and reorganised. The Charter of Bogota adopted on this occasion 
furnished the new constitutional instrument that was required and thereby 
established the Organisation of American States (O.A.S.) The Charter proclaimed 
expressly in its first article that the O.A.S. is a regional agency within the 
United Nations and highlighted that the basic aim was to strengthen peace and 
security, to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes, to provide for common 
action in the event of aggression and to promote economic 0 social and cultural 
development. At Bogota in 1948 the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man was adopted on May 2 1948. It contained ten articles setting out duties 
60. Judgment 13 August 1981 0 para. 10. 
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of individuals and twenty-eight articles proclaiming his rightso In Santiago in 
1959 a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs adopted a "Conclusion" which 
charged the Inter-American Council of Jurists to prepare a draft Convention on 
Human Rights and a draft Convention on the creation of an Inter-American Court 
for the Protection of Human Rightsc It also resolved to create an Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights of seven members elected as individuals by the Council 
of the OaAoSo from panels of three candidates presented by governmentso At a 
specialised conference on Human Rights held on San Jose 0 Costa Rice from November 
7 to 22 1969 0 the American Convention on Human Rights, also known as "The Pact 
of San Jose" 0 was drafted and signed on November 22 1969o It entered into force 
on July 18 1978 when eleven ratifications had been achievedo 
Article 1 states that the aim of the Convention "is to ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise" of their rights and 
freedoms recognised thereino Article 2 provides that contracting parties will 
adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary in cases where the rights and 
freedoms are not already ensured in their domestic lawo Twenty-six rights and 
freedoms are protected by the Convention and twenty-one are found also in the 
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rightso Of significance to this 
thesis 0 Article 2 relates to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; Article 
5, the right to a fair trial; Article 12, freedom of movement; Article 4 relates 
to the right to liberty and security and three rights and freedoms not found in 
the United Nations Covenant, namely Article 23, freedom from exile; Article 24 0 
prohibition of the collective explusion of aliens and Article 26, the right of 
asylum a 
Robertson (61) considers that two of the most important rights guaranteed 
in the United Nations Covenant and in the two regional Conventions (American and 
6lo Robertson 0 Human Rights in the World (1982) 0 Po 138o 
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European) are the right to liberty and security. including freedom from arbitrary 
arrest. and the right to a fair trial. 
Control ~·1cch.J.niGm 
The American Convention on Human Rights provides for two organs of control~ 
a Commission and a Court. 
(a) The Inter-American Commission 
The number of members is seven and it represents all the member countries of 
the O.A.S. ( Article 35). The members sit in a personal capacity which is 
important as this protects their independence (and in this day and age South 
America needs politically independent representatives in such organisations). 
Articles 44 to 47 give the Commission competence to consider petitions from 
individuals, groups of individuals or non-governmental organisations alleging 
violation of the Convention by states parties (Article 44). This is in common 
with Article 25 of the European Convention. But in contrast to Article 25, 
acceptance of this competence is not optional but obligatory. "This difference 
represents probably the most important advance enshrined in the American 
Convention".(62) Article 45 concerns inter-state complaints. The procedure is 
optional. not obligatory. A declaration accepting this competence of the 
Commission may be made at any time and can be made for a limited or unlimited 
period of time. 
This contrasts with the European Convention. Acceptance of the right of 
individual petition is automatic after ratification. whereas the procedure for 
inter-state complaints is optional. This is considered to be a "major advance" 
in establishing an effective system of international control 0 once it is 
recognised that a compulsory system of inter-state complaints would be 
politically dangerous in the Latin-American context. 
62. Robertson 0 op.cit. 0 p. 146. 
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The first task of the Commission is to establish the facts 0 once it has 
declared a case admissible. It may make an investigation and in order to do 
this 0 the states concerned must furnish all the necessary facilities (Article 48 
(1)(d)). The Commission then has to try and bring about a friendly settlement. 
This procedure is governed by Article 48(1)(f) and Article 49. If no friendly 
settlement is achieved 0 the Commission is required to draw up a report setting 
out the facts and stating its conclusions. 
II The Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights 
The League of Arab States was created on March 22 1945 with the signature 
of seven Arab states. These states were Egypt 0 Iraqu Jordan 0 Lebanon 0 Saudi 
Arabia 0 Syria and Yemen. In December 1968 0 the Council of the League initiated 
an Arab regional conference on Human Rights in Beirut. A Permanent Arab 
Commission on Human Rights was set up. Despite the fact that not much infor-
mation is available on the actual results of the Permanent Commission on Human 
Rights of the Arab League 0 in 1979 a Union of Arab Lawyers attempted to conclude 
an Arab Convention on Human Rights intended to guarantee fundamental rights 
within an Islamic context. The establishment of a non-governmental Permanent 
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Arab 
homeland with power to accept complaints from individuals was also proposed. 
This proposal merits attention. Coming from a part of the world which has laws 
fundamentally opposed to human rights 0 such a proposal for individual complaints 
would constitute a significant politico-religious reappraisal. 
IIIThe African Charter on Human and Peoples 0 Rights 
This is the most recent of the regional human rights treaties. It was 
adopted at a meeting of heads of state and government of the Organisation of 
African Unity in Nairobi 0 Kenya on June 26 1981. It has not yet entered into 
force. The treaty will come into force three months after a simple majority 
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(currently twenty-six) of the Organisation of African Unity member states has 
ratified ito(63)o 
IV What Value Regionalism in Human Rightsz 
The essential point to note is that regional systems may not only allow 
states to have more confidence in the standards 0 but in the supervision 
processes 0 even so far as allowing some individual participationN whereas at the 
universal level 0 doctrinal differences prevent this even though there has been 
progress on the applicable standards" 
By Resolution 6 (XXIII) the United Nations Commission decided to set up an 
ad hoc study group to consider the setting of regional Commissions on Human 
Rights in the parts of the world where they did not already exist. Those 
against the idea included the East Europeans who felt that these entities would 
interfere with issues which came within the domestic jurisdiction of states; and 
this would be contrary to the principle of national sovereignty and would 
violate Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
In opposition to this is the claim that the states have assumed inter-
national obligations to promote and respect human rights by ratifying the Charter 
of the United Nations and becoming party to her Covenants, and so the question 
of human rights is no longer simply a matter of national sovereignty. 
The most powerful argument for establishing a regional system on human 
rights is that which recognises the great divergence between peoples and their 
political, economic and social way of life 0 in different parts of the globe. It 
would be an oddity that human rights should claim to be about individual rights 0 
yet impose a central Human Rights Commission in one part of the world 0 ignoring 
63. Article 63(3)o 
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the particular divergences of different individual cultuLeS around the worldo 
Recognition of individual rights is both microcosmic (the individual person) and 
macrocosmic (the individual state)o As long as these regional systems protect 
the rights established in the Universal Declarationu they need not be expected to 
conform to one central systemo 
In arguing for the establishment of regional Commissions. one has to accept 
that states will be more willing to identify with a system which comprises 
neighbouring friendly states, a system which is run by states composed of people 
with similar cultures will obviously be more prepared to become energetically 
involved in the question of human rights. more so than if they were part of a 
large multinational systemo Secondly. from the practical point of view of 
distance and expense. a regional system makes more sense. It would help matters 
if states or individuals from remote corners of the globe did not have long 
distances to travel at great expense to present a case before a central court 
such as Strasbourg. Therefore. in taking into consideration the above points. 
regional Commissions are a positive way of ensuring complete international 
support for the promotion and respect for human rights. 
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Part Four 
lo The Substantive Law under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rii[~ts and the European Convention on Human Rights 
In this section of the essay, one will look at the case law in so far as it 
touches upon this thesis and attempt to analyse those provisions which provide 
some protection to the individual against the three principal areas of interest 
in this studyo First, what, if any, protection there is (1) against irregular 
extradition in terms of (a) preventing it or (b) remedying it; (2) the possible 
protection against extradition/deportation for some political offences; (3) The 
protection provided against extradition/deportation in other circumstanceso 
The rights enshrined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which are 
important to this study are found in Part II and include Articles 7, 12 and 13o 
Article 7 provides that, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmento In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation"o 
Article 12 provides that, "(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a 
state shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence; (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country 
including his own; (3) The above rights shall not be subject to any restrictions 
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national 
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the present 
Covenant; (4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived from the right to enter his 
own countryo 
Article 13 provides that, "An alien lawfully in the territory of a state 
party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a 
decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling 
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reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons 
against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for 
the purpose before 0 the competent authority or a person or persons especially 
designated by the competent authority"o 
Ao The International Covenant on Civil and P olt tica1 Rip:hts 
The cases under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Optional Protocol provide useful guidelines as to the level of abuse 
necessary before an individual can successfully invoke the protection of the 
Human Rights Committee. In Maroufidou v. Sweden (1) the case concerned the 
expulsion of a presumed terrorist who sought to invoke the article concerning 
freedom of aliens from arbitary expulsion.(2) The author was a Greek citizen 
who came to Sweden in 1975 to seek asylum. In 1976 she was granted a residence 
permit. On April 4 1977 she was arrested in Stockholm on suspicion of having 
supported a terrorist plan to abduct a former member of the Swedish government. 
On May 5 the Swedish government decided to expel her, concluding that there was 
"reason" to assume that she belonged to or worked for a terrorist organisation 
or group, as provided for in Articles 20 to 29 of the Aliens Act. The 
applicant's claim was that the Swedish authorities wrongfully considered her to 
come within the scope of Articles 20 to 29 of the Aliens Acto Thus the decision 
to expel her was not taken in accordance with Swedish law and was therefore in 
violation of Article 13 of the Covenanto 
The Committee considered that the essential question was whether the 
expulsion was "in accordance with the law". Article 13 requires compliance with 
both the substantive and the procedural requirements of the domestic law of the 
L (6189/73) C.D. 46, 214 Decision April 9 1981, H.R.J. 9 1981 9 
p. 143 0 
2. Article 13. 
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state party concerned. Maroufidou claimed that the decision to expel her was 
based on an incorrect interpretation of the Swedish Aliens Act. But the 
Committee took the view that the interpretation of domestic law is essentially a 
matter for the authorities of the state party concerned. It is not within the 
powers or functions of the Committee to evaluate whether the competent 
authorities of the state party in question have interpreted the domestic law 
correctly in the present case before it under the Optional Protocol, unless it is 
established that they have not interpreted and applied it in good faith or that 
it is evident that there has been an abuse of power. The adoption of this 
position by the Human Rights Committee, though procedurally correct, would seem 
to highlight a deficiency which augurs ill for the individual applicant. In 
effect it suggests that it is for the individual to establish that the state has 
not interpreted and applied the domestic law in good faith. And this imposes a 
severe burden upon the individual applicant, for the state will inevitably have 
at its disposal machinery with which to counteract any potentially damaging 
assertions by the individual. The procedural inability of the Committee to 
evaluate whether the competent authorities of the state party have interpreted 
the domestic law correctly is a throw back to the old views that the manner in 
which a nation interprets its domestic laws are not the concern of the inter-
national legal order, even where such interpretation constitutes a violation of 
an individual 0 s rights. 
In the Celiberti case (3), Celiberti was a Uruguayan citizen by birth but 
had Italian nationality. She had been an active member of a resistance movement 
in Uruguay and in this connection she had been arrested for "security" reasons, 
and subsequently released several times. In 1978 when travelling to Porto 
Allegro in Brazil, she was arrested in Brazil by Uruguyan agents with the 
3. Communication No. R. 13/56 H.R.L.J. Vol 2 No. 1-2, p. 145. 
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connivance of Brazilian officers and kept in detention. The authorities 
announced that Celiberti and her companions had tried to cross the border 
security with subversive material from November 1978 to March 1979. Celiberti 
was held incommunicado and detained in a military camp. She was permitted no 
visits by relatives. In March 1979 she was charged with "subversive assoc-
iation, violation of the constitution by conspiracy and preparatory acts there-
to". She was ordered to be tried by a military court and kept in preventive 
custody. She claimed breach of Articles 9, 10 and 14. Article 9(1), right to 
liberty and security, because the act of abduction into Uruguyan territory 
constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention. Article 10(1), right of detained 
persons to be treated with humanity; she alleged she was kept incommunicado for 
four months. Article 14, right to a fair trial; she had no counsel of her own. 
Also Article 14(3)(e) because she was not tried without undue delay. 
The Human Rights Committee observed that although arrest and initial 
detention allegedly took place on foreign territory, the Committee was not barred 
either by virtue of the Optional Protocol Article 1, "individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction" or by virtue of Article 2(1) Covenant, "individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction", from considering these allegations, 
together with the subsequent abduction into Uruguyan territory, in as much as 
these acts were perpetrated by Uruguyan agents acting on foreign soil. The 
Committee stated that the reference to Article 1 Optional Protocol does not 
affect the above conclusion because the reference in that Article is not to the 
place where the violation occurred, but to the relationship between the individ-
ual and the state in relation to a violation of any rights set forth in the 
Covenant, wherever they occur. Article 2(1) does not imply that the state party 
concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant 
committed by its agents in the territory of another state, whether with the 
acquiescence of the government of that state or in opposition to it. Article 
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5(1) Covenant states "Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as 
implying for any state group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognised therein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided 
for in the present Covenant". Thus, it would be unconscionable to interpret the 
responsibility under Article 2 of the Covenant so as to permit a state party to 
perpetrate actions on the territory of another state, which if committed in its 
own territories would amount to violations of the Covenant. The Committee acting 
under Article 5(4) Optional Protocol to the Covenant took the view that the 
facts as found by the Committee disclosed violations of the Covenant and in 
particular Articles 9, 10 and 14. 
In the Lopes Burgos case (4), the author was a political refugee of 
Uruguayan nationality. Her communication was submitted on behalf of her husband 
a worker and trade union leader in Uruguay, who had been subject to various forms 
of harassment because of his trade union activities. On July 13 1976 her 
husband had been kidnapped in Buenos Aires by members of the Uruguayan security 
and intelligence forces. On July 26 1976 Burgos was illegally and clandestinely 
transported to Uruguay where he was detained incommunicado by special security 
forces at a secret prison for three months. During this detention he was 
continually subjected to physical and mental torture and other cruel and 
degrading treatment. Allegations of breach of Articles 7, 9, 12 and 14 were 
submitted. The Uruguyan government attempted to argue that they acted under 
provisions in Uruguyan law which dictate prompt security measures in certain 
instances. But without submission of fact or law to back up this assertion and 
because of the brutal acts committed against Burgos, the Committee did not accept 
that there were any circumstances present which permitted such a deviation from 
the provisions of the Covenant. Violations of the Articles were found by the 
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Conunlttee. The Committee recornmended that Uruguay release Burgos immediately and 
compensation be made for the violations he had suffered. 
In the Quinteros case ( 5); the fnr.ts r.P.nt.rP.c:l nronnc:l an abduction from the 
Venezuelan Embassy of a Uruguayan subject. The daughter of the communicite was 
arrested at her home in Montevideo on June 24 1976 and taken to a spot near the 
Venezuelan Embassy. The girl 0 Elena Quinteros. succeeded in getting into the 
Embassy grounds. The Uruguayan military personnel accompanying her then entered 
the diplomatic mission and assaulted the secretary of the Embassy before dragging 
Quinteros off the premises. Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with 
Uruguay. Her detention was never officially admitted. Her mother stated that 
there were no domestic remedies that could be invoked and/or exhausted because 
her arrest has always been denied by the Uruguayan authorities and the remedy of 
habeas corpus is only applicable in the case of detained persons. Violations of 
Articles 7 0 9 0 10 and 14 were claimed. The Committee decided that in cases where 
the author has submitted to the Committee allegations supported by substantial 
witness testimony, as in this case 0 and where further clarification of the case 
depends on information exclusively in the hands of the state party, the Committee 
may consider such allegations as substantiated in the absence of satisfactory 
evidence and explanations to the contrary submitted by the state party. On this 
basis the Committee accepted the testimony 0 amongst others, of the matter of the 
abducted girl and the Venezuelan Embassy staff 0 noting the break of diplomatic 
relations between the states. Thus violations of Articles 7 0 9, 10 and 14 were 
found and Uruguay was asked to rectify the position. 
What the Committee is attempting to do in these cases is to set forth 
minimum human rights standards in the way a state deals with its individuals. in 
5. Decision of July 21 1983. Communicastion No. R. 24/107 (1983) 
H oR • L o J o 9 p. 196 o 
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this instance. where abduction is concerned (see Chapter 3 Part I)J however where 
an alien is expelled by correct procedures as laid down in the state 9 s domestic 
law 0 the Committee will not regard itself competent to intervene 0 unless there is 
a clear abuse of power or the government has acted in bad faith.(6) The 
difference is important because it differentiates between the kind of treatment 
involved. Where the proper procedure has been followed prior to e~pulsion 0 the 
individual will have exercised his individual rights to the full 0 in judicial 
proceedings where he may have successfully invoked certain safeguards. But 
where arbitrary ex~U}sion or abduction is concerned 0 the individual has no rights 
to invoke 0 since judicial proceedings will not have preceded his removal from the 
state. The standard of treatment accorded the individual will of necessity be 
that much lower. 
B. The Substantive Law under the European Convention on Human Rights 
Even though no human rights rule has been formulated which explicitly and 
directly relates to extradition 0 the influence of human rights rules on extra-
dition is strongly felt. In the European arena 0 the Council of Europe 
illustrates this point. Even though the European Convention on Human Rights does 
not contain special provision regarding the right of asylum or the right not to 
be extradited 0 the Commission has often applied general human rights provisions 
to extradition.(?) The relevant provision in this respect is Article 3 which 
prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.(8) The claim 
by the applicant in this respect is that his or her extradition (or other 
removal) would expose them to treatment in the destination state which would 
violate Article 3 if carried out by a state party to the Convention. 
6. Siegart, op.cit., p. 185. 
7. C. Van den Wijngaert 0 op.cit. 0 p. 90. 
8. Note the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/46 Convention against Torture 
of December 10 1984 (not in force). 
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'l'he interpretation of Article 3 will form the basis of s Ludy in this section 
of the worko and the case law will be analysed with this factor in mindo Some 
reference will be made to Article 2(1) which states thatv "Everyone 0 s right to 
life shall be protected by lawa No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided"a The Committee has 
been extended by several Protocol some of which are relevant to the theme of the 
studya The Fourth Protocol entered into force on May 2 1968a Article 2 of the 
Fourth Protocol states 0 "(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a state 
shall 0 within that territory 0 have the right to liberty of movement and freedom 
to choose his residence1 (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country 0 
including his own; (3) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety 0 for 
the maintenance of public order 0 prevention of crime 0 health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (4) The rights set forth in 
paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas 0 to restrictions imposed in 
accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic 
society" a 
Article 3 of Protocol Noa 4 states that 0 "(1) No one shall be expelled by 
means of either an individual or of a collective measure from the territory of 
the state of which he is a national; (2) No one shall be deprived of the right to 
enter the territory of the state of which he is a national"a 
Article 4 states that 0 "The collective exp1usion of aliens is prohibited"a 
Protocol Noa 7 (9) 
Article 1 states thatv "(1) An alien lawfully resident in the territory of 
9o November 22 1984 EaToSo Noa 117o 
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a state shall not be expelled therefrom except in punmance of a decision reached 
in accordance with law and shall be allowed (a) to submit reasons against his 
expulsion 0 (b) to have his case reviewed and (c) to be represented for these 
purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that 
authority 0 (2) An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under 
paragraph l(a) (b) and (c) of this Article. when such expulsion is necessary in 
the interests of public order or is granted on reasons of national security". 
Before discussing the case law on Article 3 0 some discussion of the terms 
contained in the Article are necessary. As regards the jurisprudence of Article 
3, there have been attempts to define what the words contained in the article 
mean.(10) Torture is considered as containing two main elements. (a) severe 
inhuman treatment; (b) and a particular purpose 0 such as the obtaining of 
information or confessions (11) 0 (Ireland v. United Kingdom)o(12) It is 
considered both physical and non-physical, thus mental suffering is included. 
but the suffering must be of such a serious nature before torture can be 
established (the Greek Case).(13) Inhuman treatment is said to concern 
treatment which in certain situations is unjustifiable and has to be 
distinguished from roughness of detainees by both police and military 
authorities. Inhuman treatment is not suffered where a person is detained for 
a few days in uncomfortable circumstances. Degrading treatment is considered 
to be "any treatment whose severity tended to lower the victim in rank 6 position 6 
reputation or character whether in his own eyes or in the eyes of other people" 
10. P. Duffy, "Article 3 of The European Convention on Human Rights" (1983) 
IoCoLoQog PPo 316-345o 
llo Ibidog PPo 316-318o 
12o (5310/71) Report January 25 1976; 19 1\LEcCcHoRo ~ 
13o (3321-3/67; 3344/67) Report 6 12 YoEoCoHcRo 
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(East African Asians voUnited Kingdom (14) and Tyrer Vo United 
Kingdom ( 15) o 
The Commission has ::;LctLeu that the right of asylum u.nd the freedom f~om 
exPUl~ion are not included amongst the rights and freedoms mentioned in the 
Conventiono However the Commission recognises that it can amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment to send an individual to a country where he will be killed or 
enslavedo This is so 0 despite the fact that the early cases suggest an answer in 
the negativeo In X Vo Austria and Yugoslavia (16) 0 the applicant was a 
Yugoslav citizen in custody in Austria at the time of his applicationo In 1962 0 
a Yugoslav court sentenced him to nine years imprisonment for embezzling several 
million dinars from the company of which he was the regional manager in Yugo-
slaviao X escaped to Austria in November 1962o He claimed asylum 0 but the 
Austrian Ministry of the Interior never took any final decision in the mattero 
The Yugoslav government then demanded his extraditiono 
The applicant 0 s complaint was directed against his conviction in Yugoslavia 0 
which he alleged was preceded by "acts of brutality and violence" and repeated 
violation of the rights of defenceo He maintained that his case was in fact a 
political one; those who had really committed the acts of embezzlement were 
members of the Communist Party but they had been protected at the expense of an 
innocent personu ioeo, the applicant who was a practising Catholic opposed to the 
Tito regimeo 
The applicant also complained that the Austrian authorities despite all his 
efforts had ignored the political motives behind the request they had received 
14o Application Noo 4403/70 3 EoH.R.Rou Po 76. 
15o Communication 5856/72 Judgment of April 25 1978 Series 26 2 E.HoRoR., p. 1. 
16. Application No. 2143/64 7 Y.~.C.H.R., Do 314o 
- 222 -
from Yugoslavia. He claimed that if extradited he would be su:Ujected to "very 
severe and inhuman reprisals" and urged the Commission to intervene without 
delay to prevent his extradition. But after a review of the evidence the 
Commission took the view that the disputed extradition did not constitute 
"inhuman or degrading treatment" vvithin the meaning of Article 3 of the Con-
vention. There was evidence presented which suggested that the applicant was 
really attempting to evade serving his criminal sentence. In X v. Federal 
Republic of Germany (17) 0 the applicant was an Algerian citizen having served 
in the French army until 1958; then he became a member of the Front de Liberation 
Nationale. Having moved to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963 0 he was 
expelled to France in 1964. Back in Algeria he took part in an attempted Putsch 
against the regime. He was there 0 he alleges 0 detained and sentenced to death 0 
but he finally succeeded in escaping. Back in the Federal Republic of Germany 
he was refused political asylum. In October 1973 he was put in detention pending 
his expuJsion to France. He then lodged his application with the Commission. 
After negotiations between the German and the French authorities 0 the latter 
stated in August 1974 that they were prepared to admit the applicant into France. 
The German authorities indicated that, at the time of the applicant 0 s 
deportation, they would send a note to the French authorities 0 asserting that 
they assume the applicant will not be extradited to the Algerian government. The 
applicant 0 s fear was of being handed over to the Algerian authorities. The 
object of his application was to prevent his explusion to a country where 0 
according to him 0 he risked subjection to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention. The applicant equally objected to his transfer to France, and 
asserted that the French authorities would immediately proceed to expel him to 
Algeria. However 0 the Commission took the view that a direct exp~Jsion to 
Algeria was out of the question. The French Home Secretary in 1974 had expressed 
17. Application No. 6315/73 1 D. & R., p. 74. 
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his agreement to the re-admission to France of the applicant. Also 0 no request 
for the extradition of the applicant had been made by the Algerian authorities. 
The Commission then dealt with the allegation that the French might expel the 
applicant to Algeria after his deportation to France and that this would amount 
to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention for which the Federal Republic of 
Germany might be held responsible. The Commission concluded that in the 
particular circumstances of the present case 0 the government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany could not be held responsible within the frame of their 
obligations under the Convention 0 of a possible decision affecting the applicant 
taken at a later stage by the French government. 
The immediate effect of this judgment is to deny the individual applicant 
any possible safeguard against a change in policy on the part of the French 
government. If such an event did occur 0 the individual could look nowhere for 
protection. By absolving the Federal Republic of Germany from any blame in such 
an event 0 the individual would find himself unable to seek protection from any 
state.(18) More recently 0 in Becker v. Denmark (19) 0 the applicant was a 
West German journalist and director of a body called Project Children°s Protect 
and Security International. His application concerned an alleged violation of 
the Convention by the Danish government in the envisaged repatriation of one 
hundred Vietnamese children who had been billeted on Livo in Denmark. The 
applicant alleged that if the children were sent back to Vietnam9 there was a 
serious danger that they would be killed or physically persecuted because of 
their race, language and ethnic characteristics 0 since they belonged to an ethnic 
group called the Montagnard in Vietnam. Their repatriation would therefore be 
contrary to Article 3. He also alleged that repatriation contravened the 
18. Note also 9 Application No. 6357/73 ! v. Federal Republic of Germany 1 
Do & Roo Po 77. 
19. 4 D. & R. o p •• 215a 19 Y. ~ .C.H.R.p. 416. 
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prohibition of collective expulsion of alienG laid down in Article 4 Protocol 4 
of the Conventiono The government of Denmark countered that the present case 
differed essentially from the cases of expulsion and extradition which had 
previously been brought before the Commission in that here 0 the repatriation was 
being planned in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the relevant Red Cross societiesa The UaNoHaCoRo would not be 
party to anything that would jeopardise the safety of the refugeeso Also 0 the 
applicant had to submit proof of the existence of "exceptional circumstances" and 
"social reasons" to believe that an alien will be subjected to treatment 
prohibited under Article 3o And the applicant was unable to do thiso In 
essence 0 the test is for the applicant to show that there is a likelihood of 
these refugees being ill-treateda The Commission were satisfied that the Danish 
government had taken all precautionso It had issued instructions that individual 
cases ought to be looked at in determining who should be granted residence 
permits and those to be repatriatedo In other words 0 there was no question of 
mass expulsiono This is in keeping with the 1951 Convention relating to the 
status of refugees which is framed in a manner that requires an essentially 
individualistic approach in deciding refugee problemso The Danish government had 
also accepted a special responsibility for them after their return to South 
Vietnam and the Danish Red Cross would continue their representation once the 
children were in Vietnam. The application was therefore considered manifestly 
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Conventiono The actions 
and efforts of the Danish government were certainly exemplary in this connection 
and the Commission were justified in the decision they reachedo 
In Lynas Vo Switzerland (20) Lynas was arrested in Geneva on suspicion 
of forgery committed in 1963o A request was made by the United States for his 
extradition. He was accused of having attempted to introduce cocaine into the 
20o 6 Do & Ro 141 NOo 7317/75. 
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United States. He denied the charges and was extradited to the United States in 
December 1975. The applicant explained that he had engaged in activities which 
were successful to enable the Repuhl"i r. of r.h.:i l_e to obt~in £oriegn currency o Thi::: 
so frustrated the efforts of the United States to deprive Chile of monetary 
resources that the C.I.A. took steps to get rid of him, thus there was an 
unsuccessful attempt to murder him in September 1971. The narcotics charge was 
therefore a fabrication to get him to the United States where he was convinced 
he would be killed by the C.I.A. As proof he produced an individual who admitted 
being in on an abortive murder attempt in 1971. The Swiss authorities neverthe-
less extradited Lynas to the United States. In his application to the 
Conwission. after being returned to the United States. the applicant relied on 
the right to life.(21) In fact no attempt had been made on his life since his 
arrival in America. and the Swiss government put forward the view that Lynas had 
not been able to bring certain proof of the existence of a real threat to his 
life. This test of certainty may be too high for the individual to satisfy and 
especially on the facts of this particular case. The Commission accepted this 
argument put forward by the Swiss government. They took the view that by extra-
diting him to the United States, the Swiss authorities had not exposed him to the 
dangers he alleged. Thus Articles 2 and 3 had not been violated. 
One analysis that can be made of this case is the fact that the Swiss 
authorities were willing to accept the assurances from the United States 
authorities that Lynas would suffer no ill-treatment once returned to the United 
States. Thus once the two states accept guarantees given the individual has no 
further say in the matter. States rights and interests clearly override 
individual rights at this point. Lynas 0 real fear was that the C.I.A. would 
eliminate him once returned to the United States. Therefore any protections 
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accorded him would have to be prior to his removalo There were none 0 once the 
Swiss authorities decided to extradite himo 
The Co~mission has decided allegations thQt the deportation or extradition 
order in itself can amount to treatment contrary to Article 3o(22) In the case 
of Agee Vo United Kingdo~ ( 23) the applicant \vas an American citizen resident 
in the United Kingdomo He was employed for twelve years as an agent for the 
CoioAo but he resigned in 1969 due to growing disillusionmento He stated that he 
was never engaged in activities involving United States or United Kingdom 
intelligence collaboration and that he had no knowledge of United Kngdom 
intelligence services. He published a book describing the work of the CoioAa 
in South Americau but insisted he had never divulged information bearing upon 
the United Kingdom or other Western European democracieso In 1976 a deportation 
order was made against him "in the interests of national security"o Agee 
submitted that the act of deportation might amount to degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3 as being arbitraryg unjustified or disproportionate 
punishmento He also alleged potential violation of his right to liberty and 
security or person under Article 5o(24) 
The Commission however did not agree that the applicant would suffer Article 
3 violationo Deportation of an alien on grounds of state security cannot be 
looked at as a penalty in normal circumstances 8 and the applicant could not show 
that the authorities were intent on punishing him rather than trying to protect 
national securityo Thus Article 3 was not violatedo As regards Article 5 0 the 
N.D.I. Vola 2;99o PPo 112-120o 
23o Application Noo 7729/76 7 Do & Roo Po 164o 
24o Article 5(1) 0 "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of persona 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with the procedure described by law, 
Article 5(1)(f) 0 "The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his 
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extraditiono 
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Commission stated that the protection of "security" of person guaranteed by 
Article 5 is concerned with arbitrary interference by a public authority with an 
individual 0 s personal "liberty"o Accordingly any decision taken with the sphere 
of Article 5 must. in order to safeguard the individual 0 s right to "security of 
person" conform to the procedural and substantive requirements laid down by an 
already existing lawo They noted that the decision to deport Agee was taken 
under the provisions of the Immigration Act 197lo And there was no indication 
that the requirements of the Act had not been complied witho Also. Agee had 
been allowed to decide which country he wished to be deported too 
Overall the Commission noted that Article 5(1)(f) and Articles 3 and 4 of 
Protocol 4 "clearly implied" that the states parties intended to reserve for 
themselves the power to deport aliens from their territory"o(25) This case can 
be contrasted with Lynaso Lynas feared specific reprisals by the CaioAo on 
return to the United Stateso Whereas Agee merely considered the deportation 
disproportionate punishment for the facts of the caseo There was no specific 
fear that the CoioAo would attempt to get at him or ill-treat him in any way 
(although such fear would probably have been a motivating factor in his decision 
to challenge the deportation order)o Also Agee was considered a national 
security risk and this presumably put him in a different categorye For him to 
prove that he did not pose a security threat to the nation would have been 
practically impossibleo It is essentially for the state to decide who does and 
who does not pose a security risko 
Although liability to criminal prosecution will not usually bring Article 3 
into play0 it may do so if political factors are present or if the punishment is 
likely to be extremeo The most notorious case in this context is Amekrane v. 
United Kingdom (1973)o(26) The case concerned a Lieutenant-Colonel Amekrane 0 
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an officer in the Moroccan airforceo He had been involved i11 au a:Lteznpt to 
assassinate the King of Moroccoo The attempt was unsuccessful and he had flown 
to Gibraltar in search of political asylumo This was refused by the British 
authorities in Gibraltaro Before his expul:::'_ on to Morocco 0 the authorities 
obtained a promise from the Moroccans that Amekrane would be treated correctly 
and tried before a military tribunal in accordance with the constitutiono In 
the event he was condemned to death and executedo In addition to alleging that 
the expulsion foreseeably led to Amekrane 0 s execution for a political offence 
his widow complained of the conditions of detention prior to expulsion 0 the 
failure of the authorities to inform Amekrane of the administrative proceedings 
and that Amekrane 0 s expulsion as an undesirable alien in fact constituted 
disguised extraditiono The breach of Article 3 was the inhuman treatment 
constituted by the fact that a political refugee applying for asylum in a 
democratic state 0 was handed over without having been heard by a court and in 
deliberate disregard of his individual rights to a country in which he was 
condemned to deatho The case resulted in a friendly settlement whereby the 
United Kingdom without admitting any violation of Article 3 0 agreed to pay 
£31o000 to Amekrane 0 s widowo A friendly settlement 0 as noted already 0 is not a 
conclusive finding on the merits of the allegations of the applicanto Mrso 
Amekrane 0 s application was declared admissible and points the way to arguments 
which might involve a breach of the Conventiono 
The British authorities needed to keep on good terms with the Moroccan 
government in order to safeguard its interests in Gibraltaro Whatever knowledge 
they had of the likelihood of inhuman treatment towards Amekrane 0 was 
subordinated to the extent that Amekrane 0 s individual rights were ignored 
completelyo It is here that the individual is most vulnerable because the rights 
26o (1973) 16 Y."R,C.H.R.~ po 357o 
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under Article 3 which he is said to possess seem to be ineffectual at a time 
when they need to be most effectiveo Siegart (27) comments of the caseu that by 
operating Article 3 extra-territoriallyu the Commission could create a right of 
asylum or at least a right to non-refoulemento In Altun Vo Fed~~~~-Re~ublic 
of Germany (28) the applicantu a Turku had founded a political organisation at 
schoolo This organisation was banned in 1979; whilst at university he joined 
various political organisationso In 1980 proceedings were begun against him 
because of his being a founder member of the Association of Revolutionary 
Secondary School Pupilso He left Turkey and went to West Berlino In 1982 his 
extradition was requestedo He was wanted for inciting the assassination of the 
Customs Minister in May 1980o A second extradition request was based exclusively 
on hiding criminals and interference with evidenceo The Turkish authorities 
stated that none of the offences carried the death penaltyo The applicant 
contended that the extradition was merely a pretext to ensure his return to 
Turkey for political reasonso The Commission accepted this as a legitimate 
consideration and its deliberations reflected this viewo They noted evidence 
that showed he had engaged in political activity in Turkey inspired by a 
political ideology which was not that of the government1 and that the applicant 
was being sought for an offence which occurred ina political contexto The 
Commission noted a disparity between the first arrest warrant in which the 
applicant was accused of inciting an assassination attempt and the latter warrant 
which only mentioned crimes of harbouring offenders and of hiding evidenceu on 
which the extradition was basedo The Commission therefore concluded that it was 
not possible to dismiss with sufficient certainty the danger of some manipulation 
of the criminal proceedings in Turkeyo The applicant 0 s allegation that torture 
was widely used was not disputed by the Turkish authoritieso Thus because the 
27o Siegart 0 opocitor Po 190o 
28o 5 EoHoRoRo 611o 
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Turkish gove.rnment could not indicate satisfactorily what safeguards it had 
taken or would take to ensure a just trial 0 given the applicant 0 s militant 
political past 0 it was not a manifestly ill-founded application under Article 
27(2)o 
The Commission had special knowledge of the situation in Turkey because of 
the Denmark Vo Turkey caseo(29) The case took a twist however.(30) On 
June 16 1983 the applicant submitted a note informing the Commission that West 
Germany Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees had granted the 
applicant political asylumo Thus the applicant proposed a friendly settlement 
if inter alia, the West German government cancelled its decision granting extra-
ditiono On August 30 1983 0 the applicant committed suicide. although proceedings 
relating to his request for asylum were still pending and further discussions 
between the Federal Ministry of Justice and the applicant 0 s lawyer concerning 
extradition were still in progressa The request by Altun°s brother to continue 
the proceedings on his brother 9 s behalf were not permitted by the Commissiono 
The Commission found however that the decision to extradite had lapsed and that 
the grounds relied on by the applicant 0 s brother to pursue the application in 
his own name had no direct relation to the subject of the applicationo In fact 0 
because the Commission was able to examine the same questions raised by Altun 
in the other case Denmark Vo Turkey above 0 there was no reason to proceed 
with Altun°s caseo On December 6 1983 the Commission declared admissible 
France 0 Norway, Denmark, Swedene the Netherlands v. Turkey (31), relating 
to the allegation that during the period September 12 1980 to July 1 1982 0 there 
was an administrative practice of torture or ill-treatment of prisoners in 
Turkey a 
29o 6 EoHoRoRo 241 Application NOo 9940-9944/82o 
30o 7 EoHoRoRo 154o 
3lo 6 EoHoRoRo 241o 
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In Kirkwood v. United Kingdom (32) 0 Kirkwood was alleged to have 
committed multiple murder and attempted murder in California. He was arrested on 
arrival at Heathrow airport 0 London and charged the next day on a warrant issued 
by a magistrate at Bow Street Magistrates° Court for his extradition to the 
United States. On December 30 1982 the United States government made a formal 
request for the applicant 0 s return to the United States. On July 12 1983 the 
applicant submitted a petition to the Secretary of State that he should not be 
ordered to be surrendered to the United States. On February 6 1984 the Secretary 
of State signed the warrant for the applicant 0 s surrender to the United States 
authorities and removal from the United Kingdom. An application by the 
applicant for a stay on his surrender and for leave to challenge the Secretary of 
State 0 s decision by way of judicial review as one which no reasonable authority 
would make was ultimately refused.(33) The law relating to extradition between 
the United Kingdom and the United States is governed by the Extradition Acts 
1870 to 1935 and the Treaty signed between the two states on June 8 1972. 
Article IV of the Treaty provides that 0 "If the offence for which extradition is 
requested is punishable by death under the relevant law of the requesting party, 
but the relevant law of the requested party does not provide for the death 
penalty in a similar case. extradition may be refused unless the requesting 
party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested party that the death 
penalty will not be carried out". This discretion is vested in the Secretary of 
State by section 11 of the Extradition Act 1870 and comes into play after the 
fugitive has exhausted his legal remedies at committal or by way of habeas 
corpus. On July 1 1983, the Secretary of State informed the applicant that he 
had received from the United States government assurances that in the event of a 
conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. the Deputy Attorney-General 
32. Application No. 10479/83. 
33. (1984) 2 All E.R.o pp. 390-395. 
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of California would ensure that a representation be made on behalf of the United 
Kingdom expressing the United Kingdom wish that the death penalty not be carried 
outo The applicant 0 s submission was that 0 bearing in mind the probability of the 
imposition of the death penalty in the event of his return to the United States 0 
after trial and conviction 0 and taking into account the automatic appeal 
procedure operated in California and the consequent delay in the implementation 
of any such death penalty 0 his extradition would constitute inhuman and degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Conventiono The applicant 0s complaint 
centres upon the inevitable psychological tension and uncertainty which will be 
generated during the appeal procedure from a decision imposing the death penalty 
on himo He contended that the length of such proceedings and the vital nature 
of their outcome will create circumstances which amount to inhuman and degrading 
treatmento The United Kingdom respondent government claimed before the 
Commission that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of 
the Convention firstly because the allegations which the applicant sought to 
rely on were expectations of certain events occurring in the futureo Therefore 9 
because the allegations were derived from assumptions rather than fact, they 
were too remote and uncertaino Secondly 9 where the alleged violation is 
ultimately based upon anticipated events taking place in a non-contracting state 9 
the Commission lacks competence ratione loci to determine the applicationo The 
government argued that the "contributory act" in returning an offender is of no 
significance in Convention terms, unless it is related to the conditions which 
obtain in the receiving non-contracting stateo And it was not possible that 
either the applicant 9 the contracting state involved or the Commission or Court 
would independently have comprehensive access to all relevant information such as 
would enable a reliable and objective measure to be made (Altun Vo Federal 
Republic of Germany where the Commission had specific knowledge of the practice 
of torture in Turkey)o The Commission noted the existence of complex and 
detailed measures to accelerate the appeal system in capital cases in 
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California. These were reflected in the priority assigned to capital cases in 
the District Attorney 0 s office 0 where counsel responsible for a capital case on 
appeal are relieved of all other responsibilities to be able to concentrate 
exclusively on the preparation of that appeal. The Commission also noted the 
backlog of cases which were making the death row phenomenon worse. However the 
Commission stated that its task was not to assess "as a mathematical probability" 
the likelihood of the applicant being exposed to the treatment about which he 
complains 0 but to examine the machinery of justice to which he will be subjected 
and to establish whether there are any aggravating factors which might suggest 
arbitrariness or unreasonableness in its operation. On this basis the Commission 
found 0 due to the material submitted before it 0 that capital cases were dealt 
with with particular vigilance to ensure their compliance with the standards of 
protection afforded by the Californian and United States constitutions in order 
to prevent arbitrariness. Thus the essential purpose of the California appeal 
system was seen as ensuring protection for the right to life and to prevent 
arbitrariness. Despite the delays 0 these delays were subjected to the 
controlling jurisdiction of the courts. And 0 because the applicant had not been 
tried or convicted 0 his risk of exposure to the death row phenomenon was 
uncertain. Thus there was no violation of Article 3 of ther Convention 0 and the 
application was manifestly ill-founded. 
Various points arise from the cases of Amekrane 0 Altun and Kirkwood. 
The distinction between the first two cases and Kirkwood is that the former 
cases were coloured by the political background of·their offences and their 
subsequent request for extradition. Kirkwood committed purely criminal offences 
(although he alleged he had been engaged in "violent political activity" in 
California). In Kirkwood 0 Article IV Treaty highlights once again that extra-
dition is very often not concerned with the rights of the individual. Once the 
Secretary of State had obtained assurances from the United States (a "friendly 
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ally?") the subjective complctints of the applicant based on tactsu were not 
powerful enough to challenge the government assuranceso The Treaty requirements 
had been complied with and this was sufficiento Regarding removal 0 one notes 
the reluctance of the United Kingdom to accept international responsibility for 
treatment which may be meted by another stateo This raises the question of 
suspensory remedies. It is not sufficient to given an individual a remedy 
against being removed to a state where he might be ill-treated if he has 
already been removed thereo (Noteu same argument in Lynas v. Switzerland). 
The requested state is unlikely to give him back. This applied in Amekrane 
alsou where the British authorities sought assurances from the Moroccan author-
ities that he would be treated and tried according to their legal rules. In the 
event he was executed. The United Kingdom were unable to (and would not have 
wanted to) interfere once Amekrane had been handed over. 
One important fact borne out by Kirkwood is the question of the relation-
ship between Article 3 and the principle of non-refoulement. Article 3 is wider 
in that no "discrimination" need be involved in the mistreatment but it is 
narrower (probably) because firstly the standard of mistreatment is higher and 
secondlyu the burden on the applicant is stricter. Another point is that 
Kirkwood shows that for refugees non-refoulement is valuable as a right for 
individuals only if there is some forum for its exercise. Under the Refugee 
Convention that can only be in domestic law (though it need not be a judicial 
remedy - merely an effective one) and that there are circumstances where 
effective guarantees must include suspensory remedies. 
Article l(F)(b) of the Refugee Convention limits non-refoulement where the 
individual has committed serious non-political crimes outside the country of 
refuge. Kirkwood was allegedly guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder. 
Thus even from the point of view of looking at the non-refoulement principle 
from a humanitarian aspect 0 Kirkwood is not likely to benefit. By contrastv 
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&~ekranc and Altun may have had strong claims to invocatiuu of the 
humanitarian principle which underlies the non-refoulement principle because 
their crimes and the subsequent request for extradition had a definite political 
colouringa such that it was clearly inhuman to return them to Morocco and Turkey 
where their lives would be seriously jeopardised 0 due to their political 
opinions. Thus they are both within the requirements of the Refugee Convention 
section 33(1) and they may also avail themselves of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. They do not fall within Article 1(F) which limits 
the non-refoulement principlea nor do they come within Article 33(2) where non-
refoulement cannot be invoked if the individual is a danger to the security of 
the country in which refuge is sought. It is difficult to establish the real 
extent of the non-refoulement rule. In the final analysis 0 because the Refugee 
Convention does not prohibit the extradition of political refugees 0 their 
protection is left totally to domestic law. In most statesg judicial 
authorities cannot apply the principle of non-refoulement when deciding about 
the extraditability of political refugees 0 since extradition laws usually do not 
provide for an explicit exception in this respect and since the application of 
the Refugee Convention usually falls beyond the scope of their competition. 
2.The Protection of the Individual in other Articles of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 
However 0 in other areas of the Convention 0 the law has developed for the 
benefit of the individual. After the passing of the 1968 Immigration Act 
certain East African Asians sought entry to the United Kingdom. They were 
British passport holders who were fleeing the anti-Asian policies of the Ugandan 
government. Some had family members who were resident in Britain. They were not 
allowed admission on the basis that their passports did not afford them an 
automatic right of entry and they would thus have to take their place in the 
immigration queue. This process would take years to sort out. 
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ll.rticle 3 of the Fourth Protocol states thatr ''No one shdll be depriveu of 
the right to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national"o But 
the United Kingdom has not ratified this Protocol.(34)o The Asians took their 
case to the Commission and nevertheless argued that their treatment under the 
Immigration Act 1968 amounted to a breach of the Fourth Protocol Article 3 and 
also amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3. Some applicants argued 
breach of Article 8 which concerns the right to respect for onegs private and 
family life0 and onegs home. The United Kingdom claimed 0 successfully0 that the 
Convention did not guarantee to everyone 0 including passport holders 0 a right of 
entry or residence. But the Commission went on to say that discrimination based 
on race could by itself amount to degrading treatment of the person 0 which is 
prohibited under Article 3a(35) "Thus a government 0 operating in an area which 
it believes substantively to be beyond the reach of the Convention 0 can find 
itself caught up via the more generalised provisions relating to the standard 
of treatment of individuals that the Convention requires"a(36) 
In conclusion 0 one notes that there are very strict requirements which need 
to be satisfied before the individual can avail himself of the protection of 
Article 3o Thus the individual cannot look to Article 3 for ready protectiono 
Only treatment of a high degree of severity will suffice before the applicant can 
successfully invoke the Articleo Because of the seriousness of finding a 
violation of Article 3 0 the Court has insisted on proof "beyond reasonable 
doubt"o Thus any theoretical protections the individual has under the 
34o Not at the time of writing anywayo 
35o East African Case 4403/70; 36 Collected Decision 927 13 
Y.B.C.H.R.~ p. 928. 
36a Ro Higgins 0 "Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law" 
(1978) B.J .I .S. Po 1 at Po 13o Note however 0 The Indian 
Residents Case No. 5301/71y X and Y Vo United Kingdom 44 Collected 
Decision 29 where the applicant East Asians were not successfulo 
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Convention do not in practice amount to very much" 
At at both the universal and regional (European) level 0 it is difficult 
to say that an individual actually hac a right to rely on the Articles in the 
European Convention or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
and the Optional Protocol 0 to the extent that he could be said to possess rights 
international law for the protection of his individual life and libertyo 
It is therefore clear that positive attempts at international level to keep 
the human rights issue at the forefront of state activity which directly affects 
the individual 0 is the only way to make sure that continuing abuse or disregard 
of these rights are exposedo 
CONCLUSION 
The exa1nination of extradition leads one to conclude that many international 
legal rules remain inter-state rules 0 and even if the individual is disadvantaged 
by their breach 0 he has no rights at the international levelo Any rights he has 
are purely matters of domestic lawo Not only is the individual dependent on 
domestic remedies but the state may change the rules to his disadvantage as 
arguably the courts have done with the interpretation of the political offence 
as illustrated in the case law referred to in Chapter Three 0 and Parliament has 
done with its abolition for certain offences by the enactment of the Suppression 
of Terrorism Act 1978. Therefore one can say that the individual finds 
protection only if his rights are interfered witho And the inevitable question 
to ask is does he have any at international level? It is argued that refugees 
have a right of non-refoulement which would impose a limit on the state 0 s power 
to limit the political offence exception. 
But this right is limitedo Firstly0 it is not a right of asylurn0 which 
remains 0 and for good reasons - mass exoduses - a state righto Secondly 0 the 
remedies for the individual at international law for breach of non-refoulement 
are essentially a matter of domestic law. It is clear that improvement in the 
provision of remedies for individuals at the international level is necessaryo 
Human rights offer some hope in this respect. With respect to Europe 0 Articles 
2 0 3 and 5 (1) enshrine important principles 0 as do the Fourth Protocol and 
Article 1 of the Seventh Protocol. At the universal level 0 Article 13 of the 
1. Article 2 0 the right to life• Article 3 0 freedom from torture and from 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment1 Article 5 0 the right to 
liberty and security of the person. 
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iuternational Covenant on Civil and Political Xights is the key Article for the 
purposes of this studyo Whilst the Human Rights Committee has allowed individ-
uals success at invoking Article 13 where proven violations have occurred 0 within 
the European context 0 our case study illustrates how difficult it is for the 
individual to succeed in invoking Article 3o And from this point of view 
importance has to be attached to the inter-action between international standards 
and the domestic legal systemo 
Whether the courts concerned are in fact able to take account of their 
state 0 s obligations under international human rights treaties will depend on 
whether these obligations are incorporated in the state 0 s domestic law8 either by 
national enactment or through self-execution 8 ioeo 0 without need for specific 
legislationo Some states provide by their constitutions that certain provisions 
of international law shall be self-executingo The Constitution of the United 
States 0 for example 0 includes international treaties which bind the United States 
among the sources of lawa(2) Other countries go further by not only making 
international law self-executing0 but assigning to it a rank in the domestic 
hierarchy superior to all prior and subsequent legislationo Examples of this 
include France (3) and the Federal Republic of Germanyo(4) But the United King-
dom does not accept any international law as self-executing where the obligations 
under international human rights treaties are not incorporated into the state 0 s 
domestic law8 the courts will be confined to the interpretation 8 application and 
enforcement of the provsions about human rights to be found in the state 0 s own 
domestic legal system0 either in its constitution or in its ordinary lawso These 
provisions sometimes follow the language of one or more of the international 
instrumentso 
2o Article VI 0 section 2o 
3o 1958 Constitution 0 Article 55o 
4o Basic Law of May 8 1949 as amended on January 1 19660 Article 25o 
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As such therefore 0 whether any violation by a particular state a human right 
protected by one of the international instruments is capable of redress by 
domestic legal proceedings will therefore depend on whether 0 firstly 0 that right 
is protected by the domestic law of the state 0 independently or through 
incorporation of an appropriate provision of international lawo Secondly 0 
whether the domestic legal system affords a procedure for such redress and 
thirdly 0 whether the preconditions for that procedure are satisfiedo 
If there is no domestic remedy available, redress through an international 
procedure will depend on whether firstly 0 the state is a party to a treaty which 
protects that righto Secondlyv that the treaty provides an appropriate procedure 
before an international institutiono Thirdlyv that the state has accepted the 
competence of that institution for that purpose 0 where the treaty requires this 
and fourthly 0 that the preconditions for that procedure are otherwise satisfiedo 
Thus 0 the fundamental point with regard to the inter-action between inter-
national standards and the domestic legal system can be summed up in two wayso 
Firstly0 it is of paramount importance that the state arranges its domestic laws 
in line with the international standards when their inconsistency is exposedo 
Secondly 0 the state ought to comply with its international obligations and 
standards and put its domestic law in ordero By so doing 0 the need for the 
individual to seek international determination of any violations would be 
eliminatedo 
This leads on to the important question of how to improve the power of the 
individual to make a claim against (his own) state at an international court -
in the European context 0 at the European Court of Human Rightso Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht hoped that the individual would ultimately be able to seek legal 
remedies before an international court of law and he suggests an amendment to 
Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which would 
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confeL· UJ:.IUH Lhe iw.l.i viuua.l the Ci:lpaci ty to initiate proceedings. 'l'he New Revised 
Rules of Court referring to the European Court of Human Rights 0 which came into 
force on January 1 1983 are an illustration of the sort of progress needed to 
bring the individual up to the standard whereby he can claim to be a full subject 
in international law. Although there is still a long way to go 0 Rule 30(1) has 
the effect of improving the applicant 0 s independent status before the court.(S) 
Muchlinski in his article (6) states that this shows that the traditional rules 
of international law will be modified where it is necessary to accommodate 
change. But he goes on to say that as far as Western Europe is concerned 0 
regional developments cannot support a fundamental change in the rules of inter-
national law without evidence of their acceptance as general custom. "It is 
clear that the granting of procedural capacity is not such a custom".(?) 
Brownlie (8) for his part argues that there are many political and practical 
factors that inhibit the granting of full international personality to the 
individual. He suggests that on the political level there are not many 
governments who will admit that the individual has any international legal 
standing. And on a more practical basis 0 the problem of representation and costs 
would raise difficult problems. 
In his book 0 Drzemczewski (9) considers the whole human rights issue as one 
concerned with effectiveness. After a survey of twenty-one legal systems 0 the 
author concludes that the Convention°s reception and application in national law 
5. P.T. Muchlinski 8 "The Status of the Individual under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Contemporary Law" (April 1985) 34 I.C.L& Part 2t 
Po 376a 
6. Ibid. 
7. P.T. Muchlinski 0 Ibid. 0 p. 379. 
8. I. Brownlie 8 Principles of Public International Law (3rd ed.) 8 p. 592. 
9. Improving the Protection of Human Rights, A Comparative Study" (1983) Oxford 
University Press. 
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could profit from a ;;harmonious" and "uniform" interpretation uf its substantive 
provisions in cases of doubt 0 by the institution of a preliminary ruling 
procedure to the European Court of Human Rightso He suggests that this would 
remove the delay currently experienced by applicants to Strasbourgo It would 
also have another effect~ the domestic court would become the primary agent for 
the enforcement of the Convention applying not its version of "Convention law" 
but an "official" version provided on request by the European Court of Human 
Rights thus avoiding conflicts of interpretation between national courtso 
LoBo Sohn (10) 0 whose article has already been mentioned and discussed 0 
believed that the statement by some international la\<T commentators that human 
rights law is "soft law" or "normes sauvages" rather than "hard law" is not 
correcto He refers to the various declarations and conventions on human rights 
and believes that the United Nations Charter forms the apex to the pyramid of 
documents referring to human rightso He believes that the Declaration is an 
authoritative listing of human rights which has become a basic component of 
international customary law building on all states 0 not only on members of the 
United Nationso He recognises the difficulty of persuading governments which 
are in group8 the international law-makers 0 to agree upon the enforcement against 
themselves where they have violated international lawo "It is not the law that 
is soft 0 but the governments".(11) He studies the guarantees in the Covenant on 
Ci~il and Political Rights and he rightly points out that the Covenant was 
designed to help states improve their domestic laws and institutions so that 
human rights would be protected throughout the worldo Even if the Covenant 
relies on domestic remedies. it "also recornises the new international status of 
individuals" and gives them access to an international committee 0 against those 
10. LoBo Sohn 0 "The New International Law; Protection of the Rights of Individ-
uals rather than States" (1982) 32 Am. UaLaRC\[o pp. 1-64o 
lla LoBo Sohnu Ibidoo Po 13a 
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states that have accepted the Optional Protocolo His assertion is that since 
almost half the members of the world community have 0 by becoming parties to the 
Covenant 0 accepted the new international rule that individuals are not mere 
objects of the provisions of the Covenanto They have safeguards enshrined in the 
Covenant which they can invoke when they suffer violation by the stateo His 
assertions are in many respects revolutionary when viewed from present day state 
policy and international practiceo But there has to be acknowledgement of the 
fact that the individual ought to possess enforceable rights in international 
law0 in the positive senseo As John Stuart Mill stated0 "The worth of a state 0 
in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it 00 o 
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